Attempt to revive discussions below...
On Wed, Jul 27, 2016 at 07:45:46AM -0700, Jeff Vander Stoep wrote:
> When kernel.perf_event_paranoid is set to 3 (or greater), disallow
> all access to performance events by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> This new level of restriction is intended to reduce the attack
> surface of the kernel. Perf is a valuable tool for developers but
> is generally unnecessary and unused on production systems. Perf may
> open up an attack vector to vulnerable device-specific drivers as
> recently demonstrated in CVE-2016-0805, CVE-2016-0819,
> CVE-2016-0843, CVE-2016-3768, and CVE-2016-3843. This new level of
> restriction allows for a safe default to be set on production systems
> while leaving a simple means for developers to grant access .
> This feature is derived from CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PERF_HARDEN by Brad
> Spengler. It is based on a patch by Ben Hutchings . Ben's patches
> have been modified and split up to address on-list feedback.
> kernel.perf_event_paranoid=3 is the default on both Debian  and
> Android .
While people weren't particularly happy with this global toggle
approach, my understanding from face-to-face discussions at LSS2016 was
that people were happy with a more scoped restriction (e.g. using
capabilities or some other access control mechanism), but no-one had the
time to work on that.
Does that match everyone's understanding, or am I mistaken?
It's also my understanding that for Android, perf_event_paranoid is
lowered when the user enables developer mode (rather than only when an
external debugger is attached); is that correct?