Eric, Am Donnerstag, 14. März 2019, 18:49:14 CET schrieb Eric Biggers: > Hi Richard, > > On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 06:15:59PM +0100, Richard Weinberger wrote: > > Usually fscrypt allows limited access to encrypted files even > > if no key is available. > > Encrypted filenames are shown and based on this names users > > can unlink and move files. > > Actually, fscrypt doesn't allow moving files without the key. It would only > be > possible for cross-renames, i.e. renames with the RENAME_EXCHANGE flag. So > for > consistency with regular renames, fscrypt also forbids cross-renames if the > key > for either the source or destination directory is missing. > > So the main use case for the ciphertext view is *deleting* files. For > example, > deleting a user's home directory after that user has been removed from the > system. Or the system freeing up space by deleting cache files from a user > who > isn't currently logged in.
Right, I somehow thought beside of deleting you can do more. > > > > This is not always what people expect. The fscrypt_key_required mount > > option disables this feature. > > If no key is present all access is denied with the -ENOKEY error code. > > The problem with this mount option is that it allows users to create > undeletable > files. So I'm not really convinced yet this is a good change. And though the > fscrypt_key_required semantics are easier to implement, we'd still have to > support the existing semantics too, thus increasing the maintenance cost. The undeletable-file argument is a good point. Thanks for bringing this up. To get rid of such files root needs to mount without the new mount parameter. ;-\ > > > > The side benefit of this is that we don't need ->d_revalidate(). > > Not having ->d_revalidate() makes an encrypted ubifs usable > > as overlayfs upper directory. > > > > It would be preferable if we could get overlayfs to work without providing a > special mount option. Yes, but let's see what Al finds in his review. > > Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <rich...@nod.at> > > --- > > fs/ubifs/crypto.c | 2 +- > > fs/ubifs/dir.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- > > fs/ubifs/super.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ > > fs/ubifs/ubifs.h | 1 + > > 4 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > > > Shouldn't readlink() honor the mount option too? Hmmm, yes. We need to honor it in ->get_link() too. > > + if (c->fscrypt_key_required && !dir->i_crypt_info) > > + return -ENOKEY; > > + > > How about returning -ENOKEY when trying to open the directory in the first > place, rather than allowing getting to readdir()? That would match the > behavior > of regular files. I'm not sure what the best approach is. We could also do it in ->permission(). Thanks, //richard
