On Thu, 2025-09-25 at 23:29 +0200, Sabrina Dubroca wrote: > 2025-09-25, 05:39:14 +0000, Wilfred Mallawa wrote: > > On Wed, 2025-09-24 at 19:50 +0200, Sabrina Dubroca wrote: > > > > @@ -1111,6 +1180,11 @@ static int tls_get_info(struct sock *sk, > > > > struct sk_buff *skb, bool net_admin) > > > > goto nla_failure; > > > > } > > > > > > > > + err = nla_put_u16(skb, TLS_INFO_TX_RECORD_SIZE_LIM, > > > > + ctx->tx_record_size_limit); > > > > > > I'm not sure here: if we do the +1 adjustment we'd be consistent > > > with > > > the value reported by getsockopt, but OTOH users may get confused > > > about seeing a value larger than TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE. > > Makes sense to keep the behaviour the same as getsockopt() right? > > So > > add the +1 changes here based on version (same as getsockopt()). In > > which case, it should never exceed TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE. > > The max value for 1.3 is TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE+1 (after adjustment), > since it's the max value that will be accepted by setsockopt (after > passing the "value - 1 > TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE" check). And it's the > value most users will see since it's the default. Ah I see what you mean. In regards to "but OTOH users may get confused about seeing a value larger than TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE.", do you think it's sufficient to document TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE and specify that for TLS 1.3 this doesn't include the ContentType byte?
Wilfred
