"Stephen C. Tweedie" wrote:

> As I understand it, "system" EAs are semantically-rich ones which the
> kernel interprets specially, but "trusted" EAs are just normal opaque
> attributes which happen to be in a privileged namespace and which
> cannot be accessed by the user.

This is correct. The latter sort are useful for things
like file backup tags which are managed by an application.

> ACLs will be system attributes so
> they won't be subject to the default CAP_TRUSTED test, but will have
> whatever test the native ACL support mandates.

That's right. The owner of a file may be able to modify
an ACL, but it has to be done in a controlled way.
The system has to intervein.

I'm not fond of the CAP_TRUSTED name, but a separate
capabilty for diddling with these is appropriate. It
may prove difficult that no process, even a capable one,
can manipulate system attributes. Someone is certainly
going to get upset about it, although I can't predict
why.

-- 

Casey Schaufler                         Manager, Trust Technology, SGI
[EMAIL PROTECTED]                           voice: 650.933.1634
[EMAIL PROTECTED]                   Pager: 888.220.0607
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