On Mon Apr 29, 2024 at 11:28 PM EEST, James Bottomley wrote:
> Add tpm2_append_name() for appending to the handle area of the TPM
> command.  When TPM_BUS_SECURITY is enabled and HMAC sessions are in
> use this adds the standard u32 handle to the buffer but additionally
> records the name of the object which must be used as part of the HMAC
> computation.  The name of certain object types (volatile and permanent
> handles and NV indexes) is a hash of the public area of the object.
> Since this hash is not known ahead of time, it must be requested from
> the TPM using TPM2_ReadPublic() (which cannot be HMAC protected, but
> if an interposer lies about it, the HMAC check will fail and the
> problem will be detected).
>
> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <james.bottom...@hansenpartnership.com>
> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheu...@linaro.org> # crypto API parts
>
> ---
>
> v6: split into new patch, update config variable
> v7: add tpm2_ prefix
> v8: minor updates
> ---
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 129 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/tpm.h              |  26 +++++++
>  2 files changed, 155 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c 
> b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> index 71b3c0e75760..99eb048f18c8 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> @@ -49,6 +49,11 @@
>   *   Under normal operation this function is done by
>   *   tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), so this is only to be used on
>   *   error legs where the latter is not executed.
> + * tpm_buf_append_name() to add a handle to the buffer.  This must be
> + *   used in place of the usual tpm_buf_append_u32() for adding
> + *   handles because handles have to be processed specially when
> + *   calculating the HMAC.  In particular, for NV, volatile and
> + *   permanent objects you now need to provide the name.
>   */
>  
>  #include "tpm.h"
> @@ -60,6 +65,9 @@
>  #include <crypto/hash.h>
>  #include <crypto/hmac.h>
>  
> +/* maximum number of names the TPM must remember for authorization */
> +#define AUTH_MAX_NAMES       3
> +
>  /*
>   * This is the structure that carries all the auth information (like
>   * session handle, nonces, session key and auth) from use to use it is
> @@ -96,8 +104,31 @@ struct tpm2_auth {
>               u8 scratch[AES_KEY_BYTES + AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
>       };
>       u8 session_key[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
> +
> +     /*
> +      * memory for three authorization handles.  We know them by
> +      * handle, but they are part of the session by name, which
> +      * we must compute and remember
> +      */
> +     u32 name_h[AUTH_MAX_NAMES];
> +     u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][2 + SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];
>  };
>  
> +/*
> + * Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255)
> + */
> +static u8 name_size(const u8 *name)
> +{
> +     static u8 size_map[] = {
> +             [TPM_ALG_SHA1] = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
> +             [TPM_ALG_SHA256] = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
> +             [TPM_ALG_SHA384] = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
> +             [TPM_ALG_SHA512] = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
> +     };
> +     u16 alg = get_unaligned_be16(name);
> +     return size_map[alg] + 2;
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * It turns out the crypto hmac(sha256) is hard for us to consume
>   * because it assumes a fixed key and the TPM seems to change the key
> @@ -277,6 +308,104 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, 
> struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   out:
>       crypto_free_kpp(kpp);
>  }
> +
> +static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf)
> +{
> +     struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
> +     off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> +     u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length);
> +     u32 val;
> +
> +     /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */
> +     tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> +
> +     /* skip public */
> +     val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
> +     if (val > tot_len)
> +             return -EINVAL;
> +     offset += val;
> +     /* name */
> +     val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
> +     if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset]))
> +             return -EINVAL;
> +     memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val);
> +     /* forget the rest */
> +     return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name)
> +{
> +     struct tpm_buf buf;
> +     int rc;
> +
> +     rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC);
> +     if (rc)
> +             return rc;
> +
> +     tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
> +     rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public");
> +     if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
> +             rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf);
> +
> +     tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
> +
> +     return rc;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer
> + * @chip: the TPM chip structure
> + * @buf: The buffer to be appended
> + * @handle: The handle to be appended
> + * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL)
> + *
> + * In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the
> + * objects pointed to by the handles.  For most objects, this is simply
> + * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name
> + * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV
> + * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name
> + * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to
> + * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended.  For these
> + * objects, the @name pointer should point to this.  If a name is
> + * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called
> + * on the handle to obtain the name.
> + *
> + * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure
> + * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a
> + * kernel message.
> + */
> +void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> +                      u32 handle, u8 *name)
> +{
> +     enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
> +     struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
> +     int slot;
> +
> +     slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE)/4;
> +     if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) {
> +             dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n");
> +             return;
> +     }
> +     WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf),
> +          "name added in wrong place\n");
> +     tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
> +     auth->session += 4;
> +
> +     if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT ||
> +         mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE ||
> +         mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
> +             if (!name)
> +                     tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]);
> +     } else {
> +             if (name)
> +                     dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name 
> but one is specified\n");
> +     }
> +
> +     auth->name_h[slot] = handle;
> +     if (name)
> +             memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name));
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_append_name);
>  /**
>   * tpm2_end_auth_session() - kill the allocated auth session
>   * @chip: the TPM chip structure
> diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
> index 81b5a70ff80d..31c2065fcd35 100644
> --- a/include/linux/tpm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
> @@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes {
>       TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD            = 0x0161,
>       TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE            = 0x0162,
>       TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT           = 0x0165,
> +     TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC             = 0x0173,
>       TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS         = 0x0176,
>       TPM2_CC_VERIFY_SIGNATURE        = 0x0177,
>       TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY          = 0x017A,
> @@ -292,6 +293,21 @@ enum tpm2_permanent_handles {
>       TPM2_RS_PW              = 0x40000009,
>  };
>  
> +/* Most Significant Octet for key types  */
> +enum tpm2_mso_type {
> +     TPM2_MSO_NVRAM          = 0x01,
> +     TPM2_MSO_SESSION        = 0x02,
> +     TPM2_MSO_POLICY         = 0x03,
> +     TPM2_MSO_PERMANENT      = 0x40,
> +     TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE       = 0x80,
> +     TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT     = 0x81,
> +};
> +
> +static inline enum tpm2_mso_type tpm2_handle_mso(u32 handle)
> +{
> +     return handle >> 24;
> +}
> +
>  enum tpm2_capabilities {
>       TPM2_CAP_HANDLES        = 1,
>       TPM2_CAP_COMMANDS       = 2,
> @@ -492,6 +508,8 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(struct 
> tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
>  
>  int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip);
> +void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> +                      u32 handle, u8 *name);
>  void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip);
>  #else
>  static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
> @@ -501,6 +519,14 @@ static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct 
> tpm_chip *chip)
>  static inline void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>  {
>  }
> +static inline void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> +                                    struct tpm_buf *buf,
> +                                    u32 handle, u8 *name)
> +{
> +     tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
> +     /* count the number of handles in the upper bits of flags */
> +     buf->handles++;
> +}
>  #endif       /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
>  
>  #endif

Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jar...@kernel.org>

BR, Jarkko


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