On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 3:17 PM Mark Salyzyn <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Mark Salyzyn (3):
>   Add flags option to get xattr method paired to __vfs_getxattr
>   overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method
>   overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred
>
> Mark Salyzyn + John Stultz (1):
>   overlayfs: inode_owner_or_capable called during execv
>
> The first three patches address fundamental security issues that should
> be solved regardless of the override_creds=off feature.
>
> The fourth adds the feature depends on these other fixes.
>
> By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the
> recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials.  The incoming accesses are
> checked against the caller's credentials.
>
> If the principles of least privilege are applied for sepolicy, the
> mounter's credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's
> when accessing the overlayfs filesystem.  For example, a file that a
> lower DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the
> generally higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector.
>
> We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all
> subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the
> caller's credentials.  The module boolean parameter and mount option
> override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature",
> existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/overlay_creds
>
> Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <[email protected]>
> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
> Cc: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>
> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
> Cc: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
> Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
> Cc: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
> Cc: John Stultz <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: [email protected]
> To: [email protected]
> To: [email protected]
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: [email protected]

The SELinux list should also be CC'd on these patches.  For those who
may just be seeing this, the lore link is below:

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/T/#t

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

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