The following is a motion in an intervention that offers a solution to the problem of judges who violate the law:
PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION’S MOTION UNDER 42 U.S.C. §1988(a) FOR JUDGMENT TO IMPLEMENT A COMMON LAW PUBLIC REMEDY TO A PUBLIC CRISIS TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: Having reviewed the issues of law raised in this case, Petitioner-in-intervention Jon Roland submits to the Court that existing available remedies are inadequate for situations in which a judge violates the law, especially if where the Judge does so according to a pattern supported by local authority to the extent that this pattern becomes a local custom, practice or policy in violation of the Constitution and Laws of the United States. In this case, it appears that Judge Jergins, aided and abetted by J. Randall Grimes, Laurie J. Nowlin, M.Patrick Davis, and other legal “peers” and authorities of Williamson County, has invented and followed new “rules” that contradict both state statutory law and the State and Federal Constitutions. For Intervenor Jon Roland, a private party asserting a private right of action to seek a public remedy to a public violation of laws, a common law solution must be adopted even though to do so is unprecedented, except for the broad remedial powers afforded by the Federal Statute authorizing the Civil Rights Action under which Plaintiffs Charles and Charlie Lincoln have filed their lawsuit. All other “normal” remedies are plainly too narrow, too deficient, and will only prolong the crisis in Williamson County at the expense of good government and the preservation of constitutional rights and values. The appellate process is overloaded, and appellate courts lack sufficiently “hands on” implementation and supervisory power to devise special remedies, which must be crafted at the fact-intensive trial level of the District Court. Normally, the appellate courts can only review the record, and some violations of law by a judge (and most of the political support for such violations) may not be preserved in the record. The supervising Administrative District judge can only reassign cases, as he has done in this case and the processes for complaints of judicial misconduct are ill-prepared to investigate systematic violations. The issues raised call for a creative solution, one that has worked in ages past, but has been all but forgotten in modern jurisprudence. Quite simply, the existing legal and equitable remedies do not contemplate a situation such as Judge Michael Jergins has created, and there is no comprehensive systemic correction available in modern lawbooks for abuses which go so far into the core of the legal system. Judge Jergins would appear to have thrown out the Constitutions of the United States and Texas, as well as large portions of the Texas Family Code and Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, without referendum. Furthermore, it appears from the record that the Attorney General of the State of Texas is determined to protect Judge Jergins in all his actions, no matter what he does in derogation of constitutional or statutory law. Finally, it also appears that the current, existing legal-system power structure in Williamson County is squarely behind Judge Jergins. As a result, without the design and implementation of a special remedy, no adequate resolution is possible. Fortunately, the attorneys for Plaintiffs Charles & Charlie Lincoln filed suit under one of the most powerful single statutes in the United States Code, namely 42 U.S.C. §§1983-1988. This statute, enacted in a series of bills passed by Congress during the Reconstruction era of 1866-1871, created no new rights whatsoever, but authorized all state and federal district courts to take whatever actions were necessary, and enter whatever legal or equitable remedies were necessary, to protect the Constitutional rights of the people. The relevant portion of the modern statute authorizing the civil rights action and remedies are as follows: 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil rights (a) Applicability of statutory and common law The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty. I propose, move, and suggest that, pursuant to the authority granted to this and to all trial courts by statute, the 395th District Court seriously consider the adoption and modification of a valid common law precedent in a late 18th century case, The Trial at Large, ... In the Nature of a Quo Warranto, Against Mr. Thomas Amery, ... of the City of Chester (1786) on the grounds that such an adoption is not merely authorized by Section 1988, as quoted above, but that the absence of any other currently existing remedy requires this Court to consider a creative solution to a problem with both political and legal dimensions is in fact REQUIRED by the text of 42 U.S.C. §1988 quoted above. The lengthy record of the Chester trial can be found online at http://www.constitution.org/trials/amery1786/amery1786.htm. The issue was whether the city officials of Chester, England, had been properly vested in their claimed powers of office, and therefore whether their actions were valid, or whether they were in violation of the law. The case was decided not by a bench trial, as would be typical of equity actions, but by a special jury composed of twelve persons trained to the law. The analogies between the Chester trial and the Lincolns’ allegations of abuses in the 395th Judicial District Court and Williamson County generally are that actions have been taken without apparent authority, but have been allowed to go on for a long time. The long duration of unconstitutional abuses may give rise to the apperance thereby of “amendment by custom”, to alter or modify both the constitutional, legal, and political environments without the invocation of lawful, constitutional, or even ordinary democratic political processes to so modify the system. Intervenor Jon Roland submits that the constitutions of the State of Texas and the United States of America are not subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by customary usage, and Intervenor asserts his intervention as a private individual seeking a public redress of a public wrong. I therefore propose and move that the parties agree to the following procedure: (1) This procedure will be invoked by having at least two independent litigants file complaints that a judge in Williamson County has, in at least three instances, violated (a) the rights protected by the U.S. Constitution; (b) the rights protected by the Texas Constitution; (c) a U.S. or state statute; (d) a Texas Rule of Judicial Procedure, either Civil or Criminal; or (e) acted in excess of the jurisdiction of the court or the authority of the judge. (2) Upon the filing of such complaints, all proceedings in the cases of the complainants shall be suspended pending review of a special quo warranto review jury, which shall be convened within ten days, and which shall consist of twelve citizens of the County, qualified to serve on juries, not more than six of which shall be lawyers in practice in the county, but none who have pending cases before the judge who is the defendant in the jury review. (3) The special review jury shall have power to subpoena witnesses and question them under oath, like a grand jury, to determine whether laws or lawful court rules have been violated or jurisdiction or powers exceeded, and should it find, on a secret ballot, by a vote of at least eight, that the violations have occurred, shall have power to provide any of the following remedies: (a) A fine of not more than $1000 for each instance of abuse, to be paid by the judge personally, and not by insurance, or reimbursed by any other party; (b) An award of the amount of the fine to injured parties; (c) Reversal of the offending action of the judge; and/or (d) Removal of the judge from the case. (4) In addition, if such a review jury shall find against any judge for at least ten such offenses within one year, it shall have power to remove the judge from the bench, and forbid him to serve as judge for at least one year. After two such one-year suspensions, upon a further offense, it may remove him from office permanently. (5) Supervision of these proceedings shall be under the jurisdiction of the supervising judge of the area, unless he should be the defendant of such complaints. (6) This procedure shall not be available for offenses in trials in which there is a jury and all issues of law are argued in the presence of the jury. It is expected that such a procedure, once established and publicized, would have such an efficient deterrent effect that it would seldom have to be invoked, but if it were, it would deal with abuses of discretion that now escape accountability, and would do much to restore public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Respectfully submitted, Signed November 4, 2005 ____________________________________ JON ROLAND Petitioner-in-Intervention, pro se 7793 Burnet Road, #37 Austin, Texas 78757 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------- Our efforts depend on donations from people like you. Directions for donors are at http://www.constitution.org/whatucando.htm Constitution Society 7793 Burnet Road #37, Austin, TX 78757 512/374-9585 www.constitution.org [EMAIL PROTECTED] Get your free digital certificate from http://www.thawte.com ---------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Get fast access to your favorite Yahoo! Groups. Make Yahoo! your home page http://us.click.yahoo.com/dpRU5A/wUILAA/yQLSAA/KlSolB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> ForumWebSiteAt http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Libertarian Yahoo! 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