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scanned from BRW's Media 'Management today':
Oh Big Brother Where Art Thou?
The privacy bill before Parliament seems destined to leave Australian
citizens vulnerable to invasions of electronic communications
Imagine, in the not too distant future, your highly confidential personal
information could be available for any corporation to use. Imagine your
every commercial move being monitored by United States spy networks and
possibly sold to US businesses. Imagine that the Australian Government
actively assisted in removing blocks to such invasions of privacy.
Well, imagine no more; that is precisely what is happening. Until recently,
such scenarios were confined to the celluloid thriller. But now, thanks to
the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Bill tabled in the House of
Representatives on June 26, 2000, Australian citizens, residents and
businesses can look forward to yet unforeseen forms of privacy invasion.
Ignoring the advice of privacy advocates, those in charge of the bill
consultation process excluded any formal mechanism for brining corporations
or government bodies to account.
IT specialist Roger Clarke, of Xamax Consultancy in Canberra, said in his
submission to the Attorney-General on the draft Bill, that it was "as
though the Government's intent were to create an image of a protective
regime, while actually reducing privacy protections, and legitimising
privacy-abusive practices." Clarke concluded that the additions this Bill
did include for protecting privacy would have very little affect.
This is a non-partisan issue. The ALP helped the Government by guaranteeing
a quiet passage of the bill, avoiding a Senate inquiry. Given the backlash
to Bob Hawke's proposed Australia Card, an inquiry would have drawn a lot
of public attention to a bill that, effectively protects the interests of
big business and sells out on the privacy interests of the public.
Due to take effect later this year, the bill will allow "data-mining"
(collecting) companies legal authority to gain information, Clarke says.
This includes the right to collect information on any group, business,
community or individual.
Former spy Mike Frost, with 34 years' experience of procedures in the
Canadian Government, states that personal information includes: name,
address, telephone number, age, family status, sex, sexual preference,
occupation, medical and health records, dental records, assets,
liabilities, income, payment records, driving records, credit-card
information and history, bank records, criminal records, and more.
He says the Canadian Government was denying the existence of such
information as he was feeding it into the database.
Global sources, combined with sophisticated compiling procedures, allow
comprehensive profiles on any individual to be purchased in this booming
market. Unhindered by public scrutiny, many data-mining companies are
becoming unscrupulous in their behaviour.
Mervyn Vogt, union delegate and candidate for the board of Telstra, works
in the specialist-products line for Telstra, assisting customers who are
having difficulty with their Telstra products. Taking an average of a
hundred calls a day from around the world, Vogt has to work with the
uncomfortable knowledge that, even if a client consents to having a
conversation recorded, this does not necessarily protect their rights to
privacy.
"People who ring up Telstra have faith in the people they are talking to,
but not necessarily with Telstra as an organisation" says Vogt.
Often, conversations will include private and personal details. It is not
uncommon for a person to ring up in state of desperation. Like a wife who
tries to use her mobile phone to seek help from a violent husband. Or a
teenager who fears that she is being stalked. In moments of stress you can
reveal more about yourself than intended. This type of information is a
gold mine for data-mining agencies.
There is little protection from abuse of privacy. Vogt says: "Telstra is
not subject to the Privacy Act. It is only subject to the
Telecommunications Interception Act, which means that, if I was involved
in a crime, the police would be required to get a court order to tap my
phone. Telstra has unfettered access to all personal customer information
it records."
Vogt is not told what happens to this data, and, as Telstra seems
unanswerable to anyone, it is impossible to verify what happens to it. Anne
O'Rourke, of Liberty Victoria, says: "The current ad-hoc regulatory
approach does not adequately protect citizens' personal data from the
dangers of misuse."
There are many ways of collecting personal data. Workplace relations
provides ample opportunity for abuse, and Telstra may also be involved.
Telstra is not responding to questions about its surveillance of employees.
The Cameo programme, which, Vogt says, 30% of US corporations use, sifts
through 5,000 messages an hour looking for key words. If a message is found
containing any of these words, the message and its attachments are
forwarded to a supervisor who reads them in full. This sophisticated form
of spying on workers is based on a far larger, in fact a gargantuan, global
spy network capable of scanning all telephone, fax, mobile and e-mail
communications.
Australia was the first country to admit that it used the UKUSA Echelon
system (Nine Network's Sunday program, 23 May, 1999), an extraordinary
admission given that this spy network has been in covert operation for 50
years.
Australia's Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), runs the Australian
operations. Martin Brady has admitted that the DSD co-operates with
counterpart signals intelligence organisations overseas under the UKUSA
relationship. Given that Australia and New Zealand are junior partners in
this network, which is dominated by the US National Security Agency (NSA),
followed by Britain and Canada, this means more than co-operation.
Established after WWII, the pact was aimed at helping the Western powers to
check the spread of communism. Through the sharing of facilities, staff,
strategies, tasks and products between the participating governments, this
global network proved invaluable during the Cold War. Since the Cold War
ended, this system has been developing into a formidable tool for gathering
economic intelligence.
According to Echelon specialist David Campbell, the DSD, with its four
overseas counterparts, operates a network of highly automated tracking
stations that illicitly picks up commercial communications and examine
every fax, telex, e-mail, phone call, or computer data message that the
satellites carry. Information is also fed into the Echelon system from the
internet and by monitoring pods on undersea cables.
The UKUSA uses the Echelon system to simultaneously scan millions of
messages every 30 minutes for key words that may be of interest to
intelligence agencies and governments. Intercepted signals are filtered
through a computer system known as the "Dictionary". This compares each new
message or call against thousands of collection requirements. Campbell says
the Dictionaries then send the messages into the spy agencies' equivalent
of the Internet.
New Zealand activist Nicky Hager, who alerted the world to the Echelon
through his book Secret Power, explains the susceptibility of this system
to corruption. Because Australia and New Zealand are junior members of the
UKUSA, they cannot turn down requests by the NSA, for example, for
information concerning their businesses and citizens.
Vogt says: "It is more advantageous for US business to use the Echelon to
maintain its leverage over Australian business. The US dedicates a high
percentage of the Echelon to purely commercial espionage."
One spectacular breach of Australia's national interest might not have
involved the Echelon, however it illustrates where Australia's allegiances
may lie. Two disgruntled former Australian Security Intelligence Service
(ASIS) agents in November 1993 revealed that ASIS had maintained files on
thousands of Australians and had done bugging work for Britain's M16 that
undermined Australian commercial interests.
All countries may be susceptible. Take, for instance, from Macedonia, the
January 24, 2001, issue of Dnevnik. Its lead story covers the 150 tapes
that were leaked to the Macedonian Parliament. The tapes are of telephone
conversations from politicians and journalists residing in Macedonia. The
European Union has recommended that Macedonia form an all-party
parliamentary inquiry into this scandal.
Vogt says: "Since Macedonia doesn't possess the technology to intercept and
record all conversations, it is obvious that it was an external
spy-network. This may also indicate that a new form of technology is out
there, because the Echelon intercepts satellite transmissions, but
Macedonia is a poor country and they can't afford to use satellites."
A little later, in an e-mail, Vogt wrote: "I am informed that, in the last
few hours, representatives of the CIA and Croatian Secret Police have
arrived in Skopje, capital of Macedonia, for discussions regarding the
matter I spoke of."
As for the rest of us, things get worse. Before New Zealand Parliament is a
crimes amendment bill that, if passed, will allow agencies that run the NZ
operational arm in UKUSA (the Government Communications Security Bureau and
the Secret Intelligence Service), to spy on their own citizens by
intercepting e-mail.
These activities could have dire consequences for Australians. Mike Frost
speaks from a Canadian perspective, but the implications are clear. "The
Canadian Government has a database that contains personal information
concerning its citizens. It is my opinion that the Government of New
Zealand probably has a similar database. I mean, why wouldn't they? The
Government of Canada will not acknowledge the existence of this database,
but I know it exist because I used to provide input to it."
British legislation is even more draconian. Copied straight from the FBI,
the Prevention of Terrorism Bill redefines terrorism as the "use of serious
violence against persons or property, or the threat to use violence, to
intimidate or coerce a government, the public, or any section of the public
for political, religious or ideological ends."
This definition places violence with coercion, yet coercion is not defined
and could mean anything from writing a letter to a newspaper or advocating
for democratic rights through community meetings. Under such a broad
understanding, the World Wildlife Fund could be seen as a terrorist
organisation.
British Labour MP Alan Simpson, stated: "We are witnessing a global
resurgence of citizens' movements, saying: 'If governments can no longer
protect our rights, we shall have to do so ourselves.' It's sad that we've
chosen this movement to redefine terrorism. Potentially, it turns activist
movements into terrorist movements. It's a catch-all bill".
Such anti-democratic legislation mirrors the US Anti-Terrorist Act of 1996,
which the FBI is using to clamp down on any left or right-wing activities.
But, there is hope. Strong encryption programs are one way that Australian
business can guard against eavesdropping. Even if Echelon intercepted a
message, it may not necessarily be understood. There is a narrow window of
opportunity for Australian business to take up encryption procedures. This
would make it unlikely that the Government would ban encryption, and
citizens would be able to maintain some control over privacy.
In 2000, France set a precedent by authorising the use of encryption in
private messages. However, until Australian privacy becomes an election
issue, we must prepare for the worst to come.
� Alan Griffiths January 27/01/01
Through rain, hail, sleet, snow, satellite spy networks, phone taps.
So, you are an Australian enterprise thinking of operating abroad to take
advantage of the globally connected world. The opportunities are there, and
the competitive terrain seems open.
Think again. The technology that has created the opportunity may also be
used to take them away.
Consider the example of the French company Thomson. The company lost a
radar contract in Brazil and is alleging the reason for the loss was that
spying networks were used to provide sensitive information to a United
States rival. The French Government is conducting an inquiry into the
surveillance system Echelon, which allegedly was used to provide the data.
Similar allegations are being made about an incident in which the European
Airbus consortium missed out on a $US6-billion aircraft contract that was
won by the Boeing Corporation of the US.
Echelon, a system set up between the US and Britain, is used for monitoring
all forms of electronic communications, including fax and e-mail. According
to a European Union report, the monitoring activities include illegal
interception of commercial satellites, and long- distance communications
from space and the internet. French authorities are alleging that it is
powerful enough to monitor most phone traffic in France. More than 120
satellite systems are said to be continually collecting intelligence, and
the system is reputed to be able to intercept more than a million
communications every 30 minutes.
The moral of the story? If you are competing in the global economy against
a powerful American rival, assume that no electronic communication is safe.
If worse comes to worst, talk face to face or resort to the one form of
communication that is nearly always reliable and private: the post.
David James
The American Management Association reports that two-thirds of its members
regularly conduct electronic surveillance of their employees. Sarah Joseph
(Monash lecturer in law), 'Taming the Leviathans: Multinational Enterprises
& Human Rights
The Direct Marketing Association will spearhead a $US100-million privacy
consumer education campaign and has hired the public relations company
Young & Rubican to create the effort. The DMA hopes to set the record
straight on privacy, change consumers' mindsets and let them know how
marketers use information and how consumers will benefit.
--
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