Am Mittwoch, 18. März 2015, 18:47:25 schrieb Daniel Borkmann:

Hi Daniel,

> From: mancha security <manc...@zoho.com>
> 
> OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(), as defined when using gcc, is insufficient to
> ensure protection from dead store optimization.
> 
> For the random driver and crypto drivers, calls are emitted ...
> 
>   $ gdb vmlinux
>   (gdb) disassemble memzero_explicit
>   Dump of assembler code for function memzero_explicit:
>     0xffffffff813a18b0 <+0>:  push   %rbp
>     0xffffffff813a18b1 <+1>:  mov    %rsi,%rdx
>     0xffffffff813a18b4 <+4>:  xor    %esi,%esi
>     0xffffffff813a18b6 <+6>:  mov    %rsp,%rbp
>     0xffffffff813a18b9 <+9>:  callq  0xffffffff813a7120 <memset>
>     0xffffffff813a18be <+14>: pop    %rbp
>     0xffffffff813a18bf <+15>: retq
>   End of assembler dump.
> 
>   (gdb) disassemble extract_entropy
>   [...]
>     0xffffffff814a5009 <+313>:        mov    %r12,%rdi
>     0xffffffff814a500c <+316>:        mov    $0xa,%esi
>     0xffffffff814a5011 <+321>:        callq  0xffffffff813a18b0 
<memzero_explicit>
>     0xffffffff814a5016 <+326>:        mov    -0x48(%rbp),%rax
>   [...]
> 
> ... but in case in future we might use facilities such as LTO, then
> OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR() is not sufficient to protect gcc from a possible
> eviction of the memset(). We have to use a compiler barrier instead.
> 
> Minimal test example when we assume memzero_explicit() would *not* be
> a call, but would have been *inlined* instead:
> 
>   static inline void memzero_explicit(void *s, size_t count)
>   {
>     memset(s, 0, count);
>     <foo>
>   }
> 
>   int main(void)
>   {
>     char buff[20];
> 
>     snprintf(buff, sizeof(buff) - 1, "test");
>     printf("%s", buff);
> 
>     memzero_explicit(buff, sizeof(buff));
>     return 0;
>   }
> 
> With <foo> := OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR():
> 
>   (gdb) disassemble main
>   Dump of assembler code for function main:
>   [...]
>    0x0000000000400464 <+36>:  callq  0x400410 <printf@plt>
>    0x0000000000400469 <+41>:  xor    %eax,%eax
>    0x000000000040046b <+43>:  add    $0x28,%rsp
>    0x000000000040046f <+47>:  retq
>   End of assembler dump.
> 
> With <foo> := barrier():
> 
>   (gdb) disassemble main
>   Dump of assembler code for function main:
>   [...]
>    0x0000000000400464 <+36>:  callq  0x400410 <printf@plt>
>    0x0000000000400469 <+41>:  movq   $0x0,(%rsp)
>    0x0000000000400471 <+49>:  movq   $0x0,0x8(%rsp)
>    0x000000000040047a <+58>:  movl   $0x0,0x10(%rsp)
>    0x0000000000400482 <+66>:  xor    %eax,%eax
>    0x0000000000400484 <+68>:  add    $0x28,%rsp
>    0x0000000000400488 <+72>:  retq
>   End of assembler dump.
> 
> As can be seen, movq, movq, movl are being emitted inlined
> via memset().
> 
> Reference: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.cryptoapi/13764/
> Fixes: d4c5efdb9777 ("random: add and use memzero_explicit() for clearing
> data") Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <han...@stressinduktion.org>
> Cc: Stephan Mueller <smuel...@chronox.de>
> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <ty...@mit.edu>
> Signed-off-by: mancha security <manc...@zoho.com>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dan...@iogearbox.net>
> ---
>  Sending to Herbert as crypto/random are the main users.
>  Based against -crypto tree. Thanks!
> 
>  lib/string.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/lib/string.c b/lib/string.c
> index ce81aae..a579201 100644
> --- a/lib/string.c
> +++ b/lib/string.c
> @@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(memset);
>  void memzero_explicit(void *s, size_t count)
>  {
>       memset(s, 0, count);
> -     OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(s);
> +     barrier();
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(memzero_explicit);

Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smuel...@chronox.de>

-- 
Ciao
Stephan
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