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On 1/15/14, 5:52 AM, Lars Luthman wrote: > > I don't think it's about UI issues anymore, simply about the lack > of a critical mass and the move to webmail. Webmail operators, who > by and large are also ad mongers, have zero interest in providing > tools for client-side encryption since that would prevent them from > analysing the message content and use it for targeting ads. I do think there is something else going on here that I'm not sure if I can adequately articulate: there are certain features of crypto (opsec/commsec in general!) that are simply non-intuitive and hard to get people to establish at an instinctual level. I'm thinking of operations like fingerprint verification. I can analogize encryption to locking boxes with keys (even asymmetric or DHE), but when it comes to other kinds of things (even explaining the utility of a cryptographic hash), there aren't a lot of real-world analogies to bootstrap their intuition. Maybe this will come in future generations of socialized human. I've wondered if a "usable cryptosystem" could be developed that used as its touchstone user intuition such that if users do what they naively think they should (or if they're lazy, etc.) it works with minimal risk to the user (not just fail safely, but not fail at all in the face of What Users Will Do). That may just be impossible or at least very hard. best, Joe - -- Joseph Lorenzo Hall Chief Technologist Center for Democracy & Technology 1634 I ST NW STE 1100 Washington DC 20006-4011 (p) 202-407-8825 (f) 202-637-0968 [email protected] PGP: https://josephhall.org/gpg-key fingerprint: 3CA2 8D7B 9F6D DBD3 4B10 1607 5F86 6987 40A9 A871 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.13 (Darwin) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJS1uJMAAoJEF+GaYdAqahx9/sP/3XLppz02g7nYn5Jy1bGf7+q icK+EJdtxKWec/WkyOdjitnd6mEEyTXOBo0OYzzDYL/KOz9fafwsIXWfaIem5Qtf cxhTxbpBKNAWosTOC6ns48SLKEe+z8W6GIMzGsjMkO8TvGdXaKUsgA/xhlMU8zjc f/uBFYBinUFSLrhPkA1pmyA7LqlCGoSAiumDaWdXRf5zNlEvXcjH5XTI9KuTH89P Gzi2el73yYHqm9OLgJVJamTTHFeHvQ665MKDmN/K/t4quBx4gv8qYHUS6KKU+zMa aa/CUFG+7Tjak/yvbFeDTU92K3H6cYRCd7fAcdOSVxV+PGuQlw2JyTzMhWjaoEVQ K9V3yt/HAX6KcVxPAyLri+BMWTk5IHMC6pfICCJT737J9jTHOxwOj0f+1gOE24mE WKAlH9eylbc+TpkmTizQh7AmP3jr4CpYm6TZcqUVrsF7M6TVEaqPYGMOCbHu3Z3C 9tz1rJZjViLr8jmRwPOnkXKh0h3GEBhObvTeYDYwyOgMp8cQJCEEJjiiDp94H5Yx LEvynLesTC9cS6LwoUFtIjoyATuJvUfeHJlh42kn9GtW9Y05A9AcN9hpOOA+I9E0 8SYaYE/2sAR8rQjuWa26rP9Th67sAiW27iLpgJrmiv+TDXM3W0h0Z4bup7P2SJs8 GHHRocjjHyHDtyNmNfFN =9UAV -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at [email protected].
