"David A. Harding" <d...@dtrt.org> writes: > On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 02:02:51PM -0400, David A. Harding wrote: >> Anyone can rewrite a SIGHASH_NOINPUT input's outpoint, but the actual >> transaction containing the settlement is expected to have (at least) two >> inputs, with the second one originating the fees. That second input's >> signature is (I assume) using SIGHASH_ALL to commit to all outpoints in >> the transaction, so it can't be arbitrarily rewritten by a third-party >> to apply to a different state outpoint > > I realized that the fee-paying input could possibly be signed with > SIGHASH_ALL|SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY to allow anyone to arbitrarily > rewrite the other input signed with SIGHASH_NOINPUT. However, this > reminded me of the well-known DoS against transactions signed with > SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY, which seems to apply generally against > SIGHASH_NOINPUT as well and may allow theft from HTLCs.
Yes, RBF Rule #3 again :( It makes RBF unusable in adversarial conditions, and it's not miner incentive-compatible. The only mitigations I have been able to come up with are: 1. Reduce the RBF grouping depth to 2, not 10. This doesn't help here though, since you can still have ~infinite fan-out of txs (create 1000 outputs, spend each with a 400ksipa tx). 2. Revert #3 to a simple "greater feerate" rule, but delay propagation proportional to tx weight, say 60 seconds (fuzzed) for a 400 ksipa tx. That reduces your ability to spam the network (you can always connect directly to nodes and waste their time and bandwidth, but you can do that pretty much today). Frankly, I'd also like a similar mechanism to not reject low-fee txs (above 250 satoshi per ksipa) but simply not propagate them. Drop them after 60 seconds if there's no CPFP to increase their effective feerate. That would allow us to use CPFP on lightning commitment txs today, without having to guess what fees will be sometime in the future. Cheers, Rusty. > ## DoS against Eltoo settlements > > Alice and Mallory have a channel with some state updates. Alice tries > to initiate a cooperate close, but Mallory stalls and instead broadcasts > the trigger transaction and the first state (state 0). Notably, the > first state is bundled into a very large vsize transaction with a low > feerate. State 1 is added to another very large low-feerate > transaction, as are states 2 through 9. > > Alice could in theory RBF the state 0 transaction, but per BIP125 rule > #3, she needs to pay an absolute fee greater than all the transactions > being replaced (not just a higher feerate). That could cost a lot. > Alice could also create a transaction that binds the final state to the > state 9 transaction and attempt CPFP, but increasing the feerate for the > transaction ancestor group to a satisfactory degree would cost the same > amount as RBF. > > So Alice is stuck waiting for states 0-9 to confirm before the final > state can be confirmed. During recent periods of full mempools on > default nodes, the waiting time for 10 nBTC/vbyte transactions has been > more than two weeks. > > ## HTLC theft > > If Mallory is able to introduce significant settlement delays, HTLC > security is compromised. For example, imagine this route: > > Mallory <-> Alice <-> Bob > > Mallory orders a widget from Bob and pays via LN by sending 1 BTC to > Alice hashlocked and timelocked, which Alice forwards to Bob also > hashlocked and timelocked. Mallory releases the preimage to Bob, who > claims the funds from Alice and ships the widget, giving Alice the > preimage. > > At this point, Mallory broadcasts the transactions described in the > preceding section. > > If the low feerate of states 0-9 prevent them from confirming before the > timeout, Mallory can create a transaction containing a dishonest final > state that executes the refund branch. Like before, she can bury this > in an ancestor transaction chain that would be cost prohibitive for Alice > to RBF. > > Considered independently, this is a very expensive attack for Mallory, > and so perhaps impractical. But Mallory can join forces with someone > already creating large low-feerate consolidation transactions. Better > yet, from Mallory's perspective, she can execute the attack against > hundreds of channels at once (creating long chains of ancestor > transactions that are large in aggregate rather than individually > large), using the aggregate size of all the victims' channels against > each of the individual victims. > > Thanks, > > -Dave > >  > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-August/006438.html > _______________________________________________ > Lightning-dev mailing list > Lightningemail@example.com > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev _______________________________________________ Lightning-dev mailing list Lightningfirstname.lastname@example.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev