From: yongduan <yongd...@tencent.com>
The code assumes log_num < in_num everywhere, and that is true as long as
in_num is incremented by descriptor iov count, and log_num by 1. However
this breaks if there's a zero sized descriptor.
As a result, if a malicious guest creates a vring desc with desc.len = 0,
it may cause the host kernel to crash by overflowing the log array. This
bug can be triggered during the VM migration.
There's no need to log when desc.len = 0, so just don't increment log_num
in this case.
Fixes: 3a4d5c94e959 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server")
Reviewed-by: Lidong Chen <lidongc...@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: ruippan <ruip...@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: yongduan <yongd...@tencent.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <m...@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhi...@canonical.com>
---
drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
index 5dc174a..36ca2cf 100644
--- a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
@@ -2178,7 +2178,7 @@ static int get_indirect(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq,
/* If this is an input descriptor, increment that count. */
if (access == VHOST_ACCESS_WO) {
*in_num += ret;
- if (unlikely(log)) {
+ if (unlikely(log && ret)) {
log[*log_num].addr = vhost64_to_cpu(vq,
desc.addr);
log[*log_num].len = vhost32_to_cpu(vq,
desc.len);
++*log_num;
@@ -2319,7 +2319,7 @@ int vhost_get_vq_desc(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq,
/* If this is an input descriptor,
* increment that count. */
*in_num += ret;
- if (unlikely(log)) {
+ if (unlikely(log && ret)) {
log[*log_num].addr = vhost64_to_cpu(vq,
desc.addr);
log[*log_num].len = vhost32_to_cpu(vq,
desc.len);
++*log_num;
--
1.8.3.1
