On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 11:42 AM, Griffin Boyce <griffinbo...@gmail.com> wrote: > Sean Cassidy <sean.a.cass...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> First is that if the load on the network is high enough, conversations >> can hide in the noise. This is helped by dummy message generation >> either by clients or servers (preferably clients to protect against >> attackers that can monitor every node). > > > Unless I'm missing something (entirely possible): From your standpoint, > the ideal would be to hit a high enough rate that it makes real-time > analysis of content (by a human) impossible. By the time the service hit > that rate of chats, it will be nigh-unusable by people. This is more or > less why chat channels (eg, IRC) were created in the first place. And that > doesn't preclude outside observers from storing and correlating the chats. >
This is mitigated (somewhat) by allowing the users to filter the amount of messages they can receive by the length of the prefix they specify. The shorter the prefix, the more messages and more "anonymous" it becomes, but if bandwidth is a concern you can increase your prefix length to lower your bandwidth consumption. The fixed message size addresses this somewhat as well. Sean > ~Griffin > > -- > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
