Two services share a VIP, one carrying IP_VS_SVC_F_SECURE_TCP. A bare SYN+ACK suffices to test the state machine: the normal service reaches ESTABLISHED, but the secure one stays in SYN_RECV.
Assisted-by: opencode:deepseek-flash Signed-off-by: Adriano Cordova <[email protected]> --- Changes in v2: - send probes with TTL=1 instead of an nft drop, and fix Sashiko comments. Changes in v4: - Check the return value of setsockopt(IP_HDRINCL), sendto() and mnl_socket_bind(), and fail do_add() when IPVS does not reply. - Check inet_pton(), initialize fam and the parsed addresses, and verify the flags attribute length before copying it (Sashiko). .../testing/selftests/net/netfilter/Makefile | 6 + .../selftests/net/netfilter/gen_tcp_probe.c | 158 ++++++++ .../net/netfilter/ipvs_secure_tcp.sh | 153 ++++++++ .../net/netfilter/ipvs_secure_tcp_mln.c | 337 ++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 654 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/net/netfilter/gen_tcp_probe.c create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/net/netfilter/ipvs_secure_tcp.sh create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/net/netfilter/ipvs_secure_tcp_mln.c diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/netfilter/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/net/netfilter/Makefile index df3c20c90f5d..f88bf69cc874 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/netfilter/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/netfilter/Makefile @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ TEST_PROGS := \ conntrack_tcp_unreplied.sh \ conntrack_vrf.sh \ ipvs.sh \ + ipvs_secure_tcp.sh \ nf_conntrack_packetdrill.sh \ nf_nat_edemux.sh \ nft_audit.sh \ @@ -52,6 +53,8 @@ TEST_GEN_FILES = \ connect_close \ conntrack_dump_flush \ conntrack_reverse_clash \ + gen_tcp_probe \ + ipvs_secure_tcp_mln \ nf_queue \ sctp_collision \ udpclash \ @@ -62,6 +65,9 @@ include ../../lib.mk $(OUTPUT)/nf_queue: CFLAGS += $(MNL_CFLAGS) $(OUTPUT)/nf_queue: LDLIBS += $(MNL_LDLIBS) +$(OUTPUT)/ipvs_secure_tcp_mln: CFLAGS += $(MNL_CFLAGS) +$(OUTPUT)/ipvs_secure_tcp_mln: LDLIBS += $(MNL_LDLIBS) + $(OUTPUT)/conntrack_dump_flush: CFLAGS += $(MNL_CFLAGS) $(OUTPUT)/conntrack_dump_flush: LDLIBS += $(MNL_LDLIBS) $(OUTPUT)/udpclash: LDLIBS += -lpthread diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/netfilter/gen_tcp_probe.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/netfilter/gen_tcp_probe.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..185c3b1146dc --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/netfilter/gen_tcp_probe.c @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Send a TCP SYN then a TCP ACK (no SYN-ACK, no data) to the VIP. + * IPVS's TCP state machine only inspects SYN/FIN/ACK/RST bits, so this + * exercises the INPUT-direction state transition: + * + * SYN: NONE -> SYN_RECV + * ACK: SYN_RECV -> ESTABLISHED (tcp_states, normal) + * SYN_RECV -> SYN_RECV (tcp_states_dos, secure_tcp) + * + * A TTL of 1 keeps the packets from reaching the real server: IPVS updates + * the connection state before forwarding, then the packet expires and an + * ICMP time-exceeded is sent back to us. + * + * Requires CAP_NET_RAW. + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <arpa/inet.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <netinet/ip.h> +#include <netinet/tcp.h> +#include <linux/if_ether.h> + +static inline uint16_t csump(const void *data, size_t len) +{ + const uint8_t *p = data; + uint32_t sum = 0; + + while (len > 1) { + uint16_t w; + + memcpy(&w, p, sizeof(w)); + sum += w; + p += 2; + len -= 2; + } + if (len) { + uint16_t w = 0; + + memcpy(&w, p, 1); + sum += w; + } + while (sum >> 16) + sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16); + return ~sum; +} + +static int send_seg(int fd, const struct in_addr *sip, uint16_t sport, + const struct in_addr *dip, uint16_t dport, + uint32_t seq, int syn, int ack) +{ + struct { + struct iphdr ip; + struct tcphdr tcp; + } pkt = { }; + struct iphdr *ip = &pkt.ip; + struct tcphdr *tcp = &pkt.tcp; + struct sockaddr_in dst; + + ip->version = 4; + ip->ihl = 5; + ip->tot_len = htons(sizeof(pkt)); + ip->id = htons((uint16_t)(seq & 0xffff)); + ip->ttl = 1; + ip->protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + ip->saddr = sip->s_addr; + ip->daddr = dip->s_addr; + + tcp->source = sport; + tcp->dest = dport; + tcp->seq = htonl(seq); + tcp->ack_seq = htonl(seq + 1); + tcp->doff = 5; + if (syn) + tcp->syn = 1; + if (ack) + tcp->ack = 1; + tcp->window = htons(1024); + + ip->check = csump(ip, sizeof(struct iphdr)); + /* pseudo header for TCP checksum */ + { + uint8_t ph[12]; + uint8_t tcpbuf[12 + sizeof(struct tcphdr)]; + + memcpy(ph, &ip->saddr, 4); + memcpy(ph + 4, &ip->daddr, 4); + ph[8] = 0; + ph[9] = IPPROTO_TCP; + ph[10] = (sizeof(struct tcphdr) >> 8) & 0xff; + ph[11] = sizeof(struct tcphdr) & 0xff; + + memcpy(tcpbuf, ph, 12); + memcpy(tcpbuf + 12, tcp, sizeof(struct tcphdr)); + tcp->check = csump(tcpbuf, sizeof(tcpbuf)); + } + + memset(&dst, 0, sizeof(dst)); + dst.sin_family = AF_INET; + dst.sin_addr = *dip; + dst.sin_port = dport; + if (sendto(fd, &pkt, sizeof(pkt), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&dst, + sizeof(dst)) < 0) { + perror("sendto"); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + struct in_addr sip = { }, dip = { }; + uint16_t sport, dport; + int fd, one = 1; + uint32_t seq = 0x12345678; + + if (argc != 5) { + fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s <src_ip> <src_port> <dst_ip> <dst_port>\n", + argv[0]); + return 2; + } + if (inet_pton(AF_INET, argv[1], &sip) != 1 || + inet_pton(AF_INET, argv[3], &dip) != 1) { + fprintf(stderr, "bad address\n"); + return 2; + } + sport = htons((uint16_t)atoi(argv[2])); + dport = htons((uint16_t)atoi(argv[4])); + + fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW); + if (fd < 0) { + perror("raw socket"); + return 1; + } + if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_HDRINCL, &one, sizeof(one)) < 0) { + perror("setsockopt"); + close(fd); + return 1; + } + + if (send_seg(fd, &sip, sport, &dip, dport, seq, 1, 0) < 0) { + close(fd); + return 1; + } + usleep(100000); + if (send_seg(fd, &sip, sport, &dip, dport, seq + 1, 0, 1) < 0) { + close(fd); + return 1; + } + + close(fd); + return 0; +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/netfilter/ipvs_secure_tcp.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/netfilter/ipvs_secure_tcp.sh new file mode 100755 index 000000000000..4d250bcbb2cf --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/netfilter/ipvs_secure_tcp.sh @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Runtime test for per-service secure_tcp (IP_VS_SVC_F_SECURE_TCP). +# +# Sets up the same 3-namespace topology as ipvs.sh +# but checks the TCP state machine, not data forwarding. Two +# identical TCP services are added on the same VIP on different ports, +# one is marked secure_tcp, the other is not. For each a bare SYN is +# followed by a bare ACK (no SYN-ACK / no data). IPVS classifies the +# connection from the flag bits: +# * normal service: SYN -> SYN_RECV, ACK -> ESTABLISHED +# * secure_tcp service: SYN -> SYN_RECV, ACK -> SYN_RECV +# This test checks that this is the case via `ipvsadm -Lnc`. +# +# Requires root, netns, ipvsadm, and the built helpers +# ipvs_secure_tcp_mln and gen_tcp_probe. + +source lib.sh + +ret=0 +readonly vip="207.175.44.110" +readonly gip="10.0.0.1" +readonly dip="172.16.0.1" +readonly rip="172.16.0.2" +readonly cip="10.0.0.2" +readonly sip="10.0.0.3" +readonly port_secure=8081 +readonly port_plain=8080 + +GREEN='\033[0;92m' +RED='\033[0;31m' +NC='\033[0m' + +checktool "ipvsadm -v" "run test without ipvsadm" + +setup() { + setup_ns ns0 ns1 ns2 + + ip link add veth01 netns "${ns0}" type veth peer name veth10 netns "${ns1}" + ip link add veth02 netns "${ns0}" type veth peer name veth20 netns "${ns2}" + ip link add veth12 netns "${ns1}" type veth peer name veth21 netns "${ns2}" + + ip netns exec "${ns0}" ip link set veth01 up + ip netns exec "${ns0}" ip link set veth02 up + ip netns exec "${ns0}" ip link add br0 type bridge + ip netns exec "${ns0}" ip link set veth01 master br0 + ip netns exec "${ns0}" ip link set veth02 master br0 + ip netns exec "${ns0}" ip link set br0 up + ip netns exec "${ns0}" ip addr add "${cip}/24" dev br0 + + ip netns exec "${ns1}" ip link set veth10 up + ip netns exec "${ns1}" ip addr add "${gip}/24" dev veth10 + ip netns exec "${ns1}" ip link set veth12 up + ip netns exec "${ns1}" ip addr add "${dip}/24" dev veth12 + ip netns exec "${ns1}" ip link set lo up + ip netns exec "${ns1}" ip addr add "${vip}/32" dev lo:1 + ip netns exec "${ns1}" sysctl -qw net.ipv4.ip_forward=1 + + ip netns exec "${ns2}" ip link set veth20 up + ip netns exec "${ns2}" ip addr add "${sip}/24" dev veth20 + ip netns exec "${ns2}" ip link set veth21 up + ip netns exec "${ns2}" ip addr add "${rip}/24" dev veth21 + + ip netns exec "${ns2}" ip addr add "${vip}/32" dev lo:1 + + ip netns exec "${ns0}" ip route add "${vip}/32" via "${gip}" dev br0 + + # load ipvs, then the rr scheduler (separate calls: modprobe treats + # the second name as a module parameter, not a second module) + ip netns exec "${ns1}" modprobe ip_vs + ip netns exec "${ns1}" modprobe ip_vs_rr + + sleep 1 +} + +cleanup() { + cleanup_all_ns +} + +# State of the connection to the VIP:port, from `ipvsadm -Lnc`. +# Fields: pro expire state source virtual destination +conn_state() { + local vport=$1 + ip netns exec "${ns1}" ipvsadm -Lnc 2>/dev/null | + awk -v vt="${vip}:${vport}" '$5==vt { print $3; exit }' +} + +assert_state() { + local port=$1 want=$2 + local got + got="$(conn_state "$port")" + echo " vip ${vip}:${port}: state=${got:-?}" + if [ "${got:-}" != "$want" ]; then + echo -e "${RED}FAIL${NC}: vip ${vip}:${port} expected state" \ + "${want}, got ${got:-none}" + ret=1 + fi +} + +test_secure() { + local bin probe + + # Register the two services (secure_tcp on the secure port) + bin="$(pwd)/ipvs_secure_tcp_mln" + probe="$(pwd)/gen_tcp_probe" + ip netns exec "${ns1}" "$bin" add "${vip}" "${port_secure}" secure + ip netns exec "${ns1}" "$bin" add "${vip}" "${port_plain}" plain + + # Add a real server to both services. Use NAT (-m): in DR the conn gets + # IP_VS_CONN_F_NOOUTPUT, which makes the client ACK an INPUT_ONLY event + # and even tcp_states_dos promotes to ESTABLISHED, hiding the difference. + ip netns exec "${ns1}" ipvsadm -a -m -t "${vip}:${port_secure}" -r "${rip}:${port_secure}" + ip netns exec "${ns1}" ipvsadm -a -m -t "${vip}:${port_plain}" -r "${rip}:${port_plain}" + + # verify the flag was actually set + local got + got="$(ip netns exec "${ns1}" "$bin" get "${vip}" "${port_secure}")" + echo " secured service reports: ${got}" + echo "${got}" | grep -q "secure_tcp=1" || + { echo -e "${RED}FAIL${NC}: flag not set"; ret=1; } + got="$(ip netns exec "${ns1}" "$bin" get "${vip}" "${port_plain}")" + echo "${got}" | grep -q "secure_tcp=0" || + { echo -e "${RED}FAIL${NC}: flag unexpectedly set"; ret=1; } + + # The probes carry TTL=1, so IPVS updates the connection state and + # then the packet expires before reaching the real server (which + # stays silent, no RST to interfere with the observation). + + # Push SYN then ACK to each service from the client + ip netns exec "${ns0}" "$probe" "${cip}" 40000 "${vip}" "${port_secure}" + ip netns exec "${ns0}" "$probe" "${cip}" 40001 "${vip}" "${port_plain}" + sleep 1 + + echo "Testing per-service secure_tcp..." + echo " --- connection table (ipvsadm -Lnc) ---" + ip netns exec "${ns1}" ipvsadm -Lnc 2>/dev/null + echo " --- end connection table ---" + assert_state "${port_plain}" ESTABLISHED + assert_state "${port_secure}" SYN_RECV +} + +trap cleanup EXIT + +setup +test_secure + +if [ "$ret" -ne 0 ]; then + echo -e "$(basename $0): ${RED}FAIL${NC}" + exit 1 +fi +echo -e "$(basename $0): ${GREEN}PASS${NC}" +exit 0 diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/netfilter/ipvs_secure_tcp_mln.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/netfilter/ipvs_secure_tcp_mln.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..54c6d860addf --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/netfilter/ipvs_secure_tcp_mln.c @@ -0,0 +1,337 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * libmnl helper to set/query the per-service secure_tcp flag + * (IP_VS_SVC_F_SECURE_TCP), which ipvsadm does not expose. + * + * Usage: + * ipvs_secure_tcp_mln add <vip> <port> <secure|plain> + * Create a TCP virtual service (scheduler "rr") with the flag either + * set or not. Add real servers afterwards with: + * ipvsadm -a -t <vip>:<port> -r <rs>:<port> + * ipvs_secure_tcp_mln get <vip> <port> + * Print "secure_tcp=<0|1>" for the service. + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <arpa/inet.h> + +#include <linux/netlink.h> +#include <linux/genetlink.h> +#include <linux/ip_vs.h> + +#include <libmnl/libmnl.h> + +/* Fallback in case the kernel's installed uapi header is older */ +#ifndef IP_VS_SVC_F_SECURE_TCP +#define IP_VS_SVC_F_SECURE_TCP 0x0100 +#endif + +/* 16-byte address storage, matching union nf_inet_addr for AF_INET */ +struct inet_addr16 { + uint8_t all[16]; +}; + +/* ---------------- family resolver ---------------- */ +static int ctrl_attr_cb(const struct nlattr *attr, void *data) +{ + const struct nlattr **tb = data; + int type = mnl_attr_get_type(attr); + + if (mnl_attr_type_valid(attr, CTRL_ATTR_MAX) < 0) + return MNL_CB_ERROR; + if (type == CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID) { + if (mnl_attr_validate(attr, MNL_TYPE_U16) < 0) + return MNL_CB_ERROR; + tb[CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID] = attr; + } + return MNL_CB_OK; +} + +static int ctrl_data_cb(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void *data) +{ + const struct nlattr *tb[CTRL_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { 0 }; + uint16_t *fam = data; + + if (nlh->nlmsg_type != GENL_ID_CTRL) + return MNL_CB_OK; + mnl_attr_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct genlmsghdr), + (mnl_attr_cb_t)ctrl_attr_cb, tb); + if (tb[CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID]) { + *fam = mnl_attr_get_u16(tb[CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID]); + return MNL_CB_STOP; + } + return MNL_CB_OK; +} + +static int resolve_family(const char *name, uint16_t *fam) +{ + struct mnl_socket *nl; + char buf[MNL_SOCKET_BUFFER_SIZE]; + struct nlmsghdr *nlh; + struct genlmsghdr *genl; + int ret; + + *fam = 0; + nl = mnl_socket_open(NETLINK_GENERIC); + if (!nl) + return -errno; + if (mnl_socket_bind(nl, 0, 0) < 0) { + mnl_socket_close(nl); + return -errno; + } + + nlh = mnl_nlmsg_put_header(buf); + genl = mnl_nlmsg_put_extra_header(nlh, sizeof(struct genlmsghdr)); + genl->cmd = CTRL_CMD_GETFAMILY; + genl->version = 1; + nlh->nlmsg_type = GENL_ID_CTRL; + nlh->nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST; + mnl_attr_put_strz(nlh, CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_NAME, name); + + if (mnl_socket_sendto(nl, nlh, nlh->nlmsg_len) < 0) { + mnl_socket_close(nl); + return -errno; + } + do { + ret = mnl_socket_recvfrom(nl, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (ret < 0) { + if (errno == EAGAIN) + continue; + mnl_socket_close(nl); + return -errno; + } + ret = mnl_cb_run(buf, ret, 0, mnl_socket_get_portid(nl), + (mnl_cb_t)ctrl_data_cb, fam); + } while (ret > 0 && *fam == 0); + + mnl_socket_close(nl); + return *fam ? 0 : -ENOENT; +} + +/* ---------------- fill service identifying attrs ---------------- */ +static int fill_service(struct nlmsghdr *nlh, const char *vip, + uint16_t port, int full, int secure) +{ + struct inet_addr16 vaddr = { 0 }; + struct nlattr *nest; + struct ip_vs_flags fl; + int af = AF_INET; + + if (inet_pton(af, vip, vaddr.all) != 1) { + fprintf(stderr, "bad VIP %s\n", vip); + return -EINVAL; + } + + nest = mnl_attr_nest_start(nlh, IPVS_CMD_ATTR_SERVICE); + mnl_attr_put_u16(nlh, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_AF, af); + mnl_attr_put_u16(nlh, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_PROTOCOL, IPPROTO_TCP); + mnl_attr_put(nlh, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_ADDR, sizeof(vaddr), &vaddr); + /* port/be16: port is passed in network order from main() */ + mnl_attr_put_u16(nlh, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_PORT, port); + + if (full) { + mnl_attr_put_strz(nlh, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_SCHED_NAME, "rr"); + memset(&fl, 0, sizeof(fl)); + fl.mask = IP_VS_SVC_F_SECURE_TCP; + if (secure) + fl.flags = IP_VS_SVC_F_SECURE_TCP; + mnl_attr_put(nlh, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_FLAGS, sizeof(fl), &fl); + mnl_attr_put_u32(nlh, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_TIMEOUT, 0); + mnl_attr_put_u32(nlh, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_NETMASK, 0xffffffff); + } + mnl_attr_nest_end(nlh, nest); + return 0; +} + +static int send_cmd(struct mnl_socket *nl, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) +{ + if (mnl_socket_sendto(nl, nlh, nlh->nlmsg_len) < 0) { + perror("sendto"); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* ---------------- get secure flag ---------------- */ +static int svc_attr_cb(const struct nlattr *attr, void *data) +{ + const struct nlattr **tb = data; + int type = mnl_attr_get_type(attr); + + if (mnl_attr_type_valid(attr, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_MAX) < 0) + return MNL_CB_ERROR; + tb[type] = attr; + return MNL_CB_OK; +} + +static int get_cb(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void *data) +{ + const struct nlattr *tb[IPVS_SVC_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { 0 }; + struct ip_vs_flags fl; + int *secure = data; + struct nlattr *nest; + + mnl_attr_for_each(nest, nlh, sizeof(struct genlmsghdr)) { + if (mnl_attr_get_type(nest) == IPVS_CMD_ATTR_SERVICE) + mnl_attr_parse_nested(nest, (mnl_attr_cb_t)svc_attr_cb, tb); + } + if (tb[IPVS_SVC_ATTR_FLAGS] && + mnl_attr_get_payload_len(tb[IPVS_SVC_ATTR_FLAGS]) >= sizeof(fl)) { + memcpy(&fl, mnl_attr_get_payload(tb[IPVS_SVC_ATTR_FLAGS]), + sizeof(fl)); + *secure = !!(fl.flags & IP_VS_SVC_F_SECURE_TCP); + } + return MNL_CB_STOP; +} + +static int do_get(uint16_t fam, const char *vip, uint16_t port) +{ + struct mnl_socket *nl; + char buf[MNL_SOCKET_BUFFER_SIZE]; + struct nlmsghdr *nlh; + struct genlmsghdr *genl; + int ret, secure = -1; + + nl = mnl_socket_open(NETLINK_GENERIC); + if (!nl) + return -errno; + if (mnl_socket_bind(nl, 0, 0) < 0) { + mnl_socket_close(nl); + return -errno; + } + nlh = mnl_nlmsg_put_header(buf); + genl = mnl_nlmsg_put_extra_header(nlh, sizeof(struct genlmsghdr)); + genl->cmd = IPVS_CMD_GET_SERVICE; + genl->version = IPVS_GENL_VERSION; + nlh->nlmsg_type = fam; + nlh->nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST; + ret = fill_service(nlh, vip, port, 0, 0); + if (ret < 0) { + mnl_socket_close(nl); + return ret; + } + if (send_cmd(nl, nlh) < 0) { + mnl_socket_close(nl); + return -1; + } + + ret = mnl_socket_recvfrom(nl, buf, sizeof(buf)); + while (ret >= 0) { + ret = mnl_cb_run(buf, ret, 0, mnl_socket_get_portid(nl), + (mnl_cb_t)get_cb, &secure); + if (ret <= MNL_CB_STOP || secure >= 0) + break; + ret = mnl_socket_recvfrom(nl, buf, sizeof(buf)); + } + mnl_socket_close(nl); + if (secure < 0) + return -ENOENT; + printf("secure_tcp=%d\n", secure); + return 0; +} + +/* ---------------- add service with flag ---------------- */ +static int do_add(uint16_t fam, const char *vip, uint16_t port, int secure) +{ + struct mnl_socket *nl; + char buf[MNL_SOCKET_BUFFER_SIZE]; + struct nlmsghdr *nlh; + struct genlmsghdr *genl; + int ret; + + /* NLM_F_EXCL: fail if the service already exists */ + nlh = mnl_nlmsg_put_header(buf); + genl = mnl_nlmsg_put_extra_header(nlh, sizeof(struct genlmsghdr)); + genl->cmd = IPVS_CMD_NEW_SERVICE; + genl->version = IPVS_GENL_VERSION; + nlh->nlmsg_type = fam; + nlh->nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_ACK | NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL; + ret = fill_service(nlh, vip, port, 1, secure); + if (ret < 0) + return 1; + + nl = mnl_socket_open(NETLINK_GENERIC); + if (!nl) + return 1; + if (mnl_socket_bind(nl, 0, 0) < 0) { + mnl_socket_close(nl); + return 1; + } + if (send_cmd(nl, nlh) < 0) { + mnl_socket_close(nl); + return 1; + } + + /* Read the reply so we can report why a command may have failed */ + for (;;) { + ret = mnl_socket_recvfrom(nl, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (ret <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "no reply from IPVS\n"); + mnl_socket_close(nl); + return 1; + } + ret = mnl_cb_run(buf, ret, 0, mnl_socket_get_portid(nl), + NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0) { + int e = errno; + + fprintf(stderr, "IPVS netlink error: ret=%d errno=%d (%s)\n", + ret, e, strerror(e)); + mnl_socket_close(nl); + return 1; + } + if (ret <= MNL_CB_STOP) + break; + } + mnl_socket_close(nl); + return 0; +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + const char *cmd, *vip; + uint16_t fam = 0; + uint16_t port; + int ret, secure = 0; + + if (argc < 4) { + fprintf(stderr, + "usage: %s add <vip> <port> <secure|plain>\n" + " %s get <vip> <port>\n", argv[0], argv[0]); + return 2; + } + cmd = argv[1]; + vip = argv[2]; + port = (uint16_t)atoi(argv[3]); + port = htons(port); + + ret = resolve_family(IPVS_GENL_NAME, &fam); + if (ret) { + fprintf(stderr, "cannot resolve IPVS genl family: %s\n", + strerror(-ret)); + return 1; + } + + if (strcmp(cmd, "add") == 0) { + if (argc < 5) { + fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s add ... <secure|plain>\n", + argv[0]); + return 2; + } + if (strcmp(argv[4], "secure") == 0) { + secure = 1; + } else if (strcmp(argv[4], "plain") != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "unknown mode %s\n", argv[4]); + return 2; + } + return do_add(fam, vip, port, secure); + } else if (strcmp(cmd, "get") == 0) { + return do_get(fam, vip, port); + } + + fprintf(stderr, "unknown command %s\n", cmd); + return 2; +} -- 2.51.0
