This is a new interface for adding entropy data to the random number
generator. The low-order byte of a delta between successive clocksource
reads is mixed into the pool, with one bit per bytes of data mixed in
credited to the entropy pool.
CC: Matt Mackall <m...@selenic.com>
CC: "Venkatesh Pallipadi (Venki)" <ve...@google.com>
CC: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mi...@elte.hu>
CC: John Stultz <johns...@us.ibm.com>
CC: Herbert Xu <herb...@gondor.apana.org.au>
CC: "David S. Miller" <da...@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <ja...@redhat.com>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/random.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index d4ddeba..03626c3 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@
* unsigned int value);
* void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
* void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
+ * void add_clocksource_randomness(int delta);
*
* add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well as
* the event type information from the hardware.
@@ -147,6 +148,12 @@
* seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
* times are usually fairly consistent.
*
+ * add_clocksource_randomness() uses time deltas between period reads
+ * of high-precision clocksources. The Linux kernel scheduler has no
+ * absolute guarantees of execution time, its best-effort, and we can
+ * be certain there will be entirely random variation in the actual
+ * deltas, at least at the nanosecond level for high-precision timers.
+ *
* All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a
* particular randomness source. They do this by keeping track of the
* first and second order deltas of the event timings.
@@ -722,6 +729,27 @@ void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
}
#endif
+void add_clocksource_randomness(int clock_delta)
+{
+ /* only mix in the low byte */
+ u8 mix = clock_delta & 0xff;
+
+ DEBUG_ENT("clock event %u\n", mix);
+
+ preempt_disable();
+ if (input_pool.entropy_count > trickle_thresh &&
+ (__get_cpu_var(trickle_count)++ & 0xfff))
+ goto out;
+
+ mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &mix, sizeof(mix));
+ /* Only credit one bit per byte to be conservative */
+ credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, sizeof(mix));
+
+out:
+ preempt_enable();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_clocksource_randomness);
+
/*********************************************************************
*
* Entropy extraction routines
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index fb7ab9d..9e303dd 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ extern void rand_initialize_irq(int irq);
extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
unsigned int value);
extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
+extern void add_clocksource_randomness(int delta);
extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
void generate_random_uuid(unsigned char uuid_out[16]);
--
1.7.1
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