----- Original Message -----
Sent: Tuesday, October 18, 2005 6:52 PM
Subject: Re (I): [SP] influenza - (Martial Law and the Avian Flu Pandemic)

Martial Law and the Avian Flu Pandemic

October 4, 2005
 

The threat of the avian flu pandemic is real.
Until recently, national governments and the WHO have dismissed the seriousness of the crisis.
The public has been  misinformed.  The issue has been barely mentioned by the media.
Why all of a sudden is avian flu on the presidential agenda?
The issue was placed on the agenda of the President's White House Press Conference (October 4, 2005).
There was nothing spontaneous in the White House journalist's question to President Bush,
which explicitly pointed to a role for the country's "defense assets" in the case of a pandemic.
We are not dealing with an off-the-cuff statement.
Both the question as well as Bush's response calling for a greater role of the Military, had been prepared in advance: 

QUESTION: Mr. President, you've been thinking a lot about pandemic flu and the risks in the United States if that should occur.
I was wondering, Secretary Leavitt has said that first responders in the states and local governments are not prepared
for something like that. To what extent are you concerned about that after Katrina and Rita?
And is that one of the reasons you're interested in the idea of using defense assets to respond to something
as broad and long-lasting as a flu might be?

BUSH: Yes. Thank you for the question.I am concerned about avian flu.
I'm concerned about what an avian flu outbreak could mean for the United States and the world.

BUSH: I have thought through the scenarios of what an avian flu outbreak could mean.
I tried to get a better handle on what the decision-making process would be by reading Mr. Barry's book
on the influenza outbreak in 1918. I would recommend it.
The policy decisions for a president in dealing with an avian flu outbreak are difficult.
One example: If we had an outbreak somewhere in the United States, do we not then quarantine that part of the country?
And how do you, then, enforce a quarantine?
It's one thing to shut down airplanes. It's another thing to prevent people from coming in to get exposed to the avian flu.

BUSH: And who best to be able to effect a quarantine?
One option is the use of a military that's able to plan and move. So that's why I put it on the table.
I think it's an important debate for Congress to have.
I noticed the other day, evidently, some governors didn't like it. I understand that.
I was the commander in chief of the National Guard and proudly so.
And, frankly, I didn't want the president telling me how to be the commander in chief of the Texas Guard.
But Congress needs to take a look at circumstances that may need to vest the capacity of the president
to move beyond that debate. And one such catastrophe or one such challenge could be an avian flu outbreak

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE)
BUSH: Wait a minute, this is an important subject.
Secondly, during my meetings at the United Nations, not only did I speak about it publicly,
I spoke about it privately to as many leaders as I could find, about the need for there to be awareness,
one, of the issue and two, reporting -- rapid reporting to WHO, so that we can deal with a potential pandemic.
The reporting needs to be not only on the birds that have fallen ill, but also on tracing
the capacity of the virus to go from bird to person to person.
That's when it gets dangerous: when it goes bird, person, person.

BUSH: And we need to know on a real-time basis as quickly as possible the facts
so that the world scientific community can analyze the facts and begin to deal with it.
Obviously, the best way to deal with a pandemic is to isolate it and keep it isolated in the region in which it begins.
As you know, there's been a lot of reporting of different flocks that have fallen ill with the H5N1 virus.
And we've also got some cases of the virus being transmitted to a person, and we're watching very carefully.
Thirdly, the development of a vaccine.

BUSH: I've spent time with Tony Fauci on the subject.
Obviously, it would be helpful if we had a breakthrough in the capacity to develop a vaccine
that would enable us to feel comfortable here at home, that not only would first responders be able to be vaccinated,
but as many Americans as possible, and people around the world.
But, unfortunately, we're just not that far down the manufacturing process.
And there's a spray, as you know, that can maybe help arrest the spread of the disease, which is in relatively limited supply.
So one of the issues is how do we encourage the manufacturing capacity of the country,
and maybe the world, to be prepared to deal with the outbreak of a pandemic?

BUSH: In other words, can we surge enough production to be able to help deal with the issue?
I take this issue very seriously, and I appreciate you bringing it to our attention.
The people of the country ought to rest assured that we're doing everything we can. We're watching it. We're careful.
We're in communications with the world.
I'm not predicting an outbreak.
I'm just suggesting to you that we better be thinking about it. And we are.
And we're more than thinking about it, we're trying to put plans in place.
And one of the plans -- back to where your original question came -- was, you know,
if we need to take some significant action, how best to do so.
And I think the president ought to have all options on the table to understand what the consequences are -- all assets on the table,
not options -- assets on the table to be able to deal with something this significant.

(White House Press Conference, 4 October, 2005, italics added)

Militarization of Public Health

The statement of President Bush suggests the enactment of Martial Law in the case of an avian flu outbreak.
Martial Law could also be established, using the pretext of an outbreak of avian flu in foreign countries
and its potential impacts on the US.  

In other words, the Military rather than the country's civilian health authorities would be put in charge.
A decision to put the Military in charge of a public health emergency spells disaster,
as evidenced by the intervention of the Military in hurricane relief in Louisiana and Southern Texas.
(See
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=newsHighlights&newsId=29

The pandemic is being presented to public opinion as an issue of  National Security,
with a view to triggering the militarization of civilian institutions in blatant violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. 

The statement of President Bush with regard to the avian flu pandemic bears a marked resemblance to an earlier statement,
also at a Press Conference, in the wake of Hurricane Rita, during which the President and Commander in Chief
called for the Military to become the "lead agency" in disaster relief.

BUSH  ".....The other question, of course, I asked, was, is there a circumstance in which the Department of Defense
becomes the lead agency. Clearly, in the case of a terrorist attack, that would be the case,
but is there a natural disaster which -- of a certain size that would then enable the Defense Department
to become the lead agency in coordinating and leading the response effort.
That's going to be a very important consideration for Congress to think about. (Italics added)

(Press Conference, 25 Sept 2005
 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=BUS20050925&articleId=1004 )

The hidden agenda consists in using the threat of a pandemic and/or the plight of a natural disaster
as a pretext to establish military rule, under the facade of a "functioning democracy".

What Bush's statements suggest is that Congress should enact legislation which will,
in practice suspend Constituional government and allow the Military to intervene in civilian affairs in violation
of the Posse Comitatus Act. The latter, however, while still on the books, is in practice already defunct.
(See Frank Morales at
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/MOR309A.html ).

Legislation inherited from the Clinton administration, not to mention the post 9/11 Patriot Acts I and II,
"blurs the line between military and civilian roles". It allows the military to intervene in judicial and law enforcement activities
even in the absence of an emergency situation.
In 1996, legislation was passed which allowed the military to intervene in the case of a national emergency
(e.g.. a terrorist attack). In 1999, Clinton's Defense Authorization Act (DAA) extended those powers
(under the 1996 legislation) by creating an "exception" to the Posse Comitatus Act,
which permits the military to be involved in civilian affairs "regardless of whether there is an emergency".
(See ACLU at
http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=8683&c=24 )

Despite this 1999 "exception" to the Posse Comitatus Act", which effectively invalidates it,
both the Pentagon and Homeland Security, have been actively lobbying Congress for the outright repeal of the 1878 legislation.
( See  Michel Chossudovsky,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO504B.html )

To achieve public support for the Military to become  "the lead agency", the Bush administration is not only resorting
to the usual counter-terrorism justification. 
Other supportive criteria are being developed to justify military rule.
In this regard, at the height of Hurricane Katrina, meetings were held under the auspices of US Northern Command,
involving the participation of  Bush, Rumsfeld and Chertoff,  to examine the role of the military in disaster relief.
(See
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=CHO20050924&articleId=991

Spiraling Defense Budget

According to the Wall Street Journal (Oct 1, 2005), the Bush administration plans to ask Congress
for an estimated $6-10 billion "to stockpile vaccines and antiviral medications
as part of its plans to prepare the U.S. for a possible flu pandemic" 

This commitment of the administration has not, however, resulted in an expansion
of the nation's public health budget. In fact quite the opposite.
Consistent with its role as "lead agency",
more than half of the money earmarked for the program is slated to be handed over to the Pentagon. 

An amendment to the defense-spending bill in the Senate would earmark $3.9 billion
"to prepare the U.S. for a flu pandemic".

In other words, what we are dealing with is a process of  militarization of  the civilian budget. 
Civilian social sector budgets are now being transferred to the Department of Defense.
The money for a public health program is controlled by the Department of Defense, under the rules of DoD procurement.  

"The US Senate voted yesterday to provide $4 billion for antiviral drugs and other measures
to prepare for a feared influenza pandemic, but whether the measure would clear Congress was uncertain.

The Senate attached the measure to a $440 billion defense-spending bill for 2006, according to the Associated Press (AP).
But the House included no flu money in its version of the defense bill,
and a key senator said he would try to keep the funds out of the House-Senate compromise version.
The Senate is expected to vote on the overall bill next week.

Almost $3.1 billion of the money would be used to stockpile the antiviral drug oseltamivir (Tamiflu),
and the rest would go for global flu surveillance, development of vaccines, and state and local preparedness,
according to a Reuters report. The government currently has enough oseltamivir to treat a few million people,
with a goal of acquiring enough to treat 20 million"

(CIDRAP,
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/panflu/news/sep3005avian.html )

Multibillion Financial Bonanza for the BioTech Conglomerates
The threat of the avian flu pandemic will result in multibillion dollar earnings for the pharmaceutical and biotech industry
In this regard, a number of major pharmaceutical companies including
GlaxoSmithKline, Sanofi-Aventis, California based Chiron Corp, BioCryst Pharmaceuticals Inc, Novavax  and Wave Biotech, 
Swiss pharmaceutical giant Roche Holding, have positioned themselves in the procurement of vaccines
in case of an avian 'flu outbreak. Maryland-based biotechnology company MedImmune which produces
"an inhaled flu vaccine" has also positioned itself to develop a vaccine against the H5N1 avian flu.
(Although it has no expertise in the avian flu virus, one of the major actors in the vaccine business,
on contract to the Pentagon, is Bioport, a company which is part owned by the Carlyle Group,
which is closely linked to the Bush Cabinet with Bush Senior on its board of directors.)


Michel Chossudovsky is Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa
and Director of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). He is the author of a
America's "War on Terrorism", Global Research,  September 2005.

 
 
 
----- Original Message -----
From: "Monica Zoppè" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, October 18, 2005 3:23 PM
Subject: [SP] influenza


Alcune riflessioni in merito all'epidemia di
influenza aviaria, che mi pare valga la pena
considerare.

L'attenzione all'argomento è maggiore di quanto
meriti, almeno in relazione ad altri grandi mali
che affliggono l'umanità. Si tratta di un
difettuccio che affligge in generale il nostro
sistema informativo; è probabile che, a meno di
evoluzioni improvvise, o titoli passino a breve
sulle pagine interne dei giornali per poi, forse,
sparirne del tutto, almeno finch`e l'epidemia
restera` confinata al mondo animale.
Infatti il famigerato virus H5N1 colpisce gli
uccelli, e, almeno nella nostra società, è assai
improbabile che si trasmetta agli esseri umani:
e` successo in estremo oriente, in societa`
prevalentemente agricole, dove il contatto con
animali vivi e` quotidiano per la grande
maggiornaza degli abitanti.
Finche` il 'passaggio agli umani' non aviene, la
conseguenza piu` significativa di quest'epidemia
(piu` propriamente panzoonosi, ovvero epidemia
che riguarda gli animali), sara` l'impatto
sull'economia delle aziende in qualche modo
connesse con l'allevamento, la distribuzione ed
il commercio di uova e pollame.

Le prime vittime ignorate son le popolazioni di
uccelli selvatici, migratori e stanziali.
Paradossalmente, sono i cacciatori che tengono
d'occhio la situazione e che saranno i primi a
testimoniare i probabile scempio. Finora i pochi
studi effettuati sembrano portare alla
conclusione che i piccioni non siano suscettibili
all'infezione e non la trasmettano, ma sappiamo
bene che il virus evolve continuamente e
rapidamente.

L'allarme per la nostra salute è del tutto
prematuro e, quel che e` piu` grave, non e`
acompagnato da misure atte a mitigare l'impatto
di un'eventuale epidemia, anzi al contrario
genera un'ansia diffusa che nuoce alla societa`.
Per non parlare di dichiarazioni stupide e
criminali come quella del presidente USA G.W.
bush, che ha recentamente paventato l'uso delle
forze armate per forzare la quarantena di zone
colpite. Una mera esibizione di forze nel
tentativo di nascondere una (consapevole?)
impotenza.

Tuttavia la possibilita` che prima o poi si
scateni un'epidemia non e` trascurabile e non va
trascurata. I casi di trasmissione a esseri umani
registrati finora si sono tutti verificati nella
penisola indocinese: Indonesia (5), Viet Nam
(91), Thailandia (17),  Cambogia (4), per un
totale di 117 casi di cui 60 mortali. I modelli
teorici piu` ottimisti mostrano che, per poter
sperare di arginare eventuali focolai, sono
necessarie misure capillari e considerevoli
risorse. Non a caso, la premessa di uno degli
studi parla di "come contenere la diffusione del
nuovo ceppo virale o almeno rallentare la
diffusione iniziale per guadagnare tempo allo
sviluppo di un vaccino".
Sempre dallo studio di modelli si vede come sia
di importanza cruciale la rapidita` di
identificazione dei nuovi casi e di intervento
presso tutti i contatti delle persone malate o
possibilmente infette. Questo presuppone un
servizio sanitario diffuso ed efficiente, cosa
che non sempre si verifica nelle zone piu` a
rischio (non pare strano che il Laos, uno tra i
paesi piu` poveri del mondo, disposto tra
VietNam, Camobgia e Thailandia, non abbia
registrato alcun caso? Se qualche caso fosse
avvenuto, sarebbe stato riconsciuto, identificato
e riportato alle organizzazioni internazionali
(OMS)?).
A logica, la prima cosa da fare dovrebbe essere
mettere tutti i paesi a rischio in grado di
affrontare il focolaio: intensificando
l'assistenza medica ed informando le popolazioni
sui rischi e sulle misure preventive piu`
elementari (ridurre il piu` possibile il contatto
con uccelli, osservare norme igieniche
stringenti, e, in caso di malattia, rivolgersi
immediatamente al presidio sanitario piu`
vicino), e rifornendo le autorita` sanitarie
locali dei farmaci disponibili, con
raccomandazioni sensate sull'uso e sull'abuso.

Sfortunatamente il mondo in cui viviamo non
corrisponde proprio la modello logico, e sara` da
vedere cosa e quando succedera`. Anche se
avessimo a disposizione tutti i piu` potenti
modelli del mondo, gli esseri umani hanno
dimostrato di essere capaci di azioni individuali
e collettive di intensita` estrema, nel bene e
nel male. La storia non e` ancora fnita.

Piu` in generale son ormai diversi anni che
assistiamo a catastrofi 'naturali' che mettono
semrpe piu` a nudo la nostra vulnerabilita`. E'
ormai diffusa la consapevolezza che siamo noi
stessi, con il nostro stile di vita e i nostri
consumi i responsabili della rovina collettiva.
Questa finora ha colpito i poveri (dallo tsunami
a Katrina, passando per le 'carestie' del Sudan),
e anche con l'influenza accade che i ricchi (noi)
si attrezzano con farmaci e tentino di guadagnino
tempo per i vaccini.
Eppure non dovrebbe essere difficle capire che se
non la smettiamo di uccidere i poveri, prima o
poi tocchera` a noi: lo capiremo in tempo?


Monica Zoppè,
Scienziate/i contro la guerra













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