tpm2_unseal_trusted() deduces number of handles in run-time even tho the expected value is known at compile time. Address the issue.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 9074ae1a5896..e78061ee2d99 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0); } else { - offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 2 * sizeof(u32); head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset) head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS); -- 2.39.5
