> A Chinese state-owned telecommunications company has been "hijacking > the vital internet backbone of western countries," according to an > academic paper published this week by researchers from the US Naval > War College and Tel Aviv University.
Note that the policy recommendation in the paper -- "access reciprocity", or allowing foreign PoPs in China -- is odd. For example, that recommendation would defeat developments in Europe to enable within-Europe telecommunications to touch only equipment located in Europe. That is, defeat attempts to limit US NSA interception opportunities for within-Europe traffic. A more obvious solution would be securing BGP so that BGP is limited to only accepting authorised routes. The lack of consideration of this alternative makes the paper's analysis of suggested policy responses rather weak. I haven't gone through the examples offered. I am wary that the peer reviewers of "Military Cyber Affairs" would be less able to review the examples of BGP behaviour than the peer reviewers of SIGCOMM "Computer Communications Review". -glen _______________________________________________ Link mailing list [email protected] http://mailman.anu.edu.au/mailman/listinfo/link
