On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 8:01 PM, Tycho Andersen <ty...@tycho.ws> wrote:
> Hi Andy,
> On Sun, Feb 04, 2018 at 05:36:33PM +0000, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> > The actual implementation of this is fairly small, although getting the
>> > synchronization right was/is slightly complex. Also worth noting that there
>> > is one race still present:
>> > 1. a task does a SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF
>> > 2. the userspace handler reads this notification
>> > 3. the task dies
>> > 4. a new task with the same pid starts
>> > 5. this new task does a SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF, gets the same cookie id
>> > that the previous one did
>> > 6. the userspace handler writes a response
>> I'm slightly confused. I thought the id was never reused for a given
>> struct seccomp_filter. (Also, shouldn't the id be u64, not u32?)
> Well, what happens when u32/64 overflows? Eventually it will wrap.
I think we can safely assume that u64 won't overflow. Even if we
processed one user return notification on a given seccomp_filter every
nanosecond (which would be insanely fast), that's 584 years.
>> On very quick reading, I have a question. What happens if a process
>> has two seccomp_filters attached, one of them returns
>> SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF, and the *other* one has a listener?
> Good question, in seccomp_run_filters(), the first (lowest, last
> applied) filter who returns SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF is the one that
> gets the notification and the other receives nothing.
> I don't really have any reason to prefer this behavior, it's just what
> happened without much thought.
Hmm. This won't nest right. Maybe we should just disallow a
user-notification-using filter from being applied if there is already
one in the stack. Then, if anyone cares about making these things
nest right, they can fix it.