From: Andy Lutomirski <l...@kernel.org>

This is temporary.  It will allow the next few patches to be tested
incrementally.

Setting unsafe_fsgsbase is a root hole.  Don't do it.

[ chang: Minor fix. Add the TAINT_INSECURE flag. ]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <l...@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok....@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <a...@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <h...@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mi...@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.han...@linux.intel.com>
---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  | 27 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt 
b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index ea8095521085..dfc2023b796b 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2729,6 +2729,9 @@
        no5lvl          [X86-64] Disable 5-level paging mode. Forces
                        kernel to use 4-level paging instead.
 
+       unsafe_fsgsbase [X86] Allow FSGSBASE instructions.  This will be
+                       replaced with a  nofsgsbase flag.
+
        no_console_suspend
                        [HW] Never suspend the console
                        Disable suspending of consoles during suspend and
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 660d0b22e962..6c54e6d2fdfb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -365,6 +365,25 @@ static __always_inline void setup_umip(struct cpuinfo_x86 
*c)
        cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Temporary hack: FSGSBASE is unsafe until a few kernel code paths are
+ * updated. This allows us to get the kernel ready incrementally. Setting
+ * unsafe_fsgsbase and TAINT_INSECURE flags will allow the series to be
+ * bisected if necessary.
+ *
+ * Once all the pieces are in place, these will go away and be replaced with
+ * a nofsgsbase chicken flag.
+ */
+static bool unsafe_fsgsbase;
+
+static __init int setup_unsafe_fsgsbase(char *arg)
+{
+       unsafe_fsgsbase = true;
+       add_taint(TAINT_INSECURE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+       return 1;
+}
+__setup("unsafe_fsgsbase", setup_unsafe_fsgsbase);
+
 /*
  * Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode.
  */
@@ -1352,6 +1371,14 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
        setup_smap(c);
        setup_umip(c);
 
+       /* Enable FSGSBASE instructions if available. */
+       if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) {
+               if (unsafe_fsgsbase)
+                       cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
+               else
+                       clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE);
+       }
+
        /*
         * The vendor-specific functions might have changed features.
         * Now we do "generic changes."
-- 
2.19.1

Reply via email to