On 03.03.2018 00:49, Hook, Gary wrote: > On 3/2/2018 5:15 PM, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote: >> On 02.03.2018 17:44, Herbert Xu wrote: >>> On Sat, Feb 24, 2018 at 05:03:21PM +0100, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote: >>>> rsa-pkcs1pad uses a value returned from a RSA implementation max_size >>>> callback as a size of an input buffer passed to the RSA implementation for >>>> encrypt and sign operations. >>>> >>>> CCP RSA implementation uses a hardware input buffer which size depends only >>>> on the current RSA key length, so it should return this key length in >>>> the max_size callback, too. >>>> This also matches what the kernel software RSA implementation does. >>>> >>>> Previously, the value returned from this callback was always the maximum >>>> RSA key size the CCP hardware supports. >>>> This resulted in this huge buffer being passed by rsa-pkcs1pad to CCP even >>>> for smaller key sizes and then in a buffer overflow when ccp_run_rsa_cmd() >>>> tried to copy this large input buffer into a RSA key length-sized hardware >>>> input buffer. >>>> >>>> Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <m...@maciej.szmigiero.name> >>>> Fixes: ceeec0afd684 ("crypto: ccp - Add support for RSA on the CCP") >>>> Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org >>> >>> Patch applied. Thanks. >> >> Thanks. >> >> However, what about the first patch from this series? >> Without it, while it no longer should cause a buffer overflow, in-kernel >> X.509 certificate verification will still fail with CCP driver loaded >> (since CCP RSA implementation has a higher priority than the software >> RSA implementation). >> >> Maciej >> > > > I commented on that one here: > https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=151986452422791&w=2 > > Effectively a NACK. We are a reviewing a proposed patch right now.
Your earlier comment referred to the third patch from this series. My message above was about the first one. Maciej