Hi,

On 26.06.2018 18:36, Tvrtko Ursulin wrote:
> From: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>
> 
> To enable per-PMU access controls in a following patch first move all call
> sites of perf_paranoid_kernel() to after the event has been created.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
> Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]>
> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
> Cc: Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: [email protected]
> ---
>  kernel/events/core.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
>  1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> index f490caca9aa4..12de95b0472e 100644
> --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> @@ -10189,10 +10189,6 @@ static int perf_copy_attr(struct perf_event_attr 
> __user *uattr,
>                        */
>                       attr->branch_sample_type = mask;
>               }
> -             /* privileged levels capture (kernel, hv): check permissions */
> -             if ((mask & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PERM_PLM)
> -                 && perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> -                     return -EACCES;
>       }
>  
>       if (attr->sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER) {
> @@ -10409,11 +10405,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
>       if (err)
>               return err;
>  
> -     if (!attr.exclude_kernel) {
> -             if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> -                     return -EACCES;
> -     }
> -
>       if (attr.namespaces) {
>               if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>                       return -EACCES;
> @@ -10427,11 +10418,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
>                       return -EINVAL;
>       }
>  
> -     /* Only privileged users can get physical addresses */
> -     if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR) &&
> -         perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> -             return -EACCES;
> -
>       /*
>        * In cgroup mode, the pid argument is used to pass the fd
>        * opened to the cgroup directory in cgroupfs. The cpu argument
> @@ -10501,6 +10487,28 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
>               goto err_cred;
>       }
>  
> +     if (!attr.exclude_kernel) {
> +             if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
> +                     err = -EACCES;

I would separate this combined permissions check into a function e.g.
static bool perf_test_pmu_paranoid(const struct pmu *pmu, int *err) to avoid 
code duplication.

> +                     goto err_alloc;
> +             }
> +     }
> +
> +     /* Only privileged users can get physical addresses */
> +     if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR) &&
> +         perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
> +             err = -EACCES;
> +             goto err_alloc;
> +     }
> +
> +     /* privileged levels capture (kernel, hv): check permissions */
> +     if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_STACK) &&
> +         (attr.branch_sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PERM_PLM) &&
> +         perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
> +             err = -EACCES;
> +             goto err_alloc;
> +     }
> +
>       if (is_sampling_event(event)) {
>               if (event->pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_INTERRUPT) {
>                       err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> 

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