llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the
AEAD request as
assoclen += datalen - authlen;
where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen
(4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies
that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A
secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes
datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to
aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so
crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that
only spans the real frame.
The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any
IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is
shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction.
Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault
in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed.
Fixes: 4c14a2fb5d14 ("mac802154: add llsec decryption method")
Cc: [email protected]
Assisted-by: 0sec:multi-model
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>
---
v2 (Breno Leitao review):
- drop the redundant self-Reported-by.
- move the length check above sg_init_one() (datalen/authlen are
already available there).
- Assisted-by trailer -> 0sec:multi-model.
Carrying Simon Horman Reviewed-by; v2 only moves the same check earlier.
net/mac802154/llsec.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/mac802154/llsec.c b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
index 5e7cc11fab3a..85452ef9a58c 100644
--- a/net/mac802154/llsec.c
+++ b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
@@ -891,6 +891,11 @@ llsec_do_decrypt_auth(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct
mac802154_llsec *sec,
data = skb_mac_header(skb) + skb->mac_len;
datalen = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - data;
+ if (datalen < authlen) {
+ kfree_sensitive(req);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
sg_init_one(&sg, skb_mac_header(skb), assoclen + datalen);
if (!(hdr->sec.level & IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC)) {
--
2.43.0
