On 08-11-2016 18:29, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Dienstag, 8. November 2016, 17:16:38 CET schrieb Harsh Jain:
>
> Hi Harsh,
>
>> On 08-11-2016 16:45, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>>> Am Donnerstag, 27. Oktober 2016, 15:36:08 CET schrieb Harsh Jain:
>>>
>>> Hi Harsh,
>>>
>>>>>> +static void chcr_verify_tag(struct aead_request *req, u8 *input, int
>>>>>> *err)
>>>>>> +{
>>>>>> + u8 temp[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];
>>>>>> + struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
>>>>>> + int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
>>>>>> + struct cpl_fw6_pld *fw6_pld;
>>>>>> + int cmp = 0;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + fw6_pld = (struct cpl_fw6_pld *)input;
>>>>>> + if ((get_aead_subtype(tfm) == CRYPTO_ALG_SUB_TYPE_AEAD_RFC4106)
>>>>>> ||
>>>>>> + (get_aead_subtype(tfm) == CRYPTO_ALG_SUB_TYPE_AEAD_GCM)) {
>>>>>> + cmp = memcmp(&fw6_pld->data[2], (fw6_pld + 1),
>>>>>> authsize);
>>>>>> + } else {
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req->src, sg_nents(req->src), temp,
>>>>>> + authsize, req->assoclen +
>>>>>> + req->cryptlen - authsize);
>>>>> I am wondering whether the math is correct here in any case. It is
>>>>> permissible that we have an AAD size of 0 and even a zero-sized
>>>>> ciphertext. How is such scenario covered here?
>>>> Here we are trying to copy user supplied tag to local buffer(temp) for
>>>> decrypt operation only. relative index of tag in src sg list will not
>>>> change when AAD is zero and in decrypt operation cryptlen > authsize.
>>> I am just wondering where this is checked. Since all of these
>>> implementations are directly accessible from unprivileged user space, we
>>> should be careful.
>> chcr_verify_tag() will be called when req->verify is set to "VERIFY_SW",
>> same will set in decrypt callback function of Algo(like chcr_aead_decrypt)
>> only. It will ensure calling of chcr_verify_tag() in de-crypt operation
>> only.
> I think that limiting to the decryption path may not be enough. What happens
> if a caller sets some assoclen, but when invoking the decryption operation it
> provides input data that is smaller than the assoclen? The API allows this
> scenario.
If I understand correctly, in this case passed sg list will be smaller. We
should return with error -EINVAL at entry point only (like create_gcm_wr),
control should not reach to chcr_verify_tag().
>
> Ciao
> Stephan
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