"Stephen C. Tweedie" wrote:
> As I understand it, "system" EAs are semantically-rich ones which the
> kernel interprets specially, but "trusted" EAs are just normal opaque
> attributes which happen to be in a privileged namespace and which
> cannot be accessed by the user.
This is correct. The latter sort are useful for things
like file backup tags which are managed by an application.
> ACLs will be system attributes so
> they won't be subject to the default CAP_TRUSTED test, but will have
> whatever test the native ACL support mandates.
That's right. The owner of a file may be able to modify
an ACL, but it has to be done in a controlled way.
The system has to intervein.
I'm not fond of the CAP_TRUSTED name, but a separate
capabilty for diddling with these is appropriate. It
may prove difficult that no process, even a capable one,
can manipulate system attributes. Someone is certainly
going to get upset about it, although I can't predict
why.
--
Casey Schaufler Manager, Trust Technology, SGI
[EMAIL PROTECTED] voice: 650.933.1634
[EMAIL PROTECTED] Pager: 888.220.0607
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