Hi Matt, Thanks for the great work here.
Confirming the v0.0.114 release number for the LDK "fake" lightning channels mitigations. >From the LDK-side, the vulnerability didn't come as novel knowledge, we have thought of potential DoS issues in peer state machine handling (e.g [0]) a long time ago and our long-term design philosophy has always been to privilege watchtower and process separation as a defense in-depth mitigation (e.g see our glossary about "monitor replica" [1]). All those hardening architectures are not implemented yet as part of the "vanilla" LDK (we're a library after), though it's consistent with the answer we made privately during your disclosure. About the lessons, a few remarks. "Use watchtowers": note there is difference between watchtower only encompassing revoked state punishment and "monitor replica' encompassing second-stage HTLC. For that type of DoS issues, you wish to have the second deployed. "Multiple process": note your Lightning node multi-process should be free of "deadlock" and other processing contaminating bugs, i.e the chain monitoring and reaction logic should maintain liveliness even if the off-chain state machine coordinator (let's say `ChannelManager`) got DoS / crashed, the chain monitoring should be able to detect revoked states and react finally. "More security auditing needed": I can only share the opinion that security and robustness has not been the top priorities of the lightning implementations, for a very long time, I think implementations have been more focus on spec features parity to maintain a usage market share, rather thinking about the long-term network sustainability and safety of end-user funds. For the more senior Lightning devs, those issues won’t come as strong surprise, I think some things like package relay rank higher on folks priorities to mitigate publicly known and more serious security issues [2]. Looking forward to more security auditing of the Lightning Network. Cheers, Antoine [0] https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/383 and https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/59 [1] https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas [2] https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/1382 Le jeu. 24 août 2023 à 01:36, Matt Morehouse <mattmoreho...@gmail.com> a écrit : > Hi list, > > Last year a DoS vector was discovered to affect all node > implementations, where an attacker could open large numbers of fake > channels to the victim and never publish them on-chain, causing the > victim to consume excessive resources. > > Defenses against the DoS have been shipped in the following releases: > - CLN 23.02 [1] > - eclair 0.9.0 [2] > - LDK 0.0.114 [3] > - LND 0.16.0 [4] > > If you are running node software older than this, your funds may be at > risk! Update to at least the above versions to help protect your > node. > > More details about the DoS vector are available at > https://morehouse.github.io/lightning/fake-channel-dos. > > - Matt > > [1] https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning/releases/tag/v23.02 > [2] https://github.com/ACINQ/eclair/releases/tag/v0.9.0 > [3] > https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/releases/tag/v0.0.114 > [4] https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/releases/tag/v0.16.0-beta > _______________________________________________ > Lightning-dev mailing list > Lightning-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev >
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