Hi, Sorry for the continous update.
But while GreatFire reports our site as 100% blocked, I have no difficulty accessing it from my host in Shanghai. So, that's why I'd love to hear more about how you conduct your measurements. https://en.greatfire.org/search/all/https%3A//pki.net.in.tum.de BTW - the same site is listed as 0% blocked when accessed via HTTP. Maybe we are really dealing with a measurement artefact in combination with SSL handshakes going through other border routers here? Ralph On 12/23/2012 12:57 PM, Ralph Holz wrote: > Hi, > > FWIW, our PKI site with our measurements and data sets gets reported as > "100% blocked" by GreatFire. ;) I wonder how I should interpret that. ;) > > https://en.greatfire.org/search/all/https%3A//pki.net.in.tum.de > > Ralph > > On 12/23/2012 04:28 AM, Martin Johnson wrote: >> Hi all, >> >> I'm the founder of GreatFire.org. Let me try to explain how we run our >> tests. I'd very much like to get your feedback on how our system can >> become more accurate and transparent. >> >> The two Crypto.cat URLs being tested can be viewed here: >> https://en.greatfire.org/https/project.crypto.cat >> https://en.greatfire.org/https/blog.crypto.cat >> >> Both pages state that the URLs are "x% restricted in China" but "0% >> blocked". Next to the "Otherwise restricted" label, there's a link to >> "Throttling" explaining our definition which in turn refers >> to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandwidth_throttling. A throttled >> websites is slow but not blocked. Labeling it as throttled also suggests >> that it's intentionally slow, which we cannot prove. A lot of foreign >> websites are slow in China, but there are big differences. For example, >> we strongly suspect that GMail and other Google services are actively >> throttled, to discourage people from using them. Other websites could >> simply be slow because of where they are hosted and the speed from China >> to that web host. >> >> On our test pages, if you click on any date in the calendar, you can >> view our detailed test data. You can for example see that the "Host IPs" >> for Crypto.cat returned when tested from the US and different locations >> in China are the same. You can also verify the HTML title and the >> download size, etc. >> >> Crypto.cat is not blocked in China now, but if it becomes popular, it >> will most likely be blocked. If they use DNS poisoning you'd have to >> setup mirror websites. If they block the IP, however, you can rotate the >> IP addresses to get around it. We offer a service that does this >> at https://unblock.cn.com and we'd be happy to help you reach as many >> users as possible in China. >> >> Feedback very welcome. >> >> Martin Johnson >> --- >> https://FreeWeibo.com <https://freeweibo.com/> - Uncensored, Anonymous >> Sina Weibo Search. >> https://GreatFire.org <https://greatfire.org/> - Monitoring Online >> Censorship In China. >> https://Unblock.cn.com <https://unblock.cn.com/> - We Can Unblock Your >> Website In China. >> >> >> >> On Sun, Dec 23, 2012 at 1:04 AM, Joss Wright >> <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 05:48:34PM +0100, Ralph Holz wrote: >> > >> > PS: While I was at it, I checked the current DNS rewriting for >> > twitter.com <http://twitter.com>. It still points to a Korean IP. >> >> Some of the more fun DNS poisoning in my experiments[1] were >=15 >> apparently unrelated servers across China all redirecting >> torproject.org <http://torproject.org> >> to 'tonycastro.net <http://tonycastro.net>' or 'tonycastro.com >> <http://tonycastro.com>', and a separate set redirecting >> to 'thepetclubfl.net <http://thepetclubfl.net>'. >> >> A New Scientist journalist wrote up that work[2] and contacted both >> sites. Tony Castro[3] instantly threatened to sue everyone in sight for >> implying that he was a Chinese sleeper agent. The Pet Club webmaster had >> noticed the Chinese traffic and was interested to know where it had come >> from. :) (I suggested setting up a few China-focused pay-per-view >> adverts.) >> >> Joss >> >> [1] >> >> http://www.slideshare.net/josswright/through-a-router-darkly-remote-investigation-of-chinese-internet-f >> [1b >> >> <http://www.slideshare.net/josswright/through-a-router-darkly-remote-investigation-of-chinese-internet-f >> [1b>] >> >> http://www.pseudonymity.net/~joss/doc/work/presentation/2012/10/wright-censormap.pdf >> (Original) >> [2] >> >> http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21628936.300-florida-pet-spa-mystery-link-to-chinas-great-firewall.html >> (Requires registration.) >> [3] http://tonycastro.net/ (A life story worth Googling...) >> >> -- >> Joss Wright | @JossWright >> http://www.pseudonymity.net >> -- >> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> >> >> >> -- >> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> > > -- Ralph Holz Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München Phone +49 89 28918043 http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ PGP: A805 D19C E23E 6BBB E0C4 86DC 520E 0C83 69B0 03EF -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
