Hi "Stephan, Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on char-misc/char-misc-testing] [also build test ERROR on cryptodev/master crypto/master v5.9-rc3 next-20200828] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch] url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Stephan-M-ller/dev-random-a-new-approach-with-full-SP800-90B-compliance/20200825-153914 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git d162219c655c8cf8003128a13840d6c1e183fb80 config: riscv-allmodconfig (attached as .config) compiler: riscv64-linux-gcc (GCC) 9.3.0 reproduce (this is a W=1 build): wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross # save the attached .config to linux build tree COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-9.3.0 make.cross ARCH=riscv If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate Reported-by: kernel test robot <l...@intel.com> All errors (new ones prefixed by >>): drivers/char/lrng/lrng_switch.c: In function 'lrng_drng_switch': >> drivers/char/lrng/lrng_switch.c:20:2: error: variable 'seed' with >> 'latent_entropy' attribute must not be local 20 | u8 seed[LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES] __latent_entropy; | ^~ # https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/b4a65336bab63ba2d7b4be76a1acad8eb6b63daf git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux git fetch --no-tags linux-review Stephan-M-ller/dev-random-a-new-approach-with-full-SP800-90B-compliance/20200825-153914 git checkout b4a65336bab63ba2d7b4be76a1acad8eb6b63daf vim +20 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_switch.c 13 14 static int lrng_drng_switch(struct lrng_drng *drng_store, 15 const struct lrng_crypto_cb *cb, int node) 16 { 17 const struct lrng_crypto_cb *old_cb; 18 unsigned long flags = 0; 19 int ret; > 20 u8 seed[LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES] __latent_entropy; 21 void *new_drng = cb->lrng_drng_alloc(LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES); 22 void *old_drng, *new_hash, *old_hash; 23 bool sl = false, reset_drng = !lrng_get_available(); 24 25 if (IS_ERR(new_drng)) { 26 pr_warn("could not allocate new DRNG for NUMA node %d (%ld)\n", 27 node, PTR_ERR(new_drng)); 28 return PTR_ERR(new_drng); 29 } 30 31 /* 32 * The seed potentially used as MAC key is undefined to add some 33 * variation. Yet, the security of the MAC does not rely on the key 34 * being secret. The key is only there to turn a MAC into a hash. 35 * The intention is to allow the specification of CMAC(AES) as "hash" 36 * to limit the dependency to AES when using the CTR DRBG. 37 */ 38 new_hash = cb->lrng_hash_alloc(seed, sizeof(seed)); 39 if (IS_ERR(new_hash)) { 40 pr_warn("could not allocate new LRNG pool hash (%ld)\n", 41 PTR_ERR(new_hash)); 42 cb->lrng_drng_dealloc(new_drng); 43 return PTR_ERR(new_hash); 44 } 45 46 lrng_drng_lock(drng_store, &flags); 47 48 /* 49 * Pull from existing DRNG to seed new DRNG regardless of seed status 50 * of old DRNG -- the entropy state for the DRNG is left unchanged which 51 * implies that als the new DRNG is reseeded when deemed necessary. This 52 * seeding of the new DRNG shall only ensure that the new DRNG has the 53 * same entropy as the old DRNG. 54 */ 55 ret = drng_store->crypto_cb->lrng_drng_generate_helper( 56 drng_store->drng, seed, sizeof(seed)); 57 lrng_drng_unlock(drng_store, &flags); 58 59 if (ret < 0) { 60 reset_drng = true; 61 pr_warn("getting random data from DRNG failed for NUMA node %d (%d)\n", 62 node, ret); 63 } else { 64 /* seed new DRNG with data */ 65 ret = cb->lrng_drng_seed_helper(new_drng, seed, ret); 66 if (ret < 0) { 67 reset_drng = true; 68 pr_warn("seeding of new DRNG failed for NUMA node %d (%d)\n", 69 node, ret); 70 } else { 71 pr_debug("seeded new DRNG of NUMA node %d instance from old DRNG instance\n", 72 node); 73 } 74 } 75 76 mutex_lock(&drng_store->lock); 77 /* 78 * If we switch the DRNG from the initial ChaCha20 DRNG to something 79 * else, there is a lock transition from spin lock to mutex (see 80 * lrng_drng_is_atomic and how the lock is taken in lrng_drng_lock). 81 * Thus, we need to take both locks during the transition phase. 82 */ 83 if (lrng_drng_is_atomic(drng_store)) { 84 spin_lock_irqsave(&drng_store->spin_lock, flags); 85 sl = true; 86 } else { 87 __acquire(&drng_store->spin_lock); 88 } 89 90 if (reset_drng) 91 lrng_drng_reset(drng_store); 92 93 old_drng = drng_store->drng; 94 old_cb = drng_store->crypto_cb; 95 drng_store->drng = new_drng; 96 drng_store->crypto_cb = cb; 97 98 old_hash = drng_store->hash; 99 drng_store->hash = new_hash; 100 pr_info("Entropy pool read-hash allocated for DRNG for NUMA node %d\n", 101 node); 102 103 if (sl) 104 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&drng_store->spin_lock, flags); 105 else 106 __release(&drng_store->spin_lock); 107 mutex_unlock(&drng_store->lock); 108 109 /* ChaCha20 serves as atomic instance left untouched. */ 110 if (old_drng != &chacha20) { 111 old_cb->lrng_drng_dealloc(old_drng); 112 old_cb->lrng_hash_dealloc(old_hash); 113 } 114 115 pr_info("DRNG of NUMA node %d switched\n", node); 116 117 return 0; 118 } 119 --- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-...@lists.01.org
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