Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1999 20:35:13 -0500 (EST)
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From: "Margrete Strand-Rangnes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Organization: Public Citizen Global Trade Watch
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Subject: [mai] Noam Chomsky on the MAI Shell Game
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LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE - January 1999
FROM BRETTON WOODS TO THE MAI
Finance and Silence
______________________________________________________________
The suspension of negotiations on the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI), which had taken place within the framework of
the OECD over the last three years, spelled an undeniable victory
for the various associated campaign groups, led by France, which
had mobilised to prevent the signature of the agreement. However,
this is not necessarily the last we have seen of the MAI. Noam
Chomsky charts the major developments since Bretton Woods.
by NOAM CHOMSKY *
______________________________________________________________
Liberalising the movements of capital worldwide has proved a
powerful weapon against democracy and the social contract, much
as was anticipated by the framers of the (Bretton Woods)
international economic order in the 1940s. Unregulated capital
flow can be used very effectively to undermine attempts by
individual governments to introduce progressive measures. For
instance, any country trying to stimulate its economy or increase
its health spending is likely to find this deviant behaviour
instantly punished by a flight of capital.
This capital mobility since the Bretton Woods system was
essentially dismantled from the early 1970s has led to what some
economists have called a "Virtual Senate" of financial capital
that is able to decide social and economic policy just because
they can shift funds around. The volume of transactions on world
finance markets has grown to the point where it is now estimated
in the range of $1,500 billion a day. It has also changed in
character: whereas 30 years ago about 90% of foreign exchange
transactions was related to the real economy (trade and long term
investment), by now well over 90% of a vastly greater sum
consists of short-term flows, about 80% less than a week in
duration, often much shorter, speculating against currencies or
exchange rate fluctuations. Markets have become increasingly
volatile and less and less predictable and financial crises are
occurring with increasing regularity.
A small tax on short-term speculation was proposed in the early
1970s by James Tobin, Nobel prize-winner for economics. It was
conceived as a way of introducing "grains of sand" into the cogs
of the speculative process and encouraging long-term productive
investment (1). It was not until the 1970s and 1980s that major
economies abandoned capital controls. South Korea was compelled
to drop them in the early 1990s, widely regarded as a factor in
the current crisis. Some countries - Chile, for example - still
impose controls to penalise short-term investment.
The Tobin tax has been on the agenda for nearly a quarter of a
century now, but the world's major financial institutions simply
don't want the Tobin tax and other such ideas to be considered.
They have profited enormously from the recent arrangements - even
if it means a slowdown in the real economy and major crises.
Though they are potential beneficiaries of such a measure,
manufacturers and industrialists have also generally opposed it.
Presumably they are not unhappy about the way in which financial
liberalisation counteracts social policies and exercises a
downward pressure on labour costs. So it is no surprise that a
major book about the Tobin tax (2) published two years ago was
boycotted by the press, under pressure from international bodies
and financial circles - notably American, including, it has been
reported, the Clinton administration.
Concealing alternative economic measures becomes necessary
because public opinion is strongly opposed to policies of "free
trade" - a misleading concept, when we take a closer look - and
financial liberalisation. In autumn 1997 the Clinton
administration was obliged to back down on attempts to secure
Congressional agreement for renewal of the so-called "fast track"
procedure for negotiating trade agreements (3). Politicians had
come under substantial popular pressure from trade unions and
other constituencies, and the White House realised it would be
impossible to obtain majority support.
Also underway at the time were preparations for the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) which has been under
negotiation behind closed doors since 1995 within the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The
mobilisation of citizens' movements, particularly in Canada,
finally was able to break the "veil of secrecy", as it was
described by the former Chief Justice of the Australian High
Court when the barriers were broken early this year. It has
delayed and may now have contributed to undermining the project
(4).
However, that's not the end of it: negotiations are certain to
resume in one way or another, perhaps within the World Trade
Organisation (WTO), but more probably still farther away from the
public gaze. One idea advanced by supporters of financial
liberalisation is that the Articles of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) should be changed to incorporate something like MAI
principles as conditions for credits. The "advantage" of such a
solution is that the IMF operates out of sight and is
unaccountable to the public.
(This article is a transcript of an interview in April 1998
edited by Normand Baillargeon, who is also responsible for the
footnotes.)
* Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT),
Boston, USA.
Translated by Ed Emery
(1) See Howard M. Wachtel, "Trois taxes globales pour maitriser
le capital", Maniere de voir no. 42, "Anatomie de la crise
financiere" November-December 1998.
(2) Mahbub Ul Haq, Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, The Tobin Tax:
Coping with Financial Volatility, Oxford University Press, 1996.
On this subject, see Ibrahim Warde, "La taxe Tobin, bOte noire
des spTculateurs, cible des censeurs", Le Monde diplomatique,
"Rating agencies, the new superpowers?", English Internet
edition, February 1997,.
(3) This would have given the president the right to sign trade
agreements which Congress would then be unable to alter. They
would have the choice only of ratifying or rejecting the texts as
they stood.
(4) Mr Jospin's government bowed to pressure and withdrew from
the negotiations on 10 October last.
_________________________________________________________________
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED � 1999 Le Monde diplomatique
<http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/inside/1999/01/12chomsky.html>
**********************************
In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is
distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior
interest in receiving the included information for research and
educational purposes.
Margrete Strand Rangnes
MAI Project Coordinator
Public Citizen Global Trade Watch
215 Pennsylvania Ave, SE
Washington DC, 20003
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202-547 7392 (fax)
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