On Sat, Aug 29, 2026 at 06:39:17PM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
> The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle,
> keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash,
> policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the
> accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure.
> 
> Define a trusted_tpm_options structure and move the TPM-specific fields
> there. Store a pointer to trusted_tpm_options in the private member of
> trusted_key_options.
> 
> No functional change intended.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
> ---
> Changelog:
>  v4:
>   - Rebased onto mainline after tpm-buf memory-safe allocation changes were
>     merged
>   - Resolved the resulting merge conflicts
> 
>  v3:
>   - Exclude the preparatory clean up patch as the problem has been addressed
>     in commit 9ec4175a30eb ("KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature")
> 
>  v2:
>   - Exclude the bug-fix patch as it has already been applied to 6.19-rc7
>   - Rename instances of trusted_tpm_options from tpm_opts to private
>   - Use pr_debug and KERN_DEBUG for logging debug messages (preparatory clean
>     up patch)
>   - Address other minor comments from Jarkko
> 
>  include/keys/trusted-type.h               | 11 ---
>  include/keys/trusted_tpm.h                | 14 ++++
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 96 ++++++++++++++---------
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 50 ++++++------
>  4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> index 9f9940482da4..3db61b57cf73 100644
> --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> @@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload {
>  
>  struct trusted_key_options {
>       uint16_t keytype;
> -     uint32_t keyhandle;
> -     unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
> -     uint32_t blobauth_len;
> -     unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
> -     uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
> -     unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
> -     int pcrlock;
> -     uint32_t hash;
> -     uint32_t policydigest_len;
> -     unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
> -     uint32_t policyhandle;
>       void *private;
>  };
>  
> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> index 3a0fa3bc8454..98d638d13ecb 100644
> --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> @@ -6,6 +6,20 @@
>  
>  extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops;
>  
> +struct trusted_tpm_options {

To be aligned with existing convention a better name would be "trusted_key_tpm".

> +     uint32_t keyhandle;
> +     unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
> +     uint32_t blobauth_len;
> +     unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
> +     uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
> +     unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
> +     int pcrlock;
> +     uint32_t hash;
> +     uint32_t policydigest_len;
> +     unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
> +     uint32_t policyhandle;
> +};
> +
>  int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>                     struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>                     struct trusted_key_options *options);
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c 
> b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> index bf0bf7f36970..14d005e76a1c 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> @@ -48,15 +48,17 @@ enum {
>  #ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
>  static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
>  {
> +     struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private;
> +
>       if (!trusted_debug)
>               return;
>  
>       pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
> -     pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
> -     pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
> -     pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
> +     pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", private->keyhandle);
> +     pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", private->pcrlock);
> +     pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", private->pcrinfo_len);
>       print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> -                          16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
> +                          16, 1, private->pcrinfo, private->pcrinfo_len, 0);
>  }
>  
>  static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
> @@ -626,6 +628,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
>  static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>                   struct trusted_key_options *o)
>  {
> +     struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private;
>       int ret;
>  
>       struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -637,9 +640,10 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>       /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
>       p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
>  
> -     ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
> +     ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth,
>                      p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
> -                    o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
> +                    private->blobauth, private->pcrinfo,
> +                    private->pcrinfo_len);
>       if (ret < 0)
>               pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>  
> @@ -652,6 +656,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>  static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>                     struct trusted_key_options *o)
>  {
> +     struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private;
>       int ret;
>  
>       struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -660,8 +665,8 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>  
>       tpm_buf_init(tb, TPM_BUFSIZE);
>  
> -     ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
> -                      o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
> +     ret = tpm_unseal(tb, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->blob,
> +                      p->blob_len, private->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
>       if (ret < 0)
>               pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>       else
> @@ -697,6 +702,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
>  static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>                     struct trusted_key_options *opt)
>  {
> +     struct trusted_tpm_options *private = opt->private;
>       substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
>       char *p = c;
>       int token;
> @@ -712,7 +718,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload 
> *pay,
>       if (tpm2 < 0)
>               return tpm2;
>  
> -     opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
> +     private->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
>  
>       if (!c)
>               return 0;
> @@ -726,11 +732,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct 
> trusted_key_payload *pay,
>  
>               switch (token) {
>               case Opt_pcrinfo:
> -                     opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
> -                     if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
> +                     private->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
> +                     if (private->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
>                               return -EINVAL;
> -                     res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
> -                                   opt->pcrinfo_len);
> +                     res = hex2bin(private->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
> +                                   private->pcrinfo_len);
>                       if (res < 0)
>                               return -EINVAL;
>                       break;
> @@ -739,12 +745,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct 
> trusted_key_payload *pay,
>                       if (res < 0)
>                               return -EINVAL;
>                       opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
> -                     opt->keyhandle = handle;
> +                     private->keyhandle = handle;
>                       break;
>               case Opt_keyauth:
>                       if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
>                               return -EINVAL;
> -                     res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from,
> +                     res = hex2bin(private->keyauth, args[0].from,
>                                     SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
>                       if (res < 0)
>                               return -EINVAL;
> @@ -755,21 +761,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct 
> trusted_key_payload *pay,
>                        * hex strings.  TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple
>                        * passwords (although it can take a hash as well)
>                        */
> -                     opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
> +                     private->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
>  
> -                     if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
> -                             res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
> +                     if (private->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
> +                             res = hex2bin(private->blobauth, args[0].from,
>                                             TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>                               if (res < 0)
>                                       return -EINVAL;
>  
> -                             opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
> +                             private->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
>                               break;
>                       }
>  
> -                     if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) 
> {
> -                             memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
> -                                    opt->blobauth_len);
> +                     if (tpm2 &&
> +                         private->blobauth_len <=
> +                         sizeof(private->blobauth)) {
> +                             memcpy(private->blobauth, args[0].from,
> +                                    private->blobauth_len);
>                               break;
>                       }
>  
> @@ -787,14 +795,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct 
> trusted_key_payload *pay,
>                       res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
>                       if (res < 0)
>                               return -EINVAL;
> -                     opt->pcrlock = lock;
> +                     private->pcrlock = lock;
>                       break;
>               case Opt_hash:
>                       if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask))
>                               return -EINVAL;
>                       for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
>                               if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) {
> -                                     opt->hash = i;
> +                                     private->hash = i;
>                                       break;
>                               }
>                       }
> @@ -806,14 +814,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct 
> trusted_key_payload *pay,
>                       }
>                       break;
>               case Opt_policydigest:
> -                     digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
> +                     digest_len = hash_digest_size[private->hash];
>                       if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len))
>                               return -EINVAL;
> -                     res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from,
> +                     res = hex2bin(private->policydigest, args[0].from,
>                                     digest_len);
>                       if (res < 0)
>                               return -EINVAL;
> -                     opt->policydigest_len = digest_len;
> +                     private->policydigest_len = digest_len;
>                       break;
>               case Opt_policyhandle:
>                       if (!tpm2)
> @@ -821,7 +829,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload 
> *pay,
>                       res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
>                       if (res < 0)
>                               return -EINVAL;
> -                     opt->policyhandle = handle;
> +                     private->policyhandle = handle;
>                       break;
>               default:
>                       return -EINVAL;
> @@ -832,6 +840,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload 
> *pay,
>  
>  static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
>  {
> +     struct trusted_tpm_options *private;
>       struct trusted_key_options *options;
>       int tpm2;
>  
> @@ -844,14 +853,22 @@ static struct trusted_key_options 
> *trusted_options_alloc(void)
>               /* set any non-zero defaults */
>               options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
>  
> -             if (!tpm2)
> -                     options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
> +             private = kzalloc_obj(*private);
> +             if (!private) {
> +                     kfree_sensitive(options);
> +                     options = NULL;
> +             } else {
> +                     if (!tpm2)
> +                             private->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
> +                     options->private = private;
> +             }
>       }
>       return options;
>  }
>  
>  static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>  {
> +     struct trusted_tpm_options *private = NULL;
>       struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
>       int ret = 0;
>       int tpm2;
> @@ -869,7 +886,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload 
> *p, char *datablob)
>               goto out;
>       dump_options(options);
>  
> -     if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
> +     private = options->private;
> +     if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
>               ret = -EINVAL;
>               goto out;
>       }
> @@ -883,20 +901,23 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload 
> *p, char *datablob)
>               goto out;
>       }
>  
> -     if (options->pcrlock) {
> -             ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
> +     if (private->pcrlock) {
> +             ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock);
>               if (ret < 0) {
>                       pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
>                       goto out;
>               }
>       }
>  out:
> +     if (options)
> +             kfree_sensitive(options->private);
>       kfree_sensitive(options);
>       return ret;
>  }
>  
>  static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>  {
> +     struct trusted_tpm_options *private = NULL;
>       struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
>       int ret = 0;
>       int tpm2;
> @@ -914,7 +935,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload 
> *p, char *datablob)
>               goto out;
>       dump_options(options);
>  
> -     if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
> +     private = options->private;
> +     if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
>               ret = -EINVAL;
>               goto out;
>       }
> @@ -926,14 +948,16 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct 
> trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>       if (ret < 0)
>               pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>  
> -     if (options->pcrlock) {
> -             ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
> +     if (private->pcrlock) {
> +             ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock);
>               if (ret < 0) {
>                       pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
>                       goto out;
>               }
>       }
>  out:
> +     if (options)
> +             kfree_sensitive(options->private);
>       kfree_sensitive(options);
>       return ret;
>  }
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c 
> b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> index 67225dd562a9..07b831b515bb 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload 
> *payload,
>                          struct trusted_key_options *options,
>                          u8 *src, u32 len)
>  {
> +     struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
>       const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
>       u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
>       u8 *work = scratch, *work1;
> @@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload 
> *payload,
>       work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,
>                              asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid));
>  
> -     if (options->blobauth_len == 0) {
> +     if (private->blobauth_len == 0) {
>               unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
>               /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
>               w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
> @@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload 
> *payload,
>               goto err;
>       }
>  
> -     work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
> +     work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, private->keyhandle);
>       work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
>       work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len);
>  
> @@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload 
> *payload,
>                          struct trusted_key_options *options,
>                          u8 **buf)
>  {
> +     struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
>       int ret;
>       struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
>       u8 *blob;
> @@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload 
> *payload,
>               return -ENOMEM;
>  
>       *buf = blob;
> -     options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
> +     private->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
>  
>       memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
>       blob += ctx.priv_len;
> @@ -232,6 +234,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>                     struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>                     struct trusted_key_options *options)
>  {
> +     struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
>       off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
>       struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
>       struct tpm_buf *sized __free(kfree) = NULL;
> @@ -240,11 +243,11 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>       u32 flags;
>       int rc;
>  
> -     hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash);
> +     hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(private->hash);
>       if (hash < 0)
>               return hash;
>  
> -     if (!options->keyhandle)
> +     if (!private->keyhandle)
>               return -EINVAL;
>  
>       rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
> @@ -274,18 +277,18 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>  
>       tpm_buf_init_sized(sized, TPM_BUFSIZE);
>  
> -     rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
> +     rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
>       if (rc)
>               goto out;
>  
>       tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT,
> -                                 options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
> +                                 private->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>  
>       /* sensitive */
> -     tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->blobauth_len);
> +     tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->blobauth_len);
>  
> -     if (options->blobauth_len)
> -             tpm_buf_append(sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
> +     if (private->blobauth_len)
> +             tpm_buf_append(sized, private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);
>  
>       tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, payload->key_len);
>       tpm_buf_append(sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
> @@ -298,14 +301,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>  
>       /* key properties */
>       flags = 0;
> -     flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
> +     flags |= private->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
>       flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | 
> TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
>       tpm_buf_append_u32(sized, flags);
>  
>       /* policy */
> -     tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->policydigest_len);
> -     if (options->policydigest_len)
> -             tpm_buf_append(sized, options->policydigest, 
> options->policydigest_len);
> +     tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->policydigest_len);
> +     if (private->policydigest_len)
> +             tpm_buf_append(sized, private->policydigest,
> +                            private->policydigest_len);
>  
>       /* public parameters */
>       tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
> @@ -376,6 +380,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>                        u32 *blob_handle)
>  {
>       u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
> +     struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
>       struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
>       unsigned int private_len;
>       unsigned int public_len;
> @@ -395,7 +400,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>       }
>  
>       /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
> -     if (!options->keyhandle)
> +     if (!private->keyhandle)
>               return -EINVAL;
>  
>       /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
> @@ -439,11 +444,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>       tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
>       tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
>  
> -     rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
> +     rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
>       if (rc)
>               return rc;
>  
> -     tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, options->keyauth,
> +     tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, private->keyauth,
>                                   TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>  
>       tpm_buf_append(buf, blob, blob_len);
> @@ -483,6 +488,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>                          struct trusted_key_options *options,
>                          u32 blob_handle)
>  {
> +     struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
>       struct tpm_header *head;
>       struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
>       u16 data_len;
> @@ -507,10 +513,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>       if (rc)
>               return rc;
>  
> -     if (!options->policyhandle) {
> +     if (!private->policyhandle) {
>               tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
> -                                         options->blobauth,
> -                                         options->blobauth_len);
> +                                         private->blobauth,
> +                                         private->blobauth_len);
>       } else {
>               /*
>                * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the
> @@ -523,9 +529,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>                * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated
>                * password.
>                */
> -             tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, options->policyhandle,
> +             tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, private->policyhandle,
>                                    NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
> -                                  options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
> +                                  private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);
>               if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
>                       tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
>                                                   NULL, 0);
> -- 
> 2.53.0
> 

BR, Jarkko

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