On Tue, 2026-01-20 at 14:20 -0600, Frederick Lawler wrote:
> Commit 1cf7e834a6fb ("xfs: switch to multigrain timestamps")
> introduced a means to track change detection for an inode
> via ctime updates, opposed to setting kstat.change_cookie to
> an i_version when calling into xfs_vn_getattr().
> 
> This introduced a regression for IMA such that an action
> performed on a LOWER inode on a stacked file systems always
> requires a re-evaluation if the LOWER file system does not
> leverage kstat.change_cookie to track inode i_version or lacks
> i_version support all together.
> 
> In the case of stacking XFS on XFS, an action on either the LOWER or UPPER
> will require re-evaluation. Stacking TPMFS on XFS for instance, once the
> inode is UPPER is mutated, IMA resumes normal behavior because TMPFS
> leverages generic_fillattr() to update the change cookie.
> 
> This is because IMA caches kstat.change_cookie to compare against an
> inode's i_version directly in integrity_inode_attrs_changed(), and thus
> could be out of date depending on how file systems set
> kstat.change_cookie.
> 
> To address this, require integrity_inode_attrs_changed() to query
> vfs_getattr_nosec() to compare the cached version against
> kstat.change_cookie directly. This ensures that when updates occur,
> we're accessing the same changed inode version on changes, and fallback
> to compare against kstat.ctime when STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE is missing from
> result mask.
> 
> Lastly, because EVM still relies on querying and caching a inode's
> i_version directly, the integrity_inode_attrs_changed() falls back to the
> original inode.i_version != cached comparison.
> 
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aTspr4_h9IU4EyrR@CMGLRV3
> Suggested-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <[email protected]>
> ---
> We uncovered a case in kernels >= 6.13 where XFS is no longer updating
> struct kstat.change_cookie on i_op getattr() access calls. Instead, XFS is
> using multigrain ctime (as well as other file systems) for
> change detection in commit 1cf7e834a6fb ("xfs: switch to
> multigrain timestamps").
> 
> Because file systems may implement i_version as they see fit, IMA
> caching may be behind as well as file systems that don't support/export
> i_version. Thus we're proposing to compare against the kstat.change_cookie
> directly to the cached version, and fall back to a ctime guard when
> that's not updated.
> 
> EVM is largely left alone since there's no trivial way to query a file
> directly in the LSM call paths to obtain kstat.change_cookie &
> kstat.ctime to cache. Thus retains accessing i_version directly.
> 
> Regression tests will be added to the Linux Test Project instead of
> selftest to help catch future file system changes that may impact
> future evaluation of IMA.
> 
> I'd like this to be backported to at least 6.18 if possible.
> 
> Below is a simplified test that demonstrates the issue:
> 
> _fragment.config_
> CONFIG_XFS_FS=y
> CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS=y
> CONFIG_IMA=y
> CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY=y
> CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY=y
> 
> _./test.sh_
> 
> IMA_POLICY="/sys/kernel/security/ima/policy"
> TEST_BIN="/bin/date"
> MNT_BASE="/tmp/ima_test_root"
> 
> mkdir -p "$MNT_BASE"
> mount -t tmpfs tmpfs "$MNT_BASE"
> mkdir -p "$MNT_BASE"/{xfs_disk,upper,work,ovl}
> 
> dd if=/dev/zero of="$MNT_BASE/xfs.img" bs=1M count=300
> mkfs.xfs -q "$MNT_BASE/xfs.img"
> mount "$MNT_BASE/xfs.img" "$MNT_BASE/xfs_disk"
> cp "$TEST_BIN" "$MNT_BASE/xfs_disk/test_prog"
> 
> mount -t overlay overlay -o \
> "lowerdir=$MNT_BASE/xfs_disk,upperdir=$MNT_BASE/upper,workdir=$MNT_BASE/work" 
> \
> "$MNT_BASE/ovl"
> 
> echo "audit func=BPRM_CHECK uid=$(id -u nobody)" > "$IMA_POLICY"
> 
> target_prog="$MNT_BASE/ovl/test_prog"
> setpriv --reuid nobody "$target_prog"
> setpriv --reuid nobody "$target_prog"
> setpriv --reuid nobody "$target_prog"
> 
> audit_count=$(dmesg | grep -c "file=\"$target_prog\"")
> 
> if [[ "$audit_count" -eq 1 ]]; then
>         echo "PASS: Found exactly 1 audit event."
> else
>         echo "FAIL: Expected 1 audit event, but found $audit_count."
>         exit 1
> fi
> ---
> Changes since RFC:
> - Remove calls to I_IS_VERSION()
> - Function documentation/comments
> - Abide IMA/EVM change detection fallback invariants
> - Combined ctime guard into version for attributes struct
> - Link to RFC: 
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
> ---
> Changes in v2:
> - Updated commit description + message to clarify the problem.
> - compare struct timespec64 to avoid collision possibility [Roberto].
> - Don't check inode_attr_changed() in ima_check_last_writer()
> - Link to v1: 
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
> ---
>  include/linux/integrity.h           | 40 
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>  security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c |  4 +++-
>  security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c   |  5 ++---
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c    | 20 +++++++++++++------
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c   | 18 ++++++++++-------
>  5 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
> index 
> f5842372359be5341b6870a43b92e695e8fc78af..46f57402b790c9c275b85f0b30819fa196fc20c7
>  100644
> --- a/include/linux/integrity.h
> +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
> @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
>  
>  #include <linux/fs.h>
>  #include <linux/iversion.h>
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/time64.h>
>  
>  enum integrity_status {
>       INTEGRITY_PASS = 0,
> @@ -31,6 +33,7 @@ static inline void integrity_load_keys(void)
>  
>  /* An inode's attributes for detection of changes */
>  struct integrity_inode_attributes {
> +     struct timespec64 ctime;

I found the helper timespec64_to_ns(), I think it would be better for
memory occupation perspective to fit in the version field.

Thanks

Roberto

>       u64 version;            /* track inode changes */
>       unsigned long ino;
>       dev_t dev;
> @@ -42,8 +45,10 @@ struct integrity_inode_attributes {
>   */
>  static inline void
>  integrity_inode_attrs_store(struct integrity_inode_attributes *attrs,
> -                         u64 i_version, const struct inode *inode)
> +                         u64 i_version, struct timespec64 ctime,
> +                         const struct inode *inode)
>  {
> +     attrs->ctime = ctime;
>       attrs->version = i_version;
>       attrs->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
>       attrs->ino = inode->i_ino;
> @@ -51,14 +56,39 @@ integrity_inode_attrs_store(struct 
> integrity_inode_attributes *attrs,
>  
>  /*
>   * On stacked filesystems detect whether the inode or its content has 
> changed.
> + *
> + * Must be called in process context.
>   */
>  static inline bool
>  integrity_inode_attrs_changed(const struct integrity_inode_attributes *attrs,
> -                           const struct inode *inode)
> +                           struct file *file, struct inode *inode)
>  {
> -     return (inode->i_sb->s_dev != attrs->dev ||
> -             inode->i_ino != attrs->ino ||
> -             !inode_eq_iversion(inode, attrs->version));
> +     struct kstat stat;
> +
> +     might_sleep();
> +
> +     if (inode->i_sb->s_dev != attrs->dev || inode->i_ino != attrs->ino)
> +             return true;
> +
> +     /*
> +      * EVM currently relies on backing inode i_version. While IS_I_VERSION
> +      * is not a good indicator of i_version support, this still retains
> +      * the logic such that a re-evaluation should still occur for EVM, and
> +      * only for IMA if vfs_getattr_nosec() fails.
> +      */
> +     if (!file || vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat,
> +                                    STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE | STATX_CTIME,
> +                                    AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT))
> +             return !IS_I_VERSION(inode) ||
> +                     !inode_eq_iversion(inode, attrs->version);
> +
> +     if (stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE)
> +             return stat.change_cookie != attrs->version;
> +
> +     if (stat.result_mask & STATX_CTIME)
> +             return !timespec64_equal(&stat.ctime, &attrs->ctime);
> +
> +     return true;
>  }
>  
>  
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c 
> b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> index 
> a5e730ffda57fbc0a91124adaa77b946a12d08b4..361ee7b216247a0d6d2f518e82fb6e92dc355afe
>  100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> @@ -297,10 +297,12 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
>       hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, data->digest);
>  
>       if (inode != d_backing_inode(dentry) && iint) {
> +             struct timespec64 ctime = {0};
> +
>               if (IS_I_VERSION(inode))
>                       i_version = inode_query_iversion(inode);
>               integrity_inode_attrs_store(&iint->metadata_inode, i_version,
> -                                         inode);
> +                                         ctime, inode);
>       }
>  
>       /* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c 
> b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> index 
> 73d500a375cb37a54f295b0e1e93fd6e5d9ecddc..6a4e0e246005246d5700b1db590c1759242b9cb6
>  100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> @@ -752,9 +752,8 @@ bool evm_metadata_changed(struct inode *inode, struct 
> inode *metadata_inode)
>       bool ret = false;
>  
>       if (iint) {
> -             ret = (!IS_I_VERSION(metadata_inode) ||
> -                    integrity_inode_attrs_changed(&iint->metadata_inode,
> -                                                  metadata_inode));
> +             ret = integrity_inode_attrs_changed(&iint->metadata_inode,
> +                                                 NULL, metadata_inode);
>               if (ret)
>                       iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
>       }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c 
> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> index 
> c35ea613c9f8d404ba4886e3b736c3bab29d1668..0d8e0a3ebd34b70bb1b4cc995aae5d4adc90a585
>  100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> @@ -254,6 +254,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, 
> struct file *file,
>       int length;
>       void *tmpbuf;
>       u64 i_version = 0;
> +     struct timespec64 ctime = {0};
>  
>       /*
>        * Always collect the modsig, because IMA might have already collected
> @@ -272,10 +273,15 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache 
> *iint, struct file *file,
>        * to an initial measurement/appraisal/audit, but was modified to
>        * assume the file changed.
>        */
> -     result = vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat, STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE,
> +     result = vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat,
> +                                STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE | STATX_CTIME,
>                                  AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT);
> -     if (!result && (stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE))
> -             i_version = stat.change_cookie;
> +     if (!result) {
> +             if (stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE)
> +                     i_version = stat.change_cookie;
> +             if (stat.result_mask & STATX_CTIME)
> +                     ctime = stat.ctime;
> +     }
>       hash.hdr.algo = algo;
>       hash.hdr.length = hash_digest_size[algo];
>  
> @@ -305,11 +311,13 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache 
> *iint, struct file *file,
>  
>       iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
>       memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
> -     if (real_inode == inode)
> +     if (real_inode == inode) {
>               iint->real_inode.version = i_version;
> -     else
> +             iint->real_inode.ctime = ctime;
> +     } else {
>               integrity_inode_attrs_store(&iint->real_inode, i_version,
> -                                         real_inode);
> +                                         ctime, real_inode);
> +     }
>  
>       /* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */
>       if (!result)
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c 
> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 
> 5770cf691912aa912fc65280c59f5baac35dd725..54b638663c9743d39e5fb65711dbd9698b38e39b
>  100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -22,12 +22,14 @@
>  #include <linux/mount.h>
>  #include <linux/mman.h>
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/stat.h>
>  #include <linux/xattr.h>
>  #include <linux/ima.h>
>  #include <linux/fs.h>
>  #include <linux/iversion.h>
>  #include <linux/evm.h>
>  #include <linux/crash_dump.h>
> +#include <linux/time64.h>
>  
>  #include "ima.h"
>  
> @@ -199,10 +201,13 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache 
> *iint,
>                                           &iint->atomic_flags);
>               if ((iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) ||
>                   vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat,
> -                                   STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE,
> -                                   AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT) ||
> -                 !(stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE) ||
> -                 stat.change_cookie != iint->real_inode.version) {
> +                         STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE | STATX_CTIME,
> +                         AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT) ||
> +                 ((stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE) ?
> +                   stat.change_cookie != iint->real_inode.version :
> +                   (!(stat.result_mask & STATX_CTIME) ||
> +                     !timespec64_equal(&stat.ctime,
> +                                       &iint->real_inode.ctime)))) {
>                       iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
>                       iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
>                       if (update)
> @@ -328,9 +333,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const 
> struct cred *cred,
>       real_inode = d_real_inode(file_dentry(file));
>       if (real_inode != inode &&
>           (action & IMA_DO_MASK) && (iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK)) {
> -             if (!IS_I_VERSION(real_inode) ||
> -                 integrity_inode_attrs_changed(&iint->real_inode,
> -                                               real_inode)) {
> +             if (integrity_inode_attrs_changed(&iint->real_inode,
> +                                               file, real_inode)) {
>                       iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
>                       iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
>               }
> 
> ---
> base-commit: 8f0b4cce4481fb22653697cced8d0d04027cb1e8
> change-id: 20251212-xfs-ima-fixup-931780a62c2c
> 
> Best regards,


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