The IMA hook, namely ima_measure_critical_data(), to measure kernel critical data requires a custom IMA policy to be loaded.
Update ima_measure_critical_data() to utilize early boot measurement support to defer processing data if a custom IMA policy is not yet loaded. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 41be4d1d839e..ce0ef310c575 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -885,12 +885,22 @@ int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, const void *buf, int buf_len, bool measure_buf_hash) { + bool queued = false; + if (!event_name || !event_data_source || !buf || !buf_len) return -EINVAL; if (!ima_kernel_data_source_is_supported(event_data_source)) return -EPERM; + if (ima_should_queue_data()) + queued = ima_queue_data(event_name, buf, buf_len, + event_data_source, CRITICAL_DATA, + measure_buf_hash); + + if (queued) + return 0; + return process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name, CRITICAL_DATA, 0, event_data_source, measure_buf_hash); -- 2.28.0
