Hi Stefan, kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:
[auto build test ERROR on zohar-integrity/next-integrity] [also build test ERROR on pcmoore-selinux/next linus/master v6.8-rc3 next-20240206] [cannot apply to mszeredi-vfs/overlayfs-next mszeredi-vfs/next] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information] url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Stefan-Berger/ima-Rename-backing_inode-to-real_inode/20240206-022848 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git next-integrity patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240205182506.3569743-5-stefanb%40linux.ibm.com patch subject: [PATCH v2 4/9] ima: Reset EVM status upon detecting changes to the real file config: x86_64-rhel-8.3 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240206/[email protected]/config) compiler: gcc-12 (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0 reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240206/[email protected]/reproduce) If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags | Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]> | Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/ All errors (new ones prefixed by >>): security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c: In function 'process_measurement': >> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:303:58: error: 'D_REAL_METADATA' >> undeclared (first use in this function) 303 | D_REAL_METADATA))) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:303:58: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in vim +/D_REAL_METADATA +303 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c 207 208 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, 209 u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, 210 enum ima_hooks func) 211 { 212 struct inode *real_inode, *inode = file_inode(file); 213 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; 214 struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL; 215 char *pathbuf = NULL; 216 char filename[NAME_MAX]; 217 const char *pathname = NULL; 218 int rc = 0, action, must_appraise = 0; 219 int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; 220 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL; 221 struct modsig *modsig = NULL; 222 int xattr_len = 0; 223 bool violation_check; 224 enum hash_algo hash_algo; 225 unsigned int allowed_algos = 0; 226 227 if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) 228 return 0; 229 230 /* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action 231 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. 232 * Included is the appraise submask. 233 */ 234 action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, secid, 235 mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL, 236 &allowed_algos); 237 violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK || 238 func == MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT) && 239 (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE)); 240 if (!action && !violation_check) 241 return 0; 242 243 must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE; 244 245 /* Is the appraise rule hook specific? */ 246 if (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE) 247 func = FILE_CHECK; 248 249 inode_lock(inode); 250 251 if (action) { 252 iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); 253 if (!iint) 254 rc = -ENOMEM; 255 } 256 257 if (!rc && violation_check) 258 ima_rdwr_violation_check(file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE, 259 &pathbuf, &pathname, filename); 260 261 inode_unlock(inode); 262 263 if (rc) 264 goto out; 265 if (!action) 266 goto out; 267 268 mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); 269 270 if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags)) 271 /* reset appraisal flags if ima_inode_post_setattr was called */ 272 iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED | 273 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK | 274 IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS); 275 276 /* 277 * Re-evaulate the file if either the xattr has changed or the 278 * kernel has no way of detecting file change on the filesystem. 279 * (Limited to privileged mounted filesystems.) 280 */ 281 if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags) || 282 ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE) && 283 !(inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER) && 284 !(action & IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS))) { 285 iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK; 286 iint->measured_pcrs = 0; 287 } 288 289 /* 290 * Detect and re-evaluate changes made to the inode holding file data. 291 */ 292 real_inode = d_real_inode(file_dentry(file)); 293 if (real_inode != inode && 294 (action & IMA_DO_MASK) && (iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK)) { 295 if (!IS_I_VERSION(real_inode) || 296 real_inode->i_sb->s_dev != iint->real_dev || 297 real_inode->i_ino != iint->real_ino || 298 !inode_eq_iversion(real_inode, iint->version)) { 299 iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK; 300 iint->measured_pcrs = 0; 301 302 if (real_inode == d_inode(d_real(file_dentry(file), > 303 > D_REAL_METADATA))) 304 evm_reset_cache_status(file_dentry(file), iint); 305 } 306 } 307 308 /* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask 309 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED, 310 * IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED) 311 */ 312 iint->flags |= action; 313 action &= IMA_DO_MASK; 314 action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1); 315 316 /* If target pcr is already measured, unset IMA_MEASURE action */ 317 if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) && (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))) 318 action ^= IMA_MEASURE; 319 320 /* HASH sets the digital signature and update flags, nothing else */ 321 if ((action & IMA_HASH) && 322 !(test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags))) { 323 xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), 324 &xattr_value, xattr_len); 325 if ((xattr_value && xattr_len > 2) && 326 (xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) 327 set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); 328 iint->flags |= IMA_HASHED; 329 action ^= IMA_HASH; 330 set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); 331 } 332 333 /* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */ 334 if (!action) { 335 if (must_appraise) { 336 rc = mmap_violation_check(func, file, &pathbuf, 337 &pathname, filename); 338 if (!rc) 339 rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, func); 340 } 341 goto out_locked; 342 } 343 344 if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) || 345 strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) { 346 /* read 'security.ima' */ 347 xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), 348 &xattr_value, xattr_len); 349 350 /* 351 * Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy, and allow 352 * an additional measurement list entry, if needed, based on the 353 * template format and whether the file was already measured. 354 */ 355 if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED) { 356 rc = ima_read_modsig(func, buf, size, &modsig); 357 358 if (!rc && ima_template_has_modsig(template_desc) && 359 iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED) 360 action |= IMA_MEASURE; 361 } 362 } 363 364 hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len); 365 366 rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo, modsig); 367 if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL) 368 goto out_locked; 369 370 if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */ 371 pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename); 372 373 if (action & IMA_MEASURE) 374 ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, 375 xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr, 376 template_desc); 377 if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) { 378 rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr); 379 if (rc != -EPERM) { 380 inode_lock(inode); 381 rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, 382 pathname, xattr_value, 383 xattr_len, modsig); 384 inode_unlock(inode); 385 } 386 if (!rc) 387 rc = mmap_violation_check(func, file, &pathbuf, 388 &pathname, filename); 389 } 390 if (action & IMA_AUDIT) 391 ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname); 392 393 if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)) 394 rc = 0; 395 396 /* Ensure the digest was generated using an allowed algorithm */ 397 if (rc == 0 && must_appraise && allowed_algos != 0 && 398 (allowed_algos & (1U << hash_algo)) == 0) { 399 rc = -EACCES; 400 401 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, file_inode(file), 402 pathname, "collect_data", 403 "denied-hash-algorithm", rc, 0); 404 } 405 out_locked: 406 if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags) && 407 !(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) 408 rc = -EACCES; 409 mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); 410 kfree(xattr_value); 411 ima_free_modsig(modsig); 412 out: 413 if (pathbuf) 414 __putname(pathbuf); 415 if (must_appraise) { 416 if (rc && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) 417 return -EACCES; 418 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) 419 set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); 420 } 421 return 0; 422 } 423 -- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
