On Fri, Apr 7, 2023 at 8:29 PM Félix <[email protected]> wrote:
I don't see why vscode would not allow me to evaluate parts of those > strings as expected by this feature, as I already have support of scripting > , including offereing g, c, p etc. available in the scope of the running > scripts. Many years ago Paul Patternson convinced me (and all of Leo's other devs) that we must not allow Leo to execute arbitrary scripts when loading a .leo file. So: 1. leoSettings.leo contains: @bool scripting-at-script-nodes = False 2. Leo allows setting this setting to True *only* in myLeoSettings.leo. I called this policy the "Lock on the H-Bomb". Without this policy, opening any .leo file from someone else exposes the user to malicious code in @script nodes. Even with this policy, one should be wary of pushing any @button button in an outline created by someone you don't trust. Ditto for executing any command created by @command. In short, .leo files are potential viruses that virus scanners will never find. Imo, the security implications of @script, @button and @command are Leo's biggest unresolvable problem. Path expressions bypass the lock on the H-Bomb. It's no good requiring a new lock, as a few minutes thought should convince you. Edward -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "leo-editor" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/leo-editor/CAMF8tS1-Ur_CnyO-NE_rB-H2VTw5UJv-tKnm7Gof2R%2BVY3_5jw%40mail.gmail.com.
