On 3/23/2026 10:28 PM, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
On Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 11:52:34AM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
On Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 11:01:31AM -0400, Omar Elghoul wrote:
Hi,

I've been testing linux-next (tags later than 03/17) and hit new issues in
virtio-net on s390x. I bisected the issue, and I found this patch to be the
first buggy commit.

The issue seems to only be reproducible when running in Secure Execution.
Tested in a KVM guest, the virtio-net performance appears greatly reduced,
and the dmesg output shows many instances of the following error messages.

Partial relevant logs
=====================
[   49.332028] macvtap0: bad gso: type: 0, size: 0, flags 1 tunnel 0 tnl csum 0
[   74.365668] macvtap0: bad gso: type: 2e, size: 27948, flags 0 tunnel 0 tnl 
csum 0
[  403.302168] macvtap0: bad csum: flags: 2, gso_type: 23 rx_tnl_csum 0
[  403.302271] macvtap0: bad csum: flags: 2, gso_type: e0 rx_tnl_csum 0
[  403.302279] macvtap0: bad csum: flags: 2, gso_type: e1 rx_tnl_csum 0
[  403.309492] macvtap0: bad csum: flags: 2, gso_type: 4c rx_tnl_csum 0
[  403.317029] macvtap0: bad csum: flags: 2, gso_type: e0 rx_tnl_csum 0

Steps to reproduce
==================
1. Boot a Linux guest implementing this patch under QEMU/KVM (*) with SE
    enabled and a virtio-net-ccw device attached.
2. Run dmesg. The error message is usually already present at boot time,
    but if not, it can be reproduced by creating any network traffic.

(*) This patch was not tested in a non-KVM hypervisor environment.

I've further confirmed that reverting this patch onto its parent commit
resolves the issue. Please let me know if you'd like me to test a fix or if
you would need more information.

Thanks in advance.

Best,
Omar

Well... I am not sure how I missed it. Obvious in hindsight:

static void receive_buf(struct virtnet_info *vi, struct receive_queue *rq,
                         void *buf, unsigned int len, void **ctx,
                         unsigned int *xdp_xmit,
                         struct virtnet_rq_stats *stats)
{
         struct net_device *dev = vi->dev;
         struct sk_buff *skb;
         u8 flags;
if (unlikely(len < vi->hdr_len + ETH_HLEN)) {
                 pr_debug("%s: short packet %i\n", dev->name, len);
                 DEV_STATS_INC(dev, rx_length_errors);
                 virtnet_rq_free_buf(vi, rq, buf);
                 return;
         }
/* About the flags below:
          * 1. Save the flags early, as the XDP program might overwrite them.
          * These flags ensure packets marked as VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID
          * stay valid after XDP processing.
          * 2. XDP doesn't work with partially checksummed packets (refer to
          * virtnet_xdp_set()), so packets marked as
          * VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM get dropped during XDP processing.
          */
if (vi->mergeable_rx_bufs) {
                 flags = ((struct virtio_net_common_hdr *)buf)->hdr.flags;
                 skb = receive_mergeable(dev, vi, rq, buf, ctx, len, xdp_xmit,
                                         stats);
         } else if (vi->big_packets) {
                 void *p = page_address((struct page *)buf);
flags = ((struct virtio_net_common_hdr *)p)->hdr.flags;
                 skb = receive_big(dev, vi, rq, buf, len, stats);
         } else {
                 flags = ((struct virtio_net_common_hdr *)buf)->hdr.flags;
                 skb = receive_small(dev, vi, rq, buf, ctx, len, xdp_xmit, 
stats);
         }


So we are reading the header, before dma sync, which is within
receive_mergeable and friends:

static struct sk_buff *receive_mergeable(struct net_device *dev,
                                          struct virtnet_info *vi,
                                          struct receive_queue *rq,
                                          void *buf,
                                          void *ctx,
                                          unsigned int len,
                                          unsigned int *xdp_xmit,
                                          struct virtnet_rq_stats *stats)
{
         struct virtio_net_hdr_mrg_rxbuf *hdr = buf;
         int num_buf = virtio16_to_cpu(vi->vdev, hdr->num_buffers);
         struct page *page = virt_to_head_page(buf);
         int offset = buf - page_address(page);
         struct sk_buff *head_skb, *curr_skb;
         unsigned int truesize = mergeable_ctx_to_truesize(ctx);
         unsigned int headroom = mergeable_ctx_to_headroom(ctx);
head_skb = NULL; if (rq->use_page_pool_dma)
                 page_pool_dma_sync_for_cpu(rq->page_pool, page, offset, len);

Just as a test, the below should fix it (compiled only), but the real
fix is more complex since we need to be careful to avoid expensive syncing
twice.


diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
index 97035b49bae7..57b4f5954bed 100644
--- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
+++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
@@ -931,9 +931,19 @@ static struct sk_buff *page_to_skb(struct virtnet_info *vi,
static void *virtnet_rq_get_buf(struct receive_queue *rq, u32 *len, void **ctx)
  {
+       void *buf;
+
        BUG_ON(!rq->page_pool);
- return virtqueue_get_buf_ctx(rq->vq, len, ctx);
+       buf = virtqueue_get_buf_ctx(rq->vq, len, ctx);
+       if (buf && rq->use_page_pool_dma && *len) {
+               struct page *page = virt_to_head_page(buf);
+               int offset = buf - page_address(page);
+
+               page_pool_dma_sync_for_cpu(rq->page_pool, page, offset, *len);
+       }
+
+       return buf;
  }
static void virtnet_rq_unmap_free_buf(struct virtqueue *vq, void *buf)




--
MST

or maybe like this:

diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
index 97035b49bae7..835f52651006 100644
--- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
+++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
@@ -1956,13 +1956,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *receive_small(struct net_device 
*dev,
         */
        buf -= VIRTNET_RX_PAD + xdp_headroom;
- if (rq->use_page_pool_dma) {
-               int offset = buf - page_address(page) +
-                            VIRTNET_RX_PAD + xdp_headroom;
-
-               page_pool_dma_sync_for_cpu(rq->page_pool, page, offset, len);
-       }
-
        len -= vi->hdr_len;
        u64_stats_add(&stats->bytes, len);
@@ -2398,9 +2391,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *receive_mergeable(struct net_device *dev, head_skb = NULL; - if (rq->use_page_pool_dma)
-               page_pool_dma_sync_for_cpu(rq->page_pool, page, offset, len);
-
        u64_stats_add(&stats->bytes, len - vi->hdr_len);
if (check_mergeable_len(dev, ctx, len))
@@ -2563,6 +2553,13 @@ static void receive_buf(struct virtnet_info *vi, struct 
receive_queue *rq,
                return;
        }
+ if (rq->use_page_pool_dma) {
+               struct page *page = virt_to_head_page(buf);
+               int offset = buf - page_address(page);
+
+               page_pool_dma_sync_for_cpu(rq->page_pool, page, offset, len);
+       }
+
        /* About the flags below:
         * 1. Save the flags early, as the XDP program might overwrite them.
         * These flags ensure packets marked as VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID


I see the same virtio_net regression introduced by commit 24fbd3967f3f (“virtio_net: add page_pool support for buffer allocation”) on AMD EPYC (KVM/QEMU secure guests with virtio-net), in addition to s390x as in Omar Elghoul’s report [1].

The failure mode matches: broken guest networking until that commit is reverted or worked around.

I built and tested both of Michael Tsirkin’s proposed fixes in this thread [2] [3]; each resolves the issue on my AMD EPYC setup.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ [3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/#t

Tested-by: Srikanth Aithal <[email protected]>



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