-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 17/12/12 20:12, Danny O'Brien wrote: > I think these days you have to tie Forbes' (good) advice not to > save everything with an encouragement to use full disk encryption. > We're in an awkward space right now where we can't fully guarantee > that data gets deleted off a modern flash (SSD) drive, even with > previously strong deletion tools. And forensics software is good > enough to pick up a lot of local clues about what you've used your > own computer for, even if you think you've turned off all logs and > removed the saving of sensitive data. Minimize what you record, but > also encrypt.
Sorry to go off on a tech tangent after you've rightly pointed out that this isn't simply a matter of choosing the right tech, but I'd like to ask the list for a bit of advice regarding secure deletion from SSDs. Secure deletion is a problem we could solve in software, by encrypting the data and then destroying the key to render the data unrecoverable, *if* we had a few bytes of persistent, erasable storage in which to store the key. (Storing the key on the SSD itself doesn't work, because then we can't securely delete the key.) I'm not aware of any suitable storage on current smartphones or personal computers, so we may need to ask device manufacturers to add (simple, inexpensive) hardware to their devices to support secure deletion. So I have two questions for the list: who should we try to persuade, and how should we persuade them? Cheers, Michael -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJQz5G1AAoJEBEET9GfxSfMFSoH/jQ0HtBhP2bDhYLGGXk7ESU1 onC5tMBFUvvQzsqmVeV/HmEciW+WPeJ942Oek7r0DEWiBseFF3tMzquG/Yc4pURn hYaRNlEjIzPFyZ+9kXiU7cUwGozoThKw+CxwBB4LKSEOSlqn28EmPGsKG59seDrS 3PJtqPcYKCWqKXmhIu3Hzc3Zn5dsRKeWZYmv9nQm40kj3YrR4OPoz/roCT72OUDu E/SRCmd/zgDSy556OJ8U0xu3KNU9JLebWxYV+HRfAyctbjCnDP63LD+ABjKr+lTn lQnvXB9rJtB/yzyewiG++ZlT7bpzLZ5L5hI1UkHv8Udqyfnp463Azq88Plbi5MY= =9K1+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
