Hi Stephan, On 01/17/2015 10:23 AM, Stephan Mueller wrote: > during testing of my algif_aead patch with the different GCM implementations > I > am able to trigger a kernel crash from user space using __driver-gcm-aes- > aesni. > > As I hope that algif_aead is going to be included, unprivileged userspace > would then reliably crash the kernel -- with the current kernel code, > userspace has no interface to trigger the issue.
Yes, that's a problem. > > As I am not sure what the purpose of __driver-gcm-aes-aesni is (only a > backend > for RFC4106 GCM or a regular cipher), I did not yet create a patch. IMHO > there > are two solutions: > > - either create a valid setkey callback so that a key is set > > - or create a noop setkey that returns -EOPNOTSUPP which effectively disables > that cipher for regular consumption. __driver-gcm-aes-aesni is only a helper for rfc4106-gcm-aesni and it never supposed to be used on it's own. I think implementing a setkey function that only returns an error would be a good solution for this. Another question is what if someone will ignore the error or skip the setsockopt(ALG_SET_KEY) altogether and still call the sendmsg() and read() to trigger encrypt()? > Note, if it is only a backend for the RFC4106 implementation, may I ask why > __driver-gcm-aes-aesni is implemented as a separate cipher that is registered > with the kernel crypto API? This is because we need to have one instance of the helper tfm with its context per each of the rfc4106-gcm-aesni tfm instance and that was one convenient way to do this. Tadeusz -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
