On 06/04/17 10:16, Herbert Xu wrote:
> This patch fixes the xfrm_user code to use the actual array size
> rather than the hard-coded CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME length.  This is
> because the array size is fixed at 64 bytes while we want to increase
> the in-kernel CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME value.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herb...@gondor.apana.org.au>

Acked-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverd...@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverd...@nokia.com>

> ---
> 
>  net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c |    6 +++---
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
> index 9705c27..96557cf 100644
> --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
> +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
> @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static int verify_one_alg(struct nlattr **attrs, enum 
> xfrm_attr_type_t type)
>               return -EINVAL;
>       }
>  
> -     algp->alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME - 1] = '\0';
> +     algp->alg_name[sizeof(algp->alg_name) - 1] = '\0';
>       return 0;
>  }
>  
> @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static int verify_auth_trunc(struct nlattr **attrs)
>       if (nla_len(rt) < xfrm_alg_auth_len(algp))
>               return -EINVAL;
>  
> -     algp->alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME - 1] = '\0';
> +     algp->alg_name[sizeof(algp->alg_name) - 1] = '\0';
>       return 0;
>  }
>  
> @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static int verify_aead(struct nlattr **attrs)
>       if (nla_len(rt) < aead_len(algp))
>               return -EINVAL;
>  
> -     algp->alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME - 1] = '\0';
> +     algp->alg_name[sizeof(algp->alg_name) - 1] = '\0';
>       return 0;
>  }
>  
> 

-- 
Best regards,
Alexander Sverdlin.

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