On Thu, Sep 10, 2026 at 01:38:00AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Thu, Sep 03, 2026 at 04:33:05AM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote: > > The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle, > > keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash, > > policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the > > accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure. > > > > Define struct trusted_key_tpm and move the TPM-specific fields there. Store > > a pointer to it in the private member of struct trusted_key_options. > > > > Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <[email protected]> > > Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]> > > --- > > include/keys/trusted-type.h | 11 -- > > include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 14 +++ > > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 123 ++++++++++++---------- > > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 50 +++++---- > > 4 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h > > index 9f9940482da4..3db61b57cf73 100644 > > --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h > > +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h > > @@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload { > > > > struct trusted_key_options { > > uint16_t keytype; > > - uint32_t keyhandle; > > - unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > > - uint32_t blobauth_len; > > - unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > > - uint32_t pcrinfo_len; > > - unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; > > - int pcrlock; > > - uint32_t hash; > > - uint32_t policydigest_len; > > - unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; > > - uint32_t policyhandle; > > void *private; > > }; > > > > diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h > > index 3a0fa3bc8454..dafbd4a84ddd 100644 > > --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h > > +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h > > @@ -6,6 +6,20 @@ > > > > extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops; > > > > +struct trusted_key_tpm { > > + uint32_t keyhandle; > > + unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > > + uint32_t blobauth_len; > > + unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > > + uint32_t pcrinfo_len; > > + unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; > > + int pcrlock; > > + uint32_t hash; > > + uint32_t policydigest_len; > > + unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; > > + uint32_t policyhandle; > > +}; > > + > > int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > > struct trusted_key_options *options); > > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > > b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > > index 9cdfeea800a3..3ec078ca3f97 100644 > > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > > @@ -48,15 +48,17 @@ enum { > > #ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG > > static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) > > { > > + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private; > > + > > if (!trusted_debug) > > return; > > > > pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); > > - pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); > > - pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); > > - pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); > > + pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", private->keyhandle); > > + pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", private->pcrlock); > > + pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", private->pcrinfo_len); > > print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > > - 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); > > + 16, 1, private->pcrinfo, private->pcrinfo_len, 0); > > } > > > > static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) > > @@ -626,6 +628,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, > > static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, > > struct trusted_key_options *o) > > { > > + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private; > > int ret; > > > > struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL); > > @@ -637,9 +640,10 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, > > /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */ > > p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable; > > > > - ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, > > + ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, > > p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len, > > - o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len); > > + private->blobauth, private->pcrinfo, > > + private->pcrinfo_len); > > if (ret < 0) > > pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret); > > > > @@ -652,6 +656,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, > > static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, > > struct trusted_key_options *o) > > { > > + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private; > > int ret; > > > > struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL); > > @@ -660,8 +665,8 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, > > > > tpm_buf_init(tb, TPM_BUFSIZE); > > > > - ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len, > > - o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); > > + ret = tpm_unseal(tb, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->blob, > > + p->blob_len, private->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); > > if (ret < 0) > > pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret); > > else > > @@ -697,6 +702,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { > > static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > > struct trusted_key_options *opt) > > { > > + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = opt->private; > > substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; > > char *p = c; > > int token; > > @@ -712,7 +718,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct > > trusted_key_payload *pay, > > if (tpm2 < 0) > > return tpm2; > > > > - opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; > > + private->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; > > > > if (!c) > > return 0; > > @@ -726,11 +732,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct > > trusted_key_payload *pay, > > > > switch (token) { > > case Opt_pcrinfo: > > - opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2; > > - if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE) > > + private->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2; > > + if (private->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE) > > return -EINVAL; > > - res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from, > > - opt->pcrinfo_len); > > + res = hex2bin(private->pcrinfo, args[0].from, > > + private->pcrinfo_len); > > if (res < 0) > > return -EINVAL; > > break; > > @@ -739,12 +745,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct > > trusted_key_payload *pay, > > if (res < 0) > > return -EINVAL; > > opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype; > > - opt->keyhandle = handle; > > + private->keyhandle = handle; > > break; > > case Opt_keyauth: > > if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) > > return -EINVAL; > > - res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from, > > + res = hex2bin(private->keyauth, args[0].from, > > SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); > > if (res < 0) > > return -EINVAL; > > @@ -755,21 +761,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct > > trusted_key_payload *pay, > > * hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple > > * passwords (although it can take a hash as well) > > */ > > - opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); > > + private->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); > > > > - if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { > > - res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, > > + if (private->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { > > + res = hex2bin(private->blobauth, args[0].from, > > TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > > if (res < 0) > > return -EINVAL; > > > > - opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; > > + private->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; > > break; > > } > > > > - if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) > > { > > - memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, > > - opt->blobauth_len); > > + if (tpm2 && > > + private->blobauth_len <= > > + sizeof(private->blobauth)) { > > + memcpy(private->blobauth, args[0].from, > > + private->blobauth_len); > > break; > > } > > > > @@ -787,14 +795,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct > > trusted_key_payload *pay, > > res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock); > > if (res < 0) > > return -EINVAL; > > - opt->pcrlock = lock; > > + private->pcrlock = lock; > > break; > > case Opt_hash: > > if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask)) > > return -EINVAL; > > for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { > > if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { > > - opt->hash = i; > > + private->hash = i; > > break; > > } > > } > > @@ -806,14 +814,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct > > trusted_key_payload *pay, > > } > > break; > > case Opt_policydigest: > > - digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash]; > > + digest_len = hash_digest_size[private->hash]; > > if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len)) > > return -EINVAL; > > - res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from, > > + res = hex2bin(private->policydigest, args[0].from, > > digest_len); > > if (res < 0) > > return -EINVAL; > > - opt->policydigest_len = digest_len; > > + private->policydigest_len = digest_len; > > break; > > case Opt_policyhandle: > > if (!tpm2) > > @@ -821,7 +829,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct > > trusted_key_payload *pay, > > res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); > > if (res < 0) > > return -EINVAL; > > - opt->policyhandle = handle; > > + private->policyhandle = handle; > > break; > > default: > > return -EINVAL; > > @@ -832,6 +840,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct > > trusted_key_payload *pay, > > > > static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) > > { > > + struct trusted_key_tpm *private; > > struct trusted_key_options *options; > > int tpm2; > > > > @@ -844,15 +853,23 @@ static struct trusted_key_options > > *trusted_options_alloc(void) > > /* set any non-zero defaults */ > > options->keytype = SRK_keytype; > > > > - if (!tpm2) > > - options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; > > + private = kzalloc_obj(*private); > > + if (!private) { > > + kfree_sensitive(options); > > + options = NULL; > > + } else { > > + if (!tpm2) > > + private->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; > > + options->private = private; > > + } > > } > > return options; > > } > > > > static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > > { > > - struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; > > + struct trusted_key_options *options __free(kfree_sensitive) = NULL; > > + struct trusted_key_tpm *private __free(kfree_sensitive) = NULL; > > int ret = 0; > > int tpm2; > > > > @@ -864,15 +881,15 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct > > trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > > if (!options) > > return -ENOMEM; > > > > + private = options->private; > > + > > ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options); > > if (ret < 0) > > - goto out; > > + return ret; > > dump_options(options); > > > > - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { > > - ret = -EINVAL; > > - goto out; > > - } > > + if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) > > + return -EINVAL; > > > > if (tpm2) > > ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, p, options); > > @@ -880,24 +897,24 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct > > trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > > ret = key_seal(p, options); > > if (ret < 0) { > > pr_info("key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); > > - goto out; > > + return ret; > > } > > > > - if (options->pcrlock) { > > - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); > > + if (private->pcrlock) { > > + ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock); > > if (ret < 0) { > > pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); > > - goto out; > > + return ret; > > } > > } > > -out: > > - kfree_sensitive(options); > > + > > return ret; > > } > > > > static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char > > *datablob) > > { > > - struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; > > + struct trusted_key_options *options __free(kfree_sensitive) = NULL; > > + struct trusted_key_tpm *private __free(kfree_sensitive) = NULL; > > int ret = 0; > > int tpm2; > > > > @@ -908,16 +925,15 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct > > trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > > options = trusted_options_alloc(); > > if (!options) > > return -ENOMEM; > > + private = options->private; > > > > ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options); > > if (ret < 0) > > - goto out; > > + return ret; > > dump_options(options); > > > > - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { > > - ret = -EINVAL; > > - goto out; > > - } > > + if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) > > + return -EINVAL; > > > > if (tpm2) > > ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, p, options); > > @@ -925,18 +941,17 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct > > trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > > ret = key_unseal(p, options); > > if (ret < 0) { > > pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); > > - goto out; > > + return ret; > > } > > > > - if (options->pcrlock) { > > - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); > > + if (private->pcrlock) { > > + ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock); > > if (ret < 0) { > > pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); > > - goto out; > > + return ret; > > } > > } > > -out: > > - kfree_sensitive(options); > > + > > return ret; > > } > > > > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c > > b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c > > index 67225dd562a9..29da1a3328ef 100644 > > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c > > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c > > @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload > > *payload, > > struct trusted_key_options *options, > > u8 *src, u32 len) > > { > > + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private; > > const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE; > > u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); > > u8 *work = scratch, *work1; > > @@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload > > *payload, > > work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid, > > asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid)); > > > > - if (options->blobauth_len == 0) { > > + if (private->blobauth_len == 0) { > > unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool; > > /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */ > > w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true); > > @@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload > > *payload, > > goto err; > > } > > > > - work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle); > > + work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, private->keyhandle); > > work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len); > > work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len); > > > > @@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload > > *payload, > > struct trusted_key_options *options, > > u8 **buf) > > { > > + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private; > > int ret; > > struct tpm2_key_context ctx; > > u8 *blob; > > @@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload > > *payload, > > return -ENOMEM; > > > > *buf = blob; > > - options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; > > + private->keyhandle = ctx.parent; > > > > memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); > > blob += ctx.priv_len; > > @@ -232,6 +234,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > > struct trusted_key_options *options) > > { > > + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private; > > off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; > > struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL; > > struct tpm_buf *sized __free(kfree) = NULL; > > @@ -240,11 +243,11 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > u32 flags; > > int rc; > > > > - hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash); > > + hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(private->hash); > > if (hash < 0) > > return hash; > > > > - if (!options->keyhandle) > > + if (!private->keyhandle) > > return -EINVAL; > > > > rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); > > @@ -274,18 +277,18 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > > > tpm_buf_init_sized(sized, TPM_BUFSIZE); > > > > - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); > > + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL); > > if (rc) > > goto out; > > > > tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, > > - options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > > + private->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > > > > /* sensitive */ > > - tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->blobauth_len); > > + tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->blobauth_len); > > > > - if (options->blobauth_len) > > - tpm_buf_append(sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); > > + if (private->blobauth_len) > > + tpm_buf_append(sized, private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len); > > > > tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, payload->key_len); > > tpm_buf_append(sized, payload->key, payload->key_len); > > @@ -298,14 +301,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > > > /* key properties */ > > flags = 0; > > - flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH; > > + flags |= private->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH; > > flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | > > TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT); > > tpm_buf_append_u32(sized, flags); > > > > /* policy */ > > - tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->policydigest_len); > > - if (options->policydigest_len) > > - tpm_buf_append(sized, options->policydigest, > > options->policydigest_len); > > + tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->policydigest_len); > > + if (private->policydigest_len) > > + tpm_buf_append(sized, private->policydigest, > > + private->policydigest_len); > > > > /* public parameters */ > > tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, TPM_ALG_NULL); > > @@ -376,6 +380,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > u32 *blob_handle) > > { > > u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL; > > + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private; > > struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL; > > unsigned int private_len; > > unsigned int public_len; > > @@ -395,7 +400,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > } > > > > /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ > > - if (!options->keyhandle) > > + if (!private->keyhandle) > > return -EINVAL; > > > > /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */ > > @@ -439,11 +444,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE); > > tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD); > > > > - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); > > + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL); > > if (rc) > > return rc; > > > > - tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, options->keyauth, > > + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, private->keyauth, > > TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > > > > tpm_buf_append(buf, blob, blob_len); > > @@ -483,6 +488,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > struct trusted_key_options *options, > > u32 blob_handle) > > { > > + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private; > > struct tpm_header *head; > > struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL; > > u16 data_len; > > @@ -507,10 +513,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > if (rc) > > return rc; > > > > - if (!options->policyhandle) { > > + if (!private->policyhandle) { > > tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, > > - options->blobauth, > > - options->blobauth_len); > > + private->blobauth, > > + private->blobauth_len); > > } else { > > /* > > * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the > > @@ -523,9 +529,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated > > * password. > > */ > > - tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, options->policyhandle, > > + tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, private->policyhandle, > > NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0, > > - options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); > > + private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len); > > if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { > > tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, > > NULL, 0); > > -- > > 2.53.0 > > > > Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> > > BR, Jarkko
$ b4 shazam -s -l https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/[email protected]/ Grabbing thread from lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/t.mbox.gz Checking for newer revisions Grabbing search results from lore.kernel.org Added from v8: 2 patches Analyzing 8 messages in the thread Looking for additional code-review trailers on lore.kernel.org Analyzing 1 code-review messages Analyzing 1 code-review messages Will use the latest revision: v8 You can pick other revisions using the -vN flag Checking attestation on all messages, may take a moment... --- ERROR: missing [1/2]! ✓ [PATCH v8 2/2] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into struct trusted_key_tpm ✓ Signed: DKIM/ibm.com (From: [email protected]) + Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] + Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> --- Total patches: 1 --- WARNING: Thread incomplete! Applying: keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into struct trusted_key_tpm Patch failed at 0001 keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into struct trusted_key_tpm error: patch failed: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c:925 error: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c: patch does not apply hint: Use 'git am --show-current-patch=diff' to see the failed patch hint: When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue". hint: If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead. hint: To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort". hint: Disable this message with "git config advice.mergeConflict false" Please send a proper version of the patch set. BR, Jarkko
