Hi Chris, kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:
[auto build test ERROR on zohar-integrity/next-integrity] [also build test ERROR on linus/master v6.19-rc1 next-20251219] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information] url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Chris-J-Arges/ima-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-in-is_bprm_creds_for_exec/20251220-035711 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git next-integrity patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251219195456.912190-1-carges%40cloudflare.com patch subject: [PATCH] ima: Fix stack-out-of-bounds in is_bprm_creds_for_exec() config: i386-allnoconfig-bpf (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20251220/[email protected]/config) compiler: clang version 20.1.8 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 87f0227cb60147a26a1eeb4fb06e3b505e9c7261) reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20251220/[email protected]/reproduce) If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags | Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]> | Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/ All errors (new ones prefixed by >>): >> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:429:32: error: too many arguments to >> function call, expected 7, have 8 427 | rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 428 | pathname, xattr_value, 429 | xattr_len, modsig, bprm_is_check); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~ security/integrity/ima/ima.h:463:19: note: 'ima_appraise_measurement' declared here 463 | static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, | ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 464 | struct ima_iint_cache *iint, | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 465 | struct file *file, | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 466 | const unsigned char *filename, | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 467 | struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 468 | int xattr_len, | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 469 | const struct modsig *modsig) | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1 error generated. vim +429 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c 235 236 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, 237 struct lsm_prop *prop, char *buf, loff_t size, 238 int mask, enum ima_hooks func, 239 enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, bool bprm_is_check) 240 { 241 struct inode *real_inode, *inode = file_inode(file); 242 struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL; 243 struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL; 244 struct inode *metadata_inode; 245 char *pathbuf = NULL; 246 char filename[NAME_MAX]; 247 const char *pathname = NULL; 248 int rc = 0, action, must_appraise = 0; 249 int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; 250 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL; 251 struct modsig *modsig = NULL; 252 int xattr_len = 0; 253 bool violation_check; 254 enum hash_algo hash_algo; 255 unsigned int allowed_algos = 0; 256 257 if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) 258 return 0; 259 260 /* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action 261 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. 262 * Included is the appraise submask. 263 */ 264 action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, prop, 265 mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL, 266 &allowed_algos); 267 violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK || 268 func == MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT) && 269 (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE) && 270 ((action & IMA_MEASURE) || 271 (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))); 272 if (!action && !violation_check) 273 return 0; 274 275 must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE; 276 277 /* Is the appraise rule hook specific? */ 278 if (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE) 279 func = FILE_CHECK; 280 281 inode_lock(inode); 282 283 if (action) { 284 iint = ima_inode_get(inode); 285 if (!iint) 286 rc = -ENOMEM; 287 } 288 289 if (!rc && violation_check) 290 ima_rdwr_violation_check(file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE, 291 &pathbuf, &pathname, filename); 292 293 inode_unlock(inode); 294 295 if (rc) 296 goto out; 297 if (!action) 298 goto out; 299 300 mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); 301 302 if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags)) 303 /* 304 * Reset appraisal flags (action and non-action rule-specific) 305 * if ima_inode_post_setattr was called. 306 */ 307 iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED | 308 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK | 309 IMA_NONACTION_RULE_FLAGS); 310 311 /* 312 * Re-evaulate the file if either the xattr has changed or the 313 * kernel has no way of detecting file change on the filesystem. 314 * (Limited to privileged mounted filesystems.) 315 */ 316 if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags) || 317 ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE) && 318 !(inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER) && 319 !(action & IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS))) { 320 iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK; 321 iint->measured_pcrs = 0; 322 } 323 324 /* 325 * On stacked filesystems, detect and re-evaluate file data and 326 * metadata changes. 327 */ 328 real_inode = d_real_inode(file_dentry(file)); 329 if (real_inode != inode && 330 (action & IMA_DO_MASK) && (iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK)) { 331 if (!IS_I_VERSION(real_inode) || 332 integrity_inode_attrs_changed(&iint->real_inode, 333 real_inode)) { 334 iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK; 335 iint->measured_pcrs = 0; 336 } 337 338 /* 339 * Reset the EVM status when metadata changed. 340 */ 341 metadata_inode = d_inode(d_real(file_dentry(file), 342 D_REAL_METADATA)); 343 if (evm_metadata_changed(inode, metadata_inode)) 344 iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISED | 345 IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK); 346 } 347 348 /* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask 349 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED, 350 * IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED) 351 */ 352 iint->flags |= action; 353 action &= IMA_DO_MASK; 354 action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1); 355 356 /* If target pcr is already measured, unset IMA_MEASURE action */ 357 if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) && (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))) 358 action ^= IMA_MEASURE; 359 360 /* HASH sets the digital signature and update flags, nothing else */ 361 if ((action & IMA_HASH) && 362 !(test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags))) { 363 xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), 364 &xattr_value, xattr_len); 365 if ((xattr_value && xattr_len > 2) && 366 (xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) 367 set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); 368 iint->flags |= IMA_HASHED; 369 action ^= IMA_HASH; 370 set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); 371 } 372 373 /* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */ 374 if (!action) { 375 if (must_appraise) { 376 rc = mmap_violation_check(func, file, &pathbuf, 377 &pathname, filename); 378 if (!rc) 379 rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, func); 380 } 381 goto out_locked; 382 } 383 384 if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) || 385 strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) { 386 /* read 'security.ima' */ 387 xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), 388 &xattr_value, xattr_len); 389 390 /* 391 * Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy, and allow 392 * an additional measurement list entry, if needed, based on the 393 * template format and whether the file was already measured. 394 */ 395 if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED) { 396 rc = ima_read_modsig(func, buf, size, &modsig); 397 398 if (!rc && ima_template_has_modsig(template_desc) && 399 iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED) 400 action |= IMA_MEASURE; 401 } 402 } 403 404 hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len); 405 406 rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo, modsig); 407 if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL) 408 goto out_locked; 409 410 /* Defer measuring/appraising kernel modules to READING_MODULE */ 411 if (read_id == READING_MODULE_COMPRESSED) { 412 must_appraise = 0; 413 goto out_locked; 414 } 415 416 if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */ 417 pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename); 418 419 if (action & IMA_MEASURE) 420 ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, 421 xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr, 422 template_desc); 423 if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) { 424 rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr); 425 if (rc != -EPERM) { 426 inode_lock(inode); 427 rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, 428 pathname, xattr_value, > 429 xattr_len, > modsig, bprm_is_check); 430 inode_unlock(inode); 431 } 432 if (!rc) 433 rc = mmap_violation_check(func, file, &pathbuf, 434 &pathname, filename); 435 } 436 if (action & IMA_AUDIT) 437 ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname); 438 439 if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)) 440 rc = 0; 441 442 /* Ensure the digest was generated using an allowed algorithm */ 443 if (rc == 0 && must_appraise && allowed_algos != 0 && 444 (allowed_algos & (1U << hash_algo)) == 0) { 445 rc = -EACCES; 446 447 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, file_inode(file), 448 pathname, "collect_data", 449 "denied-hash-algorithm", rc, 0); 450 } 451 out_locked: 452 if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags) && 453 !(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) 454 rc = -EACCES; 455 mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); 456 kfree(xattr_value); 457 ima_free_modsig(modsig); 458 out: 459 if (pathbuf) 460 __putname(pathbuf); 461 if (must_appraise) { 462 if (rc && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) 463 return -EACCES; 464 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) 465 set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); 466 } 467 return 0; 468 } 469 -- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
