Forgot to mention: I realize my motivation is very specific to Chrome
OS, however the nolinks option seemed useful also as a mitigation to
generic privilege escalation symlink attacks, for cases where
disabling symlinks/hardlinks is acceptable.
On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 5:50 PM, Mattias Nissler <mniss...@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 5:00 PM, Al Viro <v...@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
>> On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 03:55:15PM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
>> > > Setting the "nolinks" mount option helps prevent privileged writers
>> > > from modifying files unintentionally in case there is an unexpected
>> > > link along the accessed path. The "nolinks" option is thus useful as a
>> > > defensive measure against persistent exploits (i.e. a system getting
>> > > re-exploited after a reboot) for systems that employ a read-only or
>> > > dm-verity-protected rootfs. These systems prevent non-legit binaries
>> > > from running after reboot. However, legit code typically still reads
>> > > from and writes to a writable file system previously under full
>> > > control of the attacker, who can place symlinks to trick file writes
>> > > after reboot to target a file of their choice. "nolinks" fundamentally
>> > > prevents this.
>> > Which parts of the tree would be on that "protected" rootfs and which would
>> > you mount with that option? Description above is rather vague and I'm
>> > not convinced that it actually buys you anything. Details, please...
> Apologies for the vague description, I'm happy to explain in detail.
> In case of Chrome OS, we have all binaries on a dm-verity rootfs, so
> an attacker can't modify any binaries. After reboot, everything except
> the rootfs is mounted noexec, so there's no way to re-gain code
> execution after reboot by modifying existing binaries or dropping new
> We've seen multiple exploits now where the attacker worked around
> these limitations in two steps:
> 1. Before reboot, the attacker sets up symlinks on the writeable file
> system (called "stateful" file system), which are later accessed by
> legit boot code (such as init scripts) after reboot. For example, an
> init script that copies file A to B can be abused by an attacker by
> symlinking or hardlinking B to a location C of their choice, and
> placing desired data to be written to C in A. That gives the attacker
> a primitive to write data of their choice to a path of their choice
> after reboot. Note that this primitive may target locations _outside_
> the stateful file system the attacker previously had control of.
> Particularly of interest are targets on /sys, but also tmpfs on /run
> 2. The second step for a successful attack is finding some legit code
> invoked in the boot flow that has a vulnerability exploitable by
> feeding it unexpected data. As an example, there are Linux userspace
> utilities that read config from /run which may contain shell commands
> the the utility executes, through which the attacker can gain code
> execution again.
> The purpose of the proposed patch is to raise the bar for the first
> step of the attack: Writing arbitrary files after reboot. I'm
> intending to mount the stateful file system with the nolinks option
> (or otherwise prevent symlink traversal). This will help make sure
> that any legit writes taking place during boot in init scripts etc. go
> to the files intended by the developer, and can't be redirected by an
> Does this make more sense to you?
>> PS: what the hell do restrictions on _following_ symlinks have to _creating_
>> hardlinks? I'm trying to imagine a threat model where both would apply or
>> anything else beyond the word "link" they would have in common...
> The restriction is not on _creating_ hard links, but _opening_
> hardlinks. The commonality is in the confusion between the file you're
> meaning to write vs. the file you actually end up writing to, which
> stems from the fact that as things stand a file can be accessible on
> other paths than its canonical one. For Chrome OS, I'd like to get to
> a point where most privileged code can only access a file via its
> canonical name (bind mounts are an OK exception as they're not
> persistent, so out of reach for manipulation).
>> The one you've described above might have something to do with the first
>> one (modulo missing description of the setup you have in mind), but it
>> clearly has nothing to do with the second - attackers could've created
>> whatever they wanted while the fs had been under their control, after all.
>> Doesn't make sense...