"Seen in the light of the MOQ, what is it that is described in the last part of ZMM (The Greeks). Is it the emergence of SOM, the"coming of age" of the Intellectual level, or...?" In answer to the question, I would say that I believe the schism between the sophists and the dialecticians (or between Good & Truth), and the eventual historical triumph of Truth in that battle, was the "coming of age" of the intellectual level, or what I think is the intellectual level. However, I do not arrive at this conclusion strictly in light of the MOQ. Another source has influenced my thinking on this matter for some years now. Some of you may be familiar with this source, a book by Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. For all not familiar with it, I recommend it highly. I really don't intend, however, for this to be an advertisement for that book or it's viewpoint--I just believe Jaynes has some things to say about the time period, and the accopmanying shift in human (or at least Greek, at the time) mental behavior, in question, that are very relevant to the discussion at hand. And for anyone familiar with Jaynes' work, you will realize that I am greatly simplifying his thought process in an attempt to: 1. highlight those portions which I believe are relevant here; and 2. attempt to keep this post from becoming a book. I apologize for any particularly horrid liberties I take in this regard. First, I should explain that Jaynes does not use the term "consciousness" in what I would think is considered a "normal" fashion. (And for good reason, but I suggest reading the book for more detail on how he arrives at his definition, as it is rather a long dialectic process to describe and outside the scope of this discussion.) Jaynes by consciousness does not mean awareness or even reasoning awareness. What Jaynes does mean by consciousness is a language-based mental process that is a "...metaphor-generated model of the world". Basically he is saying that consciousness is the mental process by which we analogize our experiences so that we may in some sense put them in context for ourselves and attempt thereby to achieve an understanding of our experiences. I would extend this a step further, in light of the MOQ, and say that the experiences we are attempting to contextualize are experiences of quality. After comparing the descriptions of the intellectual level of the MOQ with Jayne's descriptions of consciousness, I believe the two are attempting to describe the same process or activity of the human mind. It is the process we go through in thinking through a subject, during which the subject we are thinking about becomes an object (at least metaphorically or allegorically, in our minds). This process allows humans to conceive of ideas and such that were not possible prior to the development of this ability, as has been evidenced historically by the differences between cultures more fully able to exploit this mode of thinking (ie the rapid development of science and technology). Of course, as Pirsig points out, some things were also lost as we came to almost exclusively depend upon this mode of thought. However, that is not the particular point of this discussion, either. Jaynes' analysis of how the Greeks thought prior to this development also shows some parallels to Pirsig's (or his recollection of Phaedrus') descriptions in ZAMM. Pirsig talks about the mythos, while Jaynes talks about the bicameral mind, the psychology which may underlay how man operated during the time between the development of language and (somewhat) complicated civilization, and the development of the intellect or consciousness. While I will assume that we are all familiar with Pirsig's description of the mythos, I must of course attempt to explain Jaynes' "bicameral mind" and how it, in my opinion, is related to Pirsig's mythos. Jaynes, through interpretation and analysis of pre-intellectual legends/stories, burial rituals, societal norms, etc, attempts to show that humans prior to about 1200-1000 B.C. (at least in the Middle East, the time of change differed in other areas/cultures) thought in a very different mode than that most of us consider "normal" today (though remnants of that prior mode of thought still linger in many ways and in fact are highly regarded by some). Jaynes calls this the bicameral mind. As the name implies, there were two parts of the mind (which, to a degree, Jaynes connects to the right and left halves of the brain) which to a large degree operated separately. In his conception, one half of the brain was the "god" half while the other half was a subservient one (unfortunately I've forgotten the terms he actually used for each part of the mind, but I believe god and subservient convey the idea well enough for the time being) which took direction from the god half and executed the god's commands. This god mind contained the cultural norms, values, etc, and in some vague sense acts likes Freud's superego (though in a much stronger manner, as the subservient mind had no intellectual tools to fight the god mind with, while we today can certainly rationalize our way out of following the dictates of our superego--perhaps the superego is a weak remnant of the god mind). As is contained the cultural norms (perhaps partially in the form of legends, stories, and such that it internalized during the human learning and socialization process), I see it as being the individual psychological agent of the social mythos of Pirsig. Jaynes doesn't, to my recollection, particularly focus on the philosophers of Greece such as Socrates, Plato & Aristotle, as being a cause of the birth of the intellectual level/consciousness. There are other, larger, reasons for the transition than just the ideas of a few men at work in the breakdown of the bicameral mind and its usurpation by the intellectual level/consciousness. My guess is that the Greek philosophers are more a reflection of the process than a cause. These would be among the first (recorded) men to begin flexing the new mental muscles developed by this momentus sea-change in human thought patterns. And as with most people who have possession of a new tool, they felt the need to denigrate those that came before, who did not have the tool available. Thus the dialecticians' attack on the sophists was the flexing of the new muscles of the intellectual level/consciousness against the old guard of the mythos. Regardless of the causes (which are also a bit lengthy to get into at the moment), what Jaynes calls consciousness, and what I believe is Pirsig's intellectual level, came to dominate the mental landscape of humans. This thought process of mine hopefully leads back to our original question, and hopefully my answer is now on some more solid footing, or at least such solid footing as such speculative analysis can provide. I think the period/process in question was the "coming of age" of the intellectual level in the same since that youth "comes of age" to some degree by rebellion against the prior generation. While it was certainly not an expression of the full maturity of the intellectual level, it was a necessary step. In regards to the relation of SOM to this intellectual level/consciousness, I would note that the very process of analogizing experiences in the manner which Jaynes describes is one which, in my opinion, leads to objectifying of the subjects of thought. Whether this means that such an subject/object split is a necessary part of the intellectual level, or just a characteristic of "western" consciousness, I am not certain. Although I've studied (and attempted to practice, in the form of meditation, for example) "eastern" thought, I don't know that I have sufficient knowledge or understanding of eastern thought to hazard an intelligent guess as to whether the intellectual process is different in that regard for them. Perhaps the intellectual process is the same for them but they (and western mystics) in general remain in closer touch with their pre-intellectual selves than westerners in general. MOQ.org - http://www.moq.org
