In subsequent patches we're going to expose ptrauth to the host kernel
and userspace, but things are a bit trickier for guest kernels. For the
time being, let's hide ptrauth from KVM guests.

Regardless of how well-behaved the guest kernel is, guest userspace
could attempt to use ptrauth instructions, triggering a trap to EL2,
resulting in noise from kvm_handle_unknown_ec(). So let's write up a
handler for the PAC trap, which silently injects an UNDEF into the
guest, as if the feature were really missing.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <[email protected]>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c    |  9 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
index e5e741bfffe1..5114ad691eae 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
@@ -173,6 +173,23 @@ static int handle_sve(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct 
kvm_run *run)
        return 1;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Guest usage of a ptrauth instruction (which the guest EL1 did not turn into
+ * a NOP), or guest EL1 access to a ptrauth register.
+ */
+static int kvm_handle_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
+{
+       /*
+        * We don't currently suport ptrauth in a guest, and we mask the ID
+        * registers to prevent well-behaved guests from trying to make use of
+        * it.
+        *
+        * Inject an UNDEF, as if the feature really isn't present.
+        */
+       kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
+       return 1;
+}
+
 static exit_handle_fn arm_exit_handlers[] = {
        [0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX]  = kvm_handle_unknown_ec,
        [ESR_ELx_EC_WFx]        = kvm_handle_wfx,
@@ -195,6 +212,7 @@ static exit_handle_fn arm_exit_handlers[] = {
        [ESR_ELx_EC_BKPT32]     = kvm_handle_guest_debug,
        [ESR_ELx_EC_BRK64]      = kvm_handle_guest_debug,
        [ESR_ELx_EC_FP_ASIMD]   = handle_no_fpsimd,
+       [ESR_ELx_EC_PAC]        = kvm_handle_ptrauth,
 };
 
 static exit_handle_fn kvm_get_exit_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
index 806b0b126a64..eee399c35e84 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
@@ -1000,6 +1000,15 @@ static u64 read_id_reg(struct sys_reg_desc const *r, 
bool raz)
                                    task_pid_nr(current));
 
                val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT);
+       } else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1) {
+               const u64 ptrauth_mask = (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT) |
+                                        (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT) |
+                                        (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_SHIFT) |
+                                        (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_SHIFT);
+               if (val & ptrauth_mask)
+                       pr_err_once("kvm [%i]: ptrauth unsupported for guests, 
suppressing\n",
+                                       task_pid_nr(current));
+               val &= ~ptrauth_mask;
        } else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1) {
                if (val & (0xfUL << ID_AA64MMFR1_LOR_SHIFT))
                        pr_err_once("kvm [%i]: LORegions unsupported for 
guests, suppressing\n",
-- 
2.11.0

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