-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 2013.06.28 03.37, Alireza Mahdian wrote: > First of all anonymity is not a goal here.
I'm going to come down on you kind of hard here, but it's not aimed at you, it's aimed at everyone building systems like this. A month ago, you could plausibly argue that it was possible to build privacy-preserving tools that did not provided unlinkability (what you mean when you say anonymity). This is now revealed as obviously, laughably, tragically, and utterly false. Social graph and traffic analysis is the name of the game. Content protection actually matters much *less* than unlinkability. If you claim to be building privacy preserving system and it either does not provide strong unlinkability as at least an option, or creates central points of trust failure where someone can be compelled into compromising the network, you have done nothing. Yes, there are different tools that are appropriate for different contexts. However, there is little or no point in doing further research on so-called privacy perserving tools that do not preserve privacy. This sucks for folks who have grant money and research time tied up in existing project that are now plainly irrelevant. Tough. The world changed, and we as a community need to move on, in a hurry. > A structure similar to I2P or Tor that uses overlay network would > be very inefficient due to network delays Congratulations! Your job is now to figure out how to make it faster while keeping the same privacy guarantees. You don't get to opt out, because you can't do any meaningful work until you've done this. This sucks. I would be quite happy to live in a world where these were not the constraints we as developers had to live with. But we don't get that choice. E. - -- Ideas are my favorite toys. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32) iF4EAREIAAYFAlHNuKUACgkQQwkE2RkM0wr0/wD+IVTnHPuZzNSs6hqEIP0gyaiQ 8J351/zcc6UWICx6suEBAIVLljasG1kp4vOMjwCclkxYdOFcsfQBJSAp2zjvWX7D =cHDZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at [email protected] or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
