Defenders have 100% knowledge of their verification coverage. They can put a SMT solver in their continuous integration pipeline and flag all code not verified for removal.
Restraint in only shipping verified code is the silver bullet. > On Jan 18, 2017, at 9:27 PM, Tony Arcieri <basc...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> On Wed, Jan 18, 2017 at 2:12 PM, Taylor Hornby <tay...@defuse.ca> wrote: >> Less ambitiously, we can ask if complexity theory has anything to say >> about simpler aspects of life. One of them is the attacker-defender arms >> race in computer security. [...] Most of us are optimistic for >> "silver bullet" discoveries that make doing computer security a LOT >> easier [...] I'm curious if part (1) of my thesis really is accurate. > > I doubt it, and I say this as a more-than-decade-long fan of "perfect > defense". I don't think perfect defense is possible. I think the reality is > there's a lot of low-hanging fruit that can be addressed by better methods, > but to put it in Ghost in the Shell terms attack surface is "vast and > infinite", and attacks only get better. > > I don't see the cat and mouse game going away any time soon, but perhaps > we'll get better at achieving "punctuated equilibrium" where defenders are > able to reach some sort of brief reprieve in certain classes of attacks and > provide extremely strong defenses as a sort of local maximum. That is, until > some paradigm-changing attack comes crashing down, and forces everyone to > rethink their entire approach to security. > > -- > Tony Arcieri > _______________________________________________ > langsec-discuss mailing list > langsec-discuss@mail.langsec.org > https://mail.langsec.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/langsec-discuss
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