3.16.57-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>

commit 20ffa1caecca4db8f79fe665acdeaa5af815a24d upstream.

Expose indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() for use in subsequent patches.

[ tglx: Add IBPB status to spectre_v2 sysfs file ]

Co-developed-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: 
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Renumber the feature bit
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h    |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 13 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           | 10 +++++++++-
 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -189,6 +189,8 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE (7*32+10) /* Effectively INVPCID && 
CR4.PCIDE=1 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW  (7*32+11) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
 
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB       (7*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier 
enabled*/
+
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE  (7*32+29) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation 
for Spectre variant 2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD (7*32+30) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for 
Spectre variant 2 */
 /* Because the ALTERNATIVE scheme is for members of the X86_FEATURE club... */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -194,5 +194,18 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
 #endif
 }
 
+static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
+{
+       asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("",
+                                "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t"
+                                "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t"
+                                "movl $0, %%edx\n\t"
+                                "wrmsr",
+                                X86_FEATURE_IBPB)
+                    : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD),
+                        [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB)
+                    : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory");
+}
+
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -358,6 +358,13 @@ retpoline_auto:
                setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
                pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n");
        }
+
+       /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
+       if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
+           boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD)) {
+               setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
+               pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
+       }
 }
 
 #undef pr_fmt
@@ -387,7 +394,8 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
                return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 
-       return sprintf(buf, "%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+       return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+                      boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ? ", IPBP" : "",
                       spectre_v2_module_string());
 }
 #endif

Reply via email to