Trusted keys duplicates tpm2_hash_map from TPM driver internals. Implement and export `tpm2_find_hash_alg()` in order to address this glitch, and replace redundant code block with a call this new function.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> --- v8: - Remove spurious tpm2_alg_to_crypto_id. - Check return value of tpm2_find_hash_alg correctly in trusted_tpm2.c i.e, fail on "hash_alg < 0". Trusted keys were tested but I had my test harness misconfigured. I bisected the failure to this patch. - The diff was not exactly minimal. Further optimize it. v7: - A new patch. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 14 +++++++++++++- include/linux/tpm.h | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 23 ++++------------------- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 5b6ccf901623..dd502322f499 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ static bool disable_pcr_integrity; module_param(disable_pcr_integrity, bool, 0444); MODULE_PARM_DESC(disable_pcr_integrity, "Disable integrity protection of TPM2_PCR_Extend"); -static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { +struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1}, {HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256}, {HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM_ALG_SHA384}, @@ -26,6 +26,18 @@ static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256}, }; +int tpm2_find_hash_alg(unsigned int crypto_id) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) + if (crypto_id == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) + return tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id; + + return -EINVAL; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_find_hash_alg); + int tpm2_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip) { chip->timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_A); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 0e9e043f728c..3d8f7d1ce2b8 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -477,6 +477,7 @@ extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, extern int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *data, size_t max); extern struct tpm_chip *tpm_default_chip(void); void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle); +int tpm2_find_hash_alg(unsigned int crypto_id); static inline void tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle) { diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 024be262702f..edd7b9d7e4dc 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -18,14 +18,6 @@ #include "tpm2key.asn1.h" -static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { - {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1}, - {HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256}, - {HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM_ALG_SHA384}, - {HASH_ALGO_SHA512, TPM_ALG_SHA512}, - {HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256}, -}; - static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2, 23, 133, 10, 1, 5 }; static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, @@ -244,20 +236,13 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; struct tpm_buf buf, sized; int blob_len = 0; - u32 hash; + int hash; u32 flags; - int i; int rc; - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) { - if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) { - hash = tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id; - break; - } - } - - if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map)) - return -EINVAL; + hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash); + if (hash < 0) + return hash; if (!options->keyhandle) return -EINVAL; -- 2.52.0
