* Andy Lutomirski <l...@amacapital.net> wrote:
>
>
> > On Feb 5, 2018, at 3:42 AM, Ingo Molnar <mi...@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> >
> > * Dan Williams <dan.j.willi...@intel.com> wrote:
> >
> >> + /*
> >> + * Sanitize extra registers of values that a speculation attack
> >> + * might want to exploit. In the CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=y case,
> >> + * the expectation is that %ebp will be clobbered before it
> >> + * could be used.
> >> + */
> >> + .macro CLEAR_EXTRA_REGS_NOSPEC
> >> + xorq %r15, %r15
> >> + xorq %r14, %r14
> >> + xorq %r13, %r13
> >> + xorq %r12, %r12
> >> + xorl %ebx, %ebx
> >> +#ifndef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
> >> + xorl %ebp, %ebp
> >> +#endif
> >> + .endm
> >
> > Yeah, so this series look pretty good to me, but there's one small detail:
> > I think
> > RBP should be cleared unconditionally here, even in the
> > CONFIG_FRAME_POINTERS=y
> > case, because:
>
> ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER should take care of rbp, though.
AFAICS there's various entry paths where it's not used I think: for example the
compat system calls in entry_64_compat.S don't seem to encode RBP in such a
fashion (unless I missed some macro side effect).
Basically I'd iterate these things the following way:
- where there's justified, demonstrable doubt we should be clearing input
values
in a simple, robust fashion (as it seems to be in this particular case)
- then we can micro-optimize again when we are convinced that it's safe
Otherwise I'm worried about the speed with which we converge to Spectre
correctness.
Thanks,
Ingo
