Forwarded from Arnold Kohen, [EMAIL PROTECTED] =================================== Bishop Belo Calls for United Nations Peace Keepers, Warns of Danger of Civil War Speaking from Dili on the morning of February 5, 1999 (the evening of February 4, Washington time) , Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo said that civilians in parts of East Timor have been given guns by elements of the Indonesian military to attack people favoring independence. There was a real possibility of civil war, and it is vital that United Nations peacekeeping forces be dispatched to East Timor as a matter of urgency. "Please talk to the American Congress and others around the world so that the U.N. can have the possibility to send forces to East Timor," the bishop pleaded. "It is time for a U.N. force to come here to prevent clashes and bloodshed." Bishop Belo's appeal came after weeks of rising attacks by paramilitary groups. Thousands of weapons have reportedly been distributed. From the earliest days of 1999, there have been killings by such groups. On January 3, 1999, in the town of Ainaro, an East Timorese group armed by Indonesian forces shot and killed two of their pro-independence countrymen who had come to their home to talk about peace. A priest described it best in a heart-wrenching report to Bishop Belo: "[The Indonesian military] do everything so that Timorese who are armed by them eliminate all those who are not on their side." Bishop Belo said there was no doubt about what was at the root of the problem: much of the trouble was fomented by elements of the Indonesian military through manipulation of groups they set up and controlled. Still, some senior Indonesian military sources acknowledge that there is concern over the weight of world public opinion regarding East Timor, and the impact of the East Timor issue on international aid to Indonesia . This makes action by concerned governments, parliaments, organizations and individuals all the more vital. Recent Background Over the past several months, the Habibie government has been under increasing pressure from various governments, including the United States, to give the people of East Timor a say in their future. Then, on January 13, 1999, Australia, the only Western nation to give full diplomatic recognition to the Indonesian occupation, adopted a new policy accepting the principle that the people of East Timor must eventually have a choice of remaining a part of Indonesia or becoming independent. Soon after, for the first time since the 1975 invasion of the territory, the Indonesian government raised the possibility of independence for East Timor, and announced that Xanana Gusmao would be moved from prison to house arrest. Nonetheless, there are varying interpretations of Jakarta's actions, and what is really intended is very difficult to know. What is indisputable is that all of this came at the precise moment when elements of Indonesian security forces were arming militias engaged in brutal attacks against pro-independence groups, with thousands of villagers fleeing such violence in the countryside, many of them taking refuge in churches. In this context , top Indonesian officials stated that East Timor could either accept the government's autonomy plan or face an abrupt Indonesian departure. Some viewed the Indonesian government's statement that it might grant independence to East Timor not a genuine turnabout, but as a complex message, one part a belated recognition that "integration" had failed, another part aimed at gaining the good will of foreign donors (the statement on possible independence for East Timor by Indonesia's finance minister was regarded as significant enough to be included as one of the pieces of good news to come out of the recently-ended World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland). Still another aspect was an unmistakable threat to the East Timorese to accept whatever the government chose to offer or face a civil war that Indonesian security forces were themselves instigating. Another side of this dark view was expressed by a highly-informed diplomat, who said that the situation was "extremely dangerous." With military elements deliberately creating conflict by distributing arms and otherwise provoking confrontations, the notion of Indonesian withdrawal from East Timor under these conditions had a sinister edge to it: "The Indonesians have to leave East Timor properly. They have a responsibility to the East Timorese to do so after all the deaths that resulted from their actions ," this source stressed, "Anything other than an orderly departure would be criminal." This, of course, was a worst-case scenario. In contrast, showing his openness to reasonable solutions, Xanana Gusmao seemed prepared to accept the possibility that there had been a positive change in government policy , though he emphasized that the Indonesian military must disarm the paramilitary groups and reduce its troops, and work toward a cease-fire. "The journey to a peaceful East Timor is still long and will take time and effort from all parties," Xanana said, adding that "Implicitly, the Indonesian government has recognized our right to self-determination, to independence." >From Bishop Belo's standpoint, he was concerned that there was no fair process to reach independence, such as the referendum he had long advocated. Indonesian officials insisted that the choice was between autonomy or a complete withdrawal, and that no referendum would be held even after a long period of autonomy. "[Something] is final only when the people say so," the bishop declared forcefully. But above all, Belo fretted about clashes taking place, which showed every sign of growing worse as Jakarta's local allies grew more agitated over the prospect of an Indonesian withdrawal . "If they grant independence now, how do we reconcile the groups who favor and oppose integration [with Indonesia]?" Bishop Belo declared. "Some time should pass in order to reach common ground and a process of reconciliation." World pressure on Indonesia to stop inciting conflict among the East Timorese and to firmly insist on an orderly Indonesian withdrawal would be indispensable. It was also necessary to have peacemaking efforts within East Timor itself, but this could only work if Indonesian forces stopped generating violence. While there was more than sufficient reason to question Jakarta's intentions, some diplomatic analysts believed that the government's own words, even if insincere at the time, tipped the balance in favor of real independence for East Timor at some stage: having stated before the world its willingness to consider independence for the territory, it would be difficult (though hardly impossible) to renege later on. Similarly, provoking chaos and violence in East Timor through irresponsible, vindictive actions like distributing arms and spreading panic would severely harm Indonesia's world standing and make it more difficult for Jakarta to get badly needed financial aid. Indeed, such an outcome would be a diplomatic disaster for Indonesia. Instead, an orderly transition must be created, even if it takes several years. A United Nations presence is essential and must be put in place as a matter of urgency to avert bloodshed in East Timor. In comparison with other U.N. peacekeeping operations in much larger countries, this would not be a huge financial burden, and it is one that the world has a moral responsibility to support after the deaths of as many as 200,000 (or more) East Timorese in a war that could easily have been prevented by timely diplomatic action. Indeed, no one has a greater responsibility to support such a U.N. effort than the governments that supported the policies that led to this disaster. All of this is taking place against the backdrop of a crippled economy and the growing plight of the poor, with huge numbers of the country's 200 million people falling below the poverty line according to the government's own statistics, which put the figure at 130 million, the worst of various estimates. It was becoming increasingly urgent for the world community to give generous backing to efforts by organizations like UNICEF to alleviate what could become a nutritional, health and educational catastrophe. Doing so might help address the growing ethnic and religious tensions in Indonesia, which experts see as largely economic and political in character. Some sources worry that military elements tied to former President Suharto are orchestrating such incidents, both in East Timor and Indonesia as a whole, as a means of arguing that a return to the ways of the old regime (and possibly the old regime itself) is necessary. Whatever the truth of this contention, it is clear that such incidents are part of the legacy of Suharto's rule. There are other worrisome signs, such as resumption of military operations and political killings in Aceh in late 1998 and early 1999. Bishop Belo has condemned such atrocities: he is keenly aware that East Timor is not alone in suffering repression in the post-Suharto era. Suggestions for Action 1. Governments and Parliaments throughout the world should be urged to press for dispatch of U.N. peacekeepers to East Timor as a matter of urgency. 2. It is crucial to generate international pressure to stop Indonesian military elements from distributing weapons in East Timor and otherwise promoting violence. 3. Humanitarian aid to Indonesia as well as East Timor should be increased as necessary, to be distributed through all of Indonesia's religious groups as ecumenically as possible. The Humanitarian Project Project on East Timor P.O. Box 32307 Washington, D.C. 20007 USA Telephone: 301 585 3229 Fax: 301 585 3288 E mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] *********************************************************** Charles Scheiner National Coordinator, East Timor Action Network/US P.O. Box 1182, White Plains, New York 10602 USA Telephone:1-914-428-7299; fax:1-914-428-7383 [EMAIL PROTECTED] PGP key available on request. Check out ETAN's new web site: http://www.etan.org For information on East Timor write [EMAIL PROTECTED] Leftlink - Australia's Broad Left Mailing List http://www.alexia.net.au/~www/mhutton/index.html The Year 2000 Bug - An Urgent Sustainability Issue http://www.peg.apc.org/~psutton/grin-y2k.htm
