Those who voted Hitler into power can at least be excused in some
measure for their ignorance. Those who voted George Bush into power
cannot. Therefore, those who voted George Bush into power are morally
inferior to those Germans who voted for Hitler. 
Vjk

--- In [email protected], "Victor Bozzo" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> 
> 
> In the two raucous hours that ensued, a question was posed to me:
"If you could have cast the deciding vote against Hitler, would you
have done so?" I replied, "No, but I would have no moral objection to
putting a bullet through his skull." In essence, I adopted a stronger
line -- a 'plumb-line' as Benjamin Tucker phrased it -- on eliminating
Hitler as a threat. 
> 
> I consider such a bullet to be an act of self-defense in a manner
that a ballot could never be. The difference is that a bullet can be
narrowly aimed at a deserving target; a ballot attacks innocent third
parties who must endure the consequences of the politician I have
assisted into a position of unjust power over their lives. Whoever
puts a man into a position of unjust power -- that is, a position of
political power -- must share responsibility for every right he
violates thereafter. 
> 
> The question then shifted: "If there had been no other strategies
possible, would you have voted against Hitler?" This postulated a
fantasy world which canceled out one of the basic realities of
existence: the constant presence of alternatives. In essence, the
question became "if the fabric of reality were rewoven into a
different pattern, would you still take the same moral stand. Since my
morals are derived from the nature of man and reality, it is not
possible for me to answer this question. But my first response was to
wonder what I would have been doing for the months and years that led
to the momentous dilemma of scratching an 'X' beside Adolph's name, or
not. Or did I have no alternatives then either? 
> 
> I can only address the reality in which I live and, in a world
replete with alternatives, I would not vote for or against Hitler.
Allow me to back-up theoretically to discuss a more fundamental
question before going on to specifically address the Nazi ballot issue. 
> 
> The question is: what is the nature of the state? Here, I accept a
Nozickian definition that the state is an institution that claims a
monopoly of force over a geographical area. It is a form of
institutionalized power, and the first step in dissect- ing its
essence is to analyze the defining terms 'power' and 'institution'. 
> 
> Albert Jay Nock wrote that there were two sorts of power: social and
state. Social power refers to the amount of freedom individuals
actually exercise over their lives: that is, the extent to which they
can freely make such choices as where and how to live. State power
refers the actual amount of control the government exercises over
individuals; that is, the extent to which it determines such choices
as where and how people live. There is an inverse and antagonistic
relationship between social and state power. This means one form of
power expands only at the expense of the other. 
> 
> I stress the word 'actual' because the power of the state does not
rest on its size -- eg. the number of laws on the books or the extent
of the territory it claims. Rather, the power of a state rests on
social conditions such as whether people will obey its laws and how
many resources it can command to enforce obedience. A key social
condition is how legitimate the state is seen to be. For without the
veil of legitimate authority, the people will not obey: the state will
not long command the resources, such as taxes and manpower, which it
needs to live. 
> 
> In other words, freedom does not depend so much on repeal- ing laws
as on weakening the authority of the state. It does not depend -- as
political strategists expediently claim -- on persuading enough people
to vote 'properly' so that libertarians can occupy seats of political
power and roll back legislation. Unfortunately, this process
strengthens the institutional framework that produced unjust laws in
the first place: it strengths the structure of state power by
accepting its authority as a tool of change. But -- according to
Nock's analysis -- state authority can never lead to a change that
strengthens social power. 
> 
> This brings up the issue of institutional analysis. People apply the
word 'institution' to such wide-ranging concepts as 'family', 'the
free market', 'church' and 'the state'. I define an institution as
being any stable and widely-accepted mechanism for achieving social
and political goals. To a great extent, these institutions function
independently of the good or bad intentions of those who use them. For
example, as long as everyone respects the rules of the free market, it
functions as a mechanism of exchange. The same is true of the state.
As long as everyone respects its rules -- eg. they vote, go through
state channels, obey the law -- it functions as a mechanism of social
control. 
> 
> F.A. Hayek popularized the 'theory of unintended conse- quences'
which argues that conscious acts produce undesigned results. This is
the theory of 'unintended consequences', and it explains why good men
who act through bad institutions will produce bad results. Good men
acting through the state will strengthen its legitimacy and
institutional framework. They will weaken the social conditions that
allow social power to surge. Ultimately, whether or not they repeal
any particular law becomes as irrelevant to producing freedom as their
intentions. 
> 
> Returning to the question of voting for Hitler... Purely for the
sake of argument, I'll grant the possibility that I could morally cast
a ballot. Even in these circumstances, however, I would still refuse
to vote against Hitler. Why? Because the essential problem is not
Hitler, but the institutional framework that allows a Hitler to grasp
a monopoly on power. Without the state to back him up and an election
to give him legitimized power, Hitler would have been -- at most --
the leader of some ragged thugs who mugged people in back alleys.
Voting for or against Hitler would only strengthen the institutional
framework that produced him -- a framework that would produce another
of his ilk in two seconds. 
> 
> Killing Hitler does less damage. But it -- like voting -- is an
admission of utter defeat. Resorting to brute force means that all
avenues of social power have been destroyed and I have been reduced to
adopting the tactics of the state. Under tyranny, such violence might
be justified as long as I could avoid harming innocent third parties.
In these circumstances, however, voting could not be justified. No one
has the right to place one human being in a position of political
power over another. A consistent libertarian can never authorize one
human being to tax and control peaceful activities. And the state is
no more than the institutionalized embodiment of this authorization. 
> 
> You cannot help freedom or social power by bowing your head to
Leviathan. 
> 
> http://www.zetetics.com/mac/hitler.htm
> 
> EPA Official: S-sir, I'm afraid you've gone mad with power... 
> Russ Cargill: Of course I have. You ever tried going mad without
power? It's boring. No one listens to you! --The Simpsons Movie
> 
> 
> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
>


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