On Wed, 2025-09-24 at 19:50 +0200, Sabrina Dubroca wrote:
>
[...]
> > +
> > static int do_tls_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname,
> > sockptr_t optval,
> > unsigned int optlen)
> > {
> > @@ -833,6 +898,9 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt(struct sock *sk,
> > int optname, sockptr_t optval,
> > case TLS_RX_EXPECT_NO_PAD:
> > rc = do_tls_setsockopt_no_pad(sk, optval, optlen);
> > break;
> > + case TLS_TX_RECORD_SIZE_LIM:
> > + rc = do_tls_setsockopt_tx_record_size(sk, optval,
> > optlen);
>
> I think we want to lock the socket here, to avoid any concurrent
> send()?
> Especially now with the ->open_rec check.
>
Yeah that's a good point, will fixup!
>
> > @@ -1111,6 +1180,11 @@ static int tls_get_info(struct sock *sk,
> > struct sk_buff *skb, bool net_admin)
> > goto nla_failure;
> > }
> >
> > + err = nla_put_u16(skb, TLS_INFO_TX_RECORD_SIZE_LIM,
> > + ctx->tx_record_size_limit);
>
> I'm not sure here: if we do the +1 adjustment we'd be consistent with
> the value reported by getsockopt, but OTOH users may get confused
> about seeing a value larger than TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE.
Makes sense to keep the behaviour the same as getsockopt() right? So
add the +1 changes here based on version (same as getsockopt()). In
which case, it should never exceed TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE.
Regards,
Wilfred
